The object of the artillery attack is to silence all coast forts and batteries commanding the har bor entrance, to put out of action all guns mounted in them, and to destroy all positions flanking the obstructions. It is the preparation for the final assault. The main strength of the defense in this phase of the action will be the coast artillery, and since the enemy, because of his limited supply of ammunition, will probably endeavor to gain the upper hand as rapidly as possible, this artillery will require an energetic, decisive, and rapid service, and should be assisted by the artillery fire of the ships of the defense that may be in the harbor. The targets to be attacked are mainly the large, heavy battle-ships. of which the vital parts are protected by power ful armor. The latter must be destroyed to put the ship out of action, and this is a task set for the heavy guns. The conduct of the coast ar tillery must lie systematic, and hence the com mand of fortified places is under a fortress com mander, under whom are the district commanders, and these again control the group of battery commanders and the search-light stations. The heavier armor of a battle-ship is on her belt, ex tending above and below the water-line. while the deck is but slightly protected. The large calibre, flat-trajectory guns are used for piercing the heavy side armor, and with the new United States explosive D (or another of equal value, Maxi mite), and the delay-action fuse of the Ordnance Department, the destructive effect is expected to be enormous. Howitzer or mortar shells are used for piercing deck armor; rapid-lire guns for firing on unprotected parts and clearing decks and tops.
The naval battle of Santiago clearly illus trated the value of a good artillery, and if such a magnificent action is possible from aboard ship, a far more favorable effect is to lie expected from the laud. But this battle also shows how dangerous it is to neglect fill preparatMus on the part of the coast artillery, and the Spanish coast artillery must bear a large portion of the blame for the sacrifice of C'ervera's fleet. Special at tention must be paid to the equipment of the ob servation stations of the district artillery com manders. Good telescopes and photographs and plans of the enemy's ships must be on hand for immediate use, to enable them to recognize the different ships, and in the group and battery com manders' stations there must be more detailed plans of the ships to determine the projectiles to he used at various ranges. Works are now pub lished giving, in silhouette, the appearance (to the naked eye, at a particular distance) of every important warship.
The inner obstructions consist of lines of mines, sea barrieades, and occasionally also of a subma rine dike. The decisive engagement for the pos session of the harbor will be fought at this bar rier, for which reason it is protected by numerous rapid-fire and torpedo batteries. The reconnais sance of the inner obstructions, and even their partial removal, may be attempted by the enemy during the artillery duel, hence the defender must make constant use of his search-lights to detect such a move. The assailant will first attempt to destroy the inner obstructions by means of tor pedo-boats, then he will try to break them up by artillery fire, and finally be may attempt to land detachments at night to blow them up, or send a drifting mine-destroyer against them. The inner mines are usually within the effeetii-e armor piercing range of the heavy guns, as well as under the fire of the rapid-fire batteries; the former act against the armored ships, the latter against the small and fast torpedo-boats or unarmored ves sels.
The forcing of the entrance is the closing act of the assailant's undertaking, and its object is the final occupation of the disputed harbor. At the bead of the final assault are torpedo-boats which, acting as a patrol, make a fatal attempt to break through the obstructions. These, as well as the torpedo flotilla following them. should be greeted with a hail of projectiles from the rapid-fire guns of the shore batteries. All other coast guns and howitzers should be directed against the battle-ships of the attacking fleet. and should fire especially at the leading ship. As the attacking vessels enter the harbor the fire of the coast guns is concentrated more and more against the vessels following. This artillery battle is continued until each fort in succession is taken by the enemy. The home fleet inclosed in the har loe should now attempt to break through the lines at all hazards, and this can best be done at ,night. Unfo•tified coast regions are subjected to attack by the enemy's fleet, the purpose being either to support the operations of a land army, or to attack a fortified harbor from the land side.
Military history proves that it is by no means easy to capture a well-defended harbor by the means at the disposal of a fleet. The success of Farragut in the Civil War appears to contradict this statement, but it must be remembered that the condition of the navy on the one band, and that of the coast artillery on the other, were at that time more favorable for forcing a harbor than they are to-day. Nevertheless, on many oe eaSi011S, Farragut himself, while attacking a sea coast, called for assistance from the artillery on the land side. Wars are so short nowadays, and decisive battles are sought so quickly in the in terest of the countries concerned, that the cooper ation of a strong land army is now deemed es sential to support the naval attack; indeed, the land attack will generally be the principal one. This was shown to be the ease in the China-Jap anese W ar as well as in the Spanish-American War. The best protection of a seacoast of a country lies in the possession of a powerful navy, but should the latter meet with misfortune the coast must be protected to prevent landings. The defense of the unfortified portions of the coast will be intrusted to a special coast guard corps, strong enough to oppose the enemy at all points with superior forces. To determine what this strength should be. the landing of the Japanese for the purpose of attacking Wei-hai-wei fur nishes some useful data. The army of 27,000 men was landed in thirty-six hours, consequently, with the better means available to-day, about 20, 000 men can be landed in twenty-four hours, hence a coast defense corps of equal strength should be able to appear at the landing-place in that time, and considering the necessary detachments to be left at various points, it will take about 30,000 men to guard the coast between two fortified forts not over a day's cruise apart.
Consult Abbot, Defense of the Seacoast of the United States (New York, 1SSS) ; and Wis ser, Tactics of Coast Defense (Kansas City, 1902). For a description of the ordnance used in modern coast defense, see COAST ARTILLERY and ORDNANCL the historical side of the subject be ing treated under ARTILLERY. The article on FORTIFICATION discusses the history and construc tion of coast defenses, together with the scheme adopted for the defense of the coast of the Unit ed States, and should be read in this connection.