DESIRE (OF. desir, Fr. disir, It. dcsiro, de sidcrio, from Lat. desidcriiim, desire, from de siderarr, to desire). An imperfect volition. In both desire and volition an 'attractive' object or 'end' is set before consciousness; but in desire the individual is unable to attain the 'end.' unable even to attempt to attain it, while in volition he makes an effort to possess the object. lie can hardly say that he is 'baffled' in desire. for that would imply the making of an attempt ; and although the object appears as desirable, it does not appear as a thing to he sought after—at least, not for the moment. The inhibition is an integral part of the situation in which the de sired object is presented. The eentral process in desire is, then, a motive shorn of its power. One may desire an object which has fallen out of reach: but since it is out of reach. one does not 'will' to get it. Only when the means of attain ment conic before the mind, or. at least, when the impossibility of reaching the object escapes the mind, does the volition arise; only then. that is, does one actually endeavor. strive to obtain the object. Until experience teaches that some things are impossible of attainment, the distinction be tween desire and volition does not arise. Thus the infant desires the moon, and at the same time stretches forth his hands to grasp it. Ile may still desire it after he has learned that it is an object in the sky; but lie does not 'will' to pos sess it.
Some psychologists have given the word 'de sire' a wider meaning than that ,just explained. They leave out the element of inhibition or in ability. and assert that whenever an idea pre sents itself as a motive it arouses desire, whether the thing desired e.g. a .limner or an ioleal in moral conolnet—is or is not realized. Under the lir-4 definition. desire is akin to wishing: for the sewntI. it is a particular kind of venation ot.v.i. an appetition, or all 'oonoloon‘or toward.' It is prohatoly better to restrict the term to its narrower meaning, and to retain the element of inhibition. the lack 01 means by the siro-conscioonsne•-. might be changed into the tolition-cunscionsness. Thus vonsideral. a dis section of desire reveal- a strong affective ele m•nt, which may consist in pleasantness or tm loleasantness. The thought of restriction is inherently mipleasant, lout the unpleasantness may be OVCICOnl• hy the agreeable thought of the object. Hver and above the affeet ion and the ideas attended to, there is in desire a complex of organic sensations, and, in ease the desire is sufficiently powerful—as in longing or (oarri ing—a well-marked feeling of effort (q.v.). Con sult: Bain. 11 en I al mud .floral Scie ucc I London, ISS 4) . I urnnn 41 nut .tnItooI Psychology (London, 1.9N1 1. Stout, 11 u two I of Psychology I London. See nix ;