There is, however. another view of the nature of emotion — the ,lanies-Lange theory, as it is called—which must be not iced here. Simply stated, the theory is that emotion consists essen tially of organic sensations. "The bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact," wrote James in Isl). our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. . . . The more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful." The hypothesis rests upon three principal arguments: (1) There can be no doubt that "objects do excite bodily changes by a preorgan 'zed media nista" and t hat changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle that the rut ire organism may be Billed a sound ing board" for changes in consciousness. (2) "Every one of the bodily changes . . . is fell acutely or oliseurely, the moment it oecuirs." (3) "If we fancy some strong emotion, and then Iry to abstract from our eonsciousness of it all the feeling of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind." In a later article (191 that by 'excit ing object' lie means the total sitnation; the object as accompanied by it „.e.meialed train of blew, and tinged with agreeableness or disagreeableness. The theory then asserts merely that the 'rank feeling of ex citement,' characteristic of emotion, is mediated by the organic suggestions aroused by our in stinctive reaction upon the situation. Even in this form, however, it can hardly be accepted.
As regards the three arguments alleged above, those who are opposed to the theory point out that the statement in (1) is certainly exaggerat ed, while that in (2) is untrue; by no means every bodily change is felt. As to (3), the or ganic sensations may be invariable concomitants, ingredients, or effects of emotion; they need not, however, be on that account its essential con stituents. Appeal is made by the defenders of the theory to two classes of facts: (a) In patho logical cases, where there is complete organic amesthesia, it is urged, there is also an entire absence of emotion. The opponents reply that such amesthesia is found only where there is also found a very great weakness of the life of idea and judgment. We should therefore expect, on any theory, to find a corresponding weakening of emotion: the appeal is altogether irrelevant. (b) Emotions may be set up by purely physio logical means (by the action of drugs and stimu lants) in which ideas and judgments play no part at all. Palpitation of the heart and feelings of suffocation produce fear; a certain amount of :limbo] produces exhilaration and cheerfulness. But, it may be replied, the palpitation and suf focation are not in themselves terrifying; they terrify because they suggest the idea of death, and the quickening of the blood-circulation and thrills of pleasant warmth that follow the taking of alcohol are not in themselves exhilaration; they bring with them a change in the current of ideation and an altered estimate of new-coming impressions: and it is here, in the changed situa tion, that we must look for the condition of the cheerful emotion. It is clear, then, that "the road to emotion lies always through the line of ideas" (Stumpf). 11\lorcover, it. is pointed out that positive arguments against the theory are at hand: (a) If the 'rank feeling of excitement' is constituted of organic sesations, how is it that we are familiar with these sensations as such; that we can describe them, isolate them by analysis, gauge their intensity, localize them? The sensation of nausea or of strain may he dis cussed as sensation, pure and simple. Under
what circtunstanees does it lose its sense-identity and bec,inn- a 'feeling of excitement'? The theory speaks of an 'instinctive' reaction, and of bodily changes following 'directly' upon the exciting fact. Ilia it brings no evidence to show that this reflex or instinctive mode of arousal can change a Sensation into a feeling of excitement. (b) If the organic sensations are of the essence of emo tion, then the emotive consciousness should evince definite changes in intensity, quality, and tem poral course. according as the organic sensations change in these respects. It does not, for we mint' have an intensiNT' emotion, without marked peripheral reactions; while, e.g. rage and ex treme joy closely resemble eat•li other in their bodily 'expression,' lint are by no means alike in eNperionco.
But those who cannot accept the .fames-Lange theory as an adequate account of the emotive process, nevertheless grant that its formulation has helm, and may yet be. useful in various ways. II lays emphasis upon pertain components of emotion that are too often overlooked, and so in creases the accuracy of our descriptions; it warns us against an undue intellectualism, an over estimation of idea as compared with bare sen tiency; and it suggests a means of settling, or at least helping to settle, the old and vexed ques tion of the classification of the emotions. If we could make a list of the typical situations which the adult man is called upon to face, and could tabulate in detail the bodily sets and braces, the quivers and chokings, wherewith he faces them, we should gain, not a new basi, of classi fication, for that wolild imply acceptance the theory, but at any rate a valuable group of facts to assist us in classification. As for the at tempts that have already been made, their name is legion. Emotions have been classed "as sad or joyous, sthenic or asthenie, natural or acquired, inspired by animate or inanimate things, formal or material, sensuous or ideal, direct or reflective, egoistic or non - egoistic, retrospective, prospec tive, or immediate, organismally or environment ally initiated" (James). It is clear that many of these divisions rest upon a non-psyeholocrieal (i.e. upon a biological, logical, or ethical) basis, and must therefore be rejected by psychology. The best mode of classification at the present time is perhaps that which distinguishes pri marily between qualitative emotions, conditioned upon the quality or character of the emotive situation, and temporal emotions, conditioned upon the temporal aspects of the stimuli compos ing the situation. Joy and sorrow, like and dis like, are emotions of quality; hope and fear, and pleasant and unpleasant surprise, are emotions of time. Within each of these main groups we may further distinguish between objective and subjective forms of a given emotion, the former characterized by emphasis upon the objective situation, the latter by emphasis upon our sub jective attitude to it. Thus. joy and sorrow are subjective, while like and dislike, sympathy and antipathy, attraction and repulsion, are ohjec• tive. Finally, we may mark off various degrees of intensity of a typical emotion, as melancholy and wretchedness, or friendliness, affection, and love.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. James, Principles of PsycholBibliography. James, Principles of Psychol- ogy (New York, 1390) ; Wundt, Outlines of Psy chology. trans. by Judd (London, 1898) ; Human and Animal Psychology, trans. by Creighton and Titchener (London, 1396); Lange, trawl- Ge miithsbewegungem (1S87); Titchener. Outline of Psychology (New York. 1399). See AFFEC TION ; ANGER; FEAR; FEELING; Moon; SENTI