ANTI-COMPACT LAWS. It is the attempt of the underwriters' associations to regulate rates and thus restrict competition which has attracted the most attention. The popular feeling has undoubtedly been that the rate agreements en tered into by nominally competing companies through underwriters' associations have resulted in keeping premium rates illegitimately high. The discussion of the question how far competi tion affords a desirable regulator of rates in the insurance business belongs in the treatment of the general subject of insurance. It is of imme diate interest at triis point to notice the legis lation against rate agreements which several States have enacted in recent years. Such laws are known as anti-compact laws. The earliest one was passed in Ohio in 1SS5. This law pro hibits not only agreements as to the rates to be charged for insuring against loss by fire, but even agreements as to the commissions to be paid to agents for securing business. Similar laws, so far as the control of rates is concerned, are now in force in ten States besides Ohio—viz. Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska (declared unconstitutional by the Unit ed States District Court, but in force pending an appeal), New Hampshire, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. In four other States
—viz. Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri. and Texas— such combinations are specifically included among those prohibited by general anti-trust laws. The anti-vompact movement apparently reached its height in the years 1897-99, no fewer than eight of the fifteen laws in force having been passed during that time. In 1900 only one such law ryas passed, and none in 1901. In 1902 Virginia repealed the law which she had enacted IS99. It is coming to be recognized that the attempt. to prevent rate compacts liy prohibitory legisla tion cannot succeed. owing to the ease with Avhieh secret agreements can be entered into. and it is to he suspected that the condition of reckless underwriting which prevails when compacts are actually abolished may be a worse evil than the relatively high rates maintained by means of the agreements.