t3) Many psychologists, again, assume the existence of an affective contrast (see AFFEC TION) ; a particular pleasure appears more pleasant if it follows a preceding unpleasantness, and vice versa (Fechner, Hdfi'ding, Lehmann). fhe affective value of a stimulus, however, is not constant, as is its sensation value, but varies with the present state of the organism and the corresponding disposition of consciousness. The `particular' pleasure, then, is not a determinate amount of pleasantness, that may 'seem' to be greater or less according to its affective setting. The pleasure actually aroused may differ within wide limits, while the stimulus remains the same. Moreover, where there is affection, there is also sensation; where there is affective con trast there must also be a 'perceptual contrast,' in the sense just defined of the conditions of the arousal of a contrast-feeling. It is, then, per haps safer to give up the idea of an 'affective contrast' altogether.
(4) Lastly, we must note that, in certain psychological systems (Wuudt, Iliiffding). the
law of contrast figures as a general law of the mental life. Wundt, e.g. speaks of the 'law of psychical contrasts' as one of the three psycho logical laws of relation; all "volitional pro cesses are arranged in groups made up of opposite qualities; . . . these opposites obey in their succession the general law of intensification . through contrast. . . The law is secondarily applied to ideas and their elements." The rejection of this law does not necessarily carry with it the rejection of spatial and affective contrast; though its acceptance would naturally incline us to accept the alleged illustrations of its working.
Consult: Fechner, rorschule der Aesthetik (Leipzig. 18761: Lehmann, Hauptgcsct,:e des menschliehen Gefiihlslebcns (Leipzig, 1S92) ; Wundt, Outlines of Psychology (Leipzig, 189S); Outlines of Psychology (London, 1891) ; Titehener, Experin•ntal Psychology (New York, 1901) ; Wirth, in Zcitschrift fiir Psgehologic, vol. xviII. (Leipzig, 1898).