There can be no adverse possession be tween husband and wife while the marital relation continues to exist ; Bell v. Bell, 37 Ala. 536, 79 Am. Dec. 73 ; Veal v. Robinson, 70 Ga. 809; Hendricks v. Rasson, 53 Mich. 575, 19 N. W. 192.
As against the purchaser at an execution sale subject to dower, the possession of the widow is not adverse; Robinson v. Allison, 124 Ala. 325, 27 South. 461; see .14 Harv. L. Rev. 157.
When the possession of the one party is consistent with the title of the other; as, where the rents of a trust estate were re ceived by a cestui que trust for more than twenty years without any interference of the trustee, it was held not to be adverse to the title of the trustee; 8 East 248. See Poston v. Balch, 69 Mo. 117. When trust property is taken possession of by a trustee, it is the possession of the cestui que trust and cannot be adverse until the trust is dis avowed, to the knowledge of the cestui que trust; Reynolds v. Sumner, 126 Ill. 58, 18 N. E. 334, 1 L. R. A. 327, 9 Am. St. Rep. 523.
When the occupier has acknowledged the claimant's title; as, if a lease be granted for a term, and, after paying the rent for the land during such term, the tenant hold for twenty years without paying rent; his possession will not be adverse. See 1 B. & P. 542 ; 8 B. & C. 717.
The possession of the tenant becomes ad verse where, to the knowledge of the land lord, the tenant disclaims the tenancy, and sets up a title adverse to the landlord; Wil lison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 43, 7 L. Ed. 596, where it was held that the rule that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title during the existence of his lease would not defeat the right of tenant to acquire title by adverse possession, after a repudiation of the tenancy brought home to the landlord. If a tenant disclaims the tenure, and claims in his own right; of which the landlord has notice, the tenancy is terminated and the tenant becomes a trespasser, though the period of the lease has not expired ; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 156, 10 L. Ed.
398; Fusselman v. Worthington, 14 Ill. 145; and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the tenant's disclaimer and the landlord's knowledge of it ; Tillotson v. Doe, 5 Ala. 407, 39 Am. Dec. 330 ; Duke v. Harper, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280, 27 Am. Dec. 462; Farrow's Heirs v. Edmundson, 4 B. Monr. (Ky.) 606, 41 Am. Dec. 250; and if continued will ripen into title; Sherman v. Transp. Co., 31 Vt. 162. There must be a disclaimer by the tenant and hostile posses sion to the landlord's knowledge, or such open and notorious possession as to raise a presumption of notice ; Dothard v. Denson, 72 Ala. 541. See generally Townsend v. Boyd, 217 Pa. 386, 66 Atl. 1099, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1149. And see Jasperson v. Scharni kow, 150 Fed. 571, 80 C. C. A. 373, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178. See LANDLORD AND TENANT ; COLOR OF TITLE.
The title by adverse possession for such a period as is required by statute to bar an action, is a fee-simple title, and is as effect ive as any otherwise acquired ; Cox v. Cox, 17 Wash. L. Rep. 53 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Hasse, 197 U. S. 9, 25 Sup. Ct. 305, 49 L. Ed. 642.
When there has been a severance of the title to the surface and that to the minerals beneath it, adverse possession of the surface will not affect the title to the minerals; Moreland v. Frick Coke Co., 170 Pa. 33, 32. Atl. 634; Lulay v. Barnes, 172 Pa. 331, 34 Atl. 52.
• It is not material that a break in the continuity of possession has been due to outside causes ; Holliday v. Cromwell, 37 Tex. 437; but in such a case it was held that the running of the statute was suspended; Western v. Flanagan, 120 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 531.