ELEMENTS, tine of the prin cipal problems of psychology is to analyze into their simplest constituent processes the mental complexes (perceptions, ideas. emotions. actions) that occur in every-day experience. These sim plest, unanalyzahle processes are termed the 'ele ments of consciousness.' See CoNsciousNEss.
We must, first of all, get a clear understanding of the elements of mind. (1) There is practical ly universal agreement among experimental psy chologists that the structural elements of mind are two—sensation and nffeetitm (see these terms). All intellectual experiences reduce to c_nsation: all emotional and volitional experi ences are compounds of sensation and affection. l'he mental organism is, so to speak, mode up of these two types of process, as the bodily organ ism is made up, from the anatomical standpoint. of certain forms of cells. Both elements are de termined by analysis and abstraction: neither occurs alone in conscious experience. In the case of affection, the final court of appeal is in trospection; that is simple which self-observation declares to be simple. In the case of sensation there are two possibilities of decision. NVe may regard sensation (a) as a psychological ultimate. or (10 as a psychophysieal ultimate. (See PsYcitoeuYstcs.) Thus, the color 'red' and the temperature quality 'hot' are unanalyzalde in introspection: they are psychologieal sensations. But in psyehophysic: red is the resultant of a chromatic (red) and an achromatic (white or gray) excitatory process, and hot is aroused by simultaneous stimulation of both warm and cold 'shots' neon the skin. Psychophysicall•, there
fore, the color and the heat are fusion qualities— perceptions. not sensations. It is immaterial which of the two 'ultimates' we take as the basis of our reconstruction of mind from the ele ments; hut we must he careful not to confuse therm (2) Psychologists, again. are fairly well agreed upon the question of the principal mental functions. though they differ as to xvhiell of these should he considered elemental. 13rentano posits three ultimate functions—presentation or idea, judgment or belief, and interest or emotion (love and hate). Stout recognizes cognition (inelud. ing, as integral constituents, sentience. simple apprehension. and belief) and volition: this lat ter includes the fundamentally distinct of feeling (being pleased and displeased) and eonation (desire and aversion). Winnlt, on the other hand. regards impulse. a volitional process compounded structurally of sensation and afTee• lion, as the one typical form of mental function from which all the rest are derivative. (3) Im pulse is further, for NVundt. the primordial mani festation of mind. This view is, of course, not shared by those who regard the reflex movement as primitive, and believe that. mind has in some way been superinduced upon unconscious bodily activity. See AcTIoN.
Consult: Stout. Inalytir Psychology (London. 15961; 13rentano, Psyrhologir (Leipzig, 1874 ; Wundt, Ratlines of Eng. bans.
London. I5041; Physio/ogische Psychologic (Leipzig. IS031.