The common law recognized a property in dogs ; State v. Sumner, 2 Ind. 377; Chapman v. Decrow, 93 Me. 378, 45 Atl. 295, 74 Am. St. Rep. 357 ; Uhlein v. Comack, 109 Mass. 273; and in the United States it is generally recognized by the law; Fisher v. Badger, 95 Mo. App. 289, 69 S. W. 26; Harrington v. Hall, 6 Pennewill (Del.) 72, 63 Atl. 875 ; Jones v. R. Co., 75 Miss. 970, 23 South. 358; Reed v. Goldneck, 112 Mo. App. 310, 86 S. W. 1104. Such property, however, is held to be of a Peculiar character ; Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536, 28 Am. Rep. 567 ; and of a qualified nature ; Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121, 81 Am. Dec. 175; City df Hagerstown v. Wit mer, 86 Md. 293, 37 Atl. 965, 39 L. R. A. 649. The owner may recover for its wrongful in jury; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 129 Ala. 322, 29 South. 859, 87 Am. St Rep. 64; Chapman v. Decrow, 93 Me. 378, 45 Atl. 295, 74 Am. St. Rep. 357 ; Moore v. Electric Co., 136 N. C. 554, 48 S. E. 822, 67 L. R. A. 470; or its conversion ; Graham v. Smith, 100 Ga. 434, 28 S. E. 225, 40 L. R. A. 503, 62 Am. St. Rep. 323; or unlawful killing; Wheatley v. Harris, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 468, 70 Am. Dec. 258; Smith v. Ry. Co., 79 254, 82 N. W. 577; State v. Coleman, 29 Utah, 417, 82 Pac. 465; Harrington v. Hall, 6 Pen newill (Del.) 72, 63 Atl. 875. At common law it was not larceny to steal a dog; 4 Bls. Com. 235 ; Mullaly v. People, 86 N. Y. 365; State v. Jenkins, 78 N. C. 481; Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 Utah, 245, 30 Pac. 760, 16 L. R. A. 689 (see note in 15 Am. Rep. 356); be cause larceny was a crime punishable by death, and it was thought not fit that a man should die for a dog; Brainard v. Knapp, 9 Misc. 207, 29 N. Y. Supp. 678; but by statute in many of the states it is now made larceny; Corn. v. Depuy, 148 Pa. 201, 23 Atl. 896 ; Pat ton v. State, 93 Ga. 111, 19 S. E. 734, 24 L.
R. A. 732; Johnson v. McConnell, 80 Cal. 545, 22 Pac. 219 ; Harrington v. Miles, 11 Kan. 481, 15 Am. Rep. 355 ; City of Carthage v. Rhodes, 101 Mo. 175, 14 S. W. 181, 9 L. R. A. 352; State v. Mease, 69 Mo. App. 581; Harris v. Eaton, 20 R. I. 84, 37 Atl. 308. There is a conflict of opinion as to whether statutes against taking goods or other prop erty shall be construed to include dogs. In subjecting them to taxation they are there by made the subject of larceny under the generic term personal property or chattel; Cora. v. Hazelwood, 84 Ky. 681, 2 S. W. 489; and see Hurley v. State, 30 Tex. App. 335, 17 S. W. 455, 28 Am. 5t. Rep. 916 ; Mullaly v. People, 86 N. Y. 365; but by Other courts it is held that taxes are not imposed on the theory that they are property, 'but as police regulations ; State v. Doe, 79 Ind. 9, 41 Am. Rep. 599 ; State v. Lymus, 26 Ohio St. 400, 20 4m. Rep. 772.
A statute requiring dogs to be put on the assessment rolls, and limiting any recovery by the owner to the value fixed by himself for the purpose of taxation, is constitutional;• Sentell v. Railroad Co., 166 U. S. 698, 17 Sup.
Ct. 693, 41 L. Ed. 1169. In this case the ani mal was a valuable Newfoundland bitch kept by the owner for breeding purposes and was killed by an electric car. The court held that the statute put a premium upon valuable dogs by giving them a recognized position and permitting the owner to put his own valua tion upon them.
They are embraced in the term "all brute creatures" ; State v. Giles, 125 Ind. 124, 25 N. E. 159; or "animals"; Warner v. Perry, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 337; State v. Coleman, 29 Utah, 417, 82 Pac. 465 ; or "domestic ani mal" ; Shaw v. Craft, 37 Fed. 317 (contra, State v. Harriman, 75 Me. 562, 46 Am. Rep. 423) ; and have been held to be included in the term "chattel"; Com. v. Hazelwood, 84 Ky. 681, 2 S. W. 489; see 40 L. R. A. 503 n.; not within the term "other beasts" ; U. S. v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292 (Gil. 226).
They are not considered as being upon the same plane with horses, cattle, sheep and other domesticated animals (see State v. Harriman, 75 Me. 562), but rather in the category of cats, monkeys,, parrots, singing birds, etc., kept for pleasure. They are peculiar in that they differ among themselves more widely than any other class of animals, and can hardly be said to have a characteris tic common to the entire race. They stand between animals farce naturw, in which, until killed, there is no property, and domestic animals, in which the right of property is complete ; Sentell v. R. Co., 166 U. S. 698, 17 Sup. Ct. 693, 41 L. Ed. 1169.
A dog cannot lawfully be killed merely for trespassing; Marshall v. Blackshire, 44 Ia. 475 ; Brent v. Kimball, 60 Ill. 211, 14 Am. Rep. 35 ; Dinwiddie v. State, 103 Ind. 101, 2 N. E. 290; Bowers v. Horen, 93 Mich. 420, 53 N. W. 535, 17 L. R. A. 773, 32 Am. St. Rep. 513; Fenton v. Bisel, 80 Mo. App. 135 ; but killing a trespassing dog is justifiable if it be necessary to protect one's property ; King v. Kline, 6 Pa. 318; Fisher v. Badger, 95 Mo. App. 289, 69 S. W. 26 ; and where dogs congregated on one's premises at night and by their noise interfered with the rest of a family, shooting among them was justified, as a reasonable and necessary means to pro tect the family from a nuisance ; Hubbard v. 90 Mich. 221, 51 N. W. 209, 15 L. R. A. 249, 30 Am. St. Rep. 426.
The owner of any animal, tame or wild, is liable for the exercise of such dangerous tendencies as generally belong to its nature, but not of any not in accordance with its nature, unless the owner or keeper knew, or ought to have known, of the existence of such dangerous tendency; Whart. Negl. § 923. To recover for damages inflicted by a ferocious dog, it is not necessary actually to prove that it has bitten a person before; L. R. 2 C. P. 1; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 511, 30 Am. Rep. 692; Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54, 22 Am. Rep. 600 ; Rowe v. Ehrmann traut, 92 Minn. 17, 99 N. W. 213.; Barclay v. Hartman, 2 Marv. (Del.) 351, 43 Atl. 174; McConnell v. Lloyd, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 25.