ACCEPTANCE (Lat. acoipere, to receive). The receipt of a thing offered by another with an intention to retain it, indicated by some act sufficient for the purpose. 2 Par sons, Contr. 221. It is necessary that each party should do some act by which he will be bound; 3 B. & Ald. 680.
The element of receipt must enter into every ac ceptance, though receipt does not necessarily mean in this sense some actual manual taking. To this element there must be added an intention to retain. This intention may exist at the time of the receipt, or subsequently ; it may be indicated by words, or acts, or any medium understood by the parties; and an acceptance of goods will be implied from mere detention, in many instances.
An acceptance involves very generally the idea of a receipt in consequence of a previous under taking on the part of the person offering to deliver such a thing as the party accepting is In some man ner bound to receive. It is through this meaning that the term acceptance, as used in reference to bills of exchange, has a relation to the more gen eral use of the term. As distinguished from assent, acceptance would denote receipt of something in compliance with, and satisfactory fulfilment of, a contract to which assent had been previously given, and the word has been held to mean something more than receive; Hall v. Los Angeles County, 74 Cal. 502, 16 Pac. 313. See ASSENT.
tinder the statute of frauds delivery and acceptance are necessary to. complete an oral contract for the sale of goods, in most cases. In such cases it is said the acceptance must be absolute and past recall ; 2 Exch. 290 ; McCulloch v. Ins. Co., 1 Pick. (Mass.) 278; Mahan v. United States, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 146, 21 L. Ed. 307. If an article is found defective, but is retained and used, it is a sufficient acceptance ; Logan v. Apartment House, 3 Misc. Rep. 296, 22 N. Y. Supp. 776. If goods are delivered to a third person by order of the purchaser they are deemed to have been received and accepted by the lat ter through his agent; Schroder v. Hardware Co., 88 Ga. 578, 15 S. E. 327. Where a ver bal contract was made for the sale of goods to be delivered at a specified point where purchaser was to pay freight for the seller, it was held that the acceptance by the car rier and possession of freight after reaching its destination, was not such an acceptance by purchaser as would take it out of the statute; Agnew v. Dumas, 64 Vt. 147, 2:3 Atl. 634. As to how far a right to make fu ture objections invalidates an acceptance, see 3 B. & Ald. 680; 10 Q. B. 111; 6 Exch.
903. See DELIVERY; BAILMENT; SALE.
Of a Dedication. See that title.
Of Bills of Exchange. An engagement to pay the bill in money when due. 4 East 72; Byles, Bills 288.
An acceptance is said to be: Absolute, which is a positive engagement to pay the bill according to its tenor.
Conditional, which is an undertaking to pay the bill on a contingency.
The holder is not bound to receive such an accept ance, hut if he does receive it, must observe its terms ; 4 M. & S. 466; Freeman v. Perot, 2 C. C. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 5,087; Dan. Neg. Inst. 411. For some examples of what do and what do not constitute conditional acceptances, see 6 C. & P. 218 ; 3 C. B. 841 ; Heaverin v. Donnell, 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 245, 45 Am. Dec. 302 ; Campbell v. Pet tengill, 7 Greenl. (Me.) 126, 20 Am. Dec. 349; Swan sey v. Breck, 10 Ala. 633; Bunton v. Ingraham, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 271; Tassey v. Church, 4 W. & S. (Pa.) 346; Cook v. Wolfendale, 105 Mass. 401; Mar shall v. Clary, 44 Ga. 513 ; Ray v. Faulkner, 73 Ill. 469; Stevens v. Power Co., 62 Me. 498 ; Pope v. Huth, 14 Cal. 407; Palmer v. Rice, 36 Neh. 844, 55 N. W. 256; Vanstrum v. Liljengren, 37 Minn. 191, 33 N. W. 555 ; Gerow v. Ride, 29 W. Va. 462, 2 S. E. 104.
Empress or absolute, which is an undertak ing in direct and express terms to pay the bill.
Implied, which is an undertaking to pay the bill inferred from acts of a character which fairly warrant such an inference.
Where one receives certain goods and sells them, knowing that a draft has been drawn on him for their price, the retaining of the proceeds is equiva lent to an acceptance of the draft ; Hall v. Bank, 133 Ill. 234, 24 N. E. 646.
If the payee writes upon a bill of ex change drawn upon him the words "pay able the 15th day of May, 1883," and signs it, it constitutes a qualified acceptance ; Van strum v. Liljengren, 37 Minn. 191, 33 N. W. 555.
Partial, which is one varying from the tenor of the bill.
An acceptance to pay part of the amount for which the bill is drawn, 1 Strange 214; Freeman v. Perot, 2 Wash. C. C. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 5,087; or to pay at a different time, 14 Jur. 806 ; Hatcher v. Stolworth, 25 Miss. 376 ; Molloy, b. 2, c. 10, § 20; or at a different place, 4 M. & S. 462, would be par tial.
Qualified, which is either conditional or partial, and introduces a variation in the sum, time, mode, or place of payment; 1 Dan. Neg. Inst. 414.
Supra protest, which is the acceptance of the bill after protest for non-acceptance by the drawee, for the honor of the drawer or a particular indorser. See AccErTos SUPRA