As to substance, the answer must be fall and perfect to all the material allegations of the bill, confessing and avoiding, denying or traversing, all the material parts ; Comyns. Dig. Chauneerg, K, 2 ; Mayer v. Gallucbat, 6 Rich. Eq. ( S. C.) 1; Beall v. Blake, 10 Ga. 449; Shotwell's Adm'r v. Struble, 21 N. J. Eq. 31; 24 Beay. 421 ; not literally merely, but an swering the substance of the charge; Mitt Eq. Pl. 309 ; Grady v. Robinson, 28 Ala. 289; Pitts v. Hooper, 16 Ga. 442 ; Smith v. Loomis, 5 N. J. Eq. 60 ; and see Hogencamp v. Acker man, 10 N. J. Eq. 267; must be responsive; Howell v. Robb, 7 N. J. Eq. 17; Chambers v. Warren, 13 Ill. 318 ; Mann v. Betterly, 21 Vt 326 ; and must state facts, and not arguments, directly and without evasion; Story, Eq. Pl.§ 852 ; Spivey v. Frazee, 7 Ind. 661; Gates v. Adams, 24 Vt. 70 ; Thompson v. Mills, 39 N. C. 390; Gamble & Johnston v. Johnson, 9 Mo. 605 ; without scandal ; Langdon v. Pick ering, 19 Me. 214 ; Burr v. Burton, 18 Ark. 215 ; or impertinence ; Langdon v. Goddard, 3 Sto. 13, Fed. Cas. No. 8,061; 6 Beay. 558; Gier v. Gregg, 4 McL. 202, Fed. Cas. No. 5, 406; donwell v. Claypool,. 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 124. See 10 Sim. 345; 17 Eng. L. & Eq. 509; Saltmarsh v. Bower & Co., 22 Ala. 221; Mc Intyre v. Trustees of Union College, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 239; U. S. v. McLaughlin, 24 Fed. 823; Crammer v. Water Co., 39 N. J. Eq. 76; 6 Ves. 456.
Under the madern English practice the form of the answer has been much simpli fied; 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86, § 17. Under the General Orders of 1852 a form was adopted, though scarcely necessary in view of the absence of all technicality ; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 724; 3 id. 2139. In the United States gener ally the answer has been simplified, but the variations from the old practice consist mainly in dividing the answer into numbered paragraphs, adjusting its general form to the bill as now drawn (see Bus.), and in omitting the clause reserving exceptions (though in practice this is very frequently retained), and the clause denying combina tion, retaining merely, to form an issue on them, a general traverse of all allegations not expressly answered.
A material allegation in a bill, which is neither expressly admitted or denied, is deemed to be controverted ; Glos v. Randolph, 133 Ill. 197, 24 N. E. 426; Yates v. Thomp son, 44 Ill. App. 145.
Insufficiency of answer is a ground for ex ception when some material allegation, charge, or interrogatory is unanswered or not fully answered; West v. Williams, 1 Md. Ch. Dec. 358; Hardeman v. Harris, 7 How. (U. S.) 726, 12 L. Ed. 889; Lea v. Vanbibber, 6 Humphr. (Tenn.) 18. See Lanum v. Steel, 10 Humphr. (Tenn.) 280; McCormick v. Chamberlin, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 543; American Loan & Trust Co. v. R. Co., 40 Fed. 384; 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. 760; Blaisdell v. Stevens, 16 Vt. 179.
Where the defendant in equity suffers a default he does not admit facts not alleged in the bill nor conclusions of the pleader from the facts stated; Cramer v. Bode, 24
Ill. App. 219.
An answer may, in some cases, be amend ed; 2 Bro. C. C. 143; '2 Ves. 85; to correct a mistake of fact ; Ambl. 292; 1 P. Wms. 297; but not of law; Ambl. 65; nor any mistake in a material matter except upon evidence of surprise; Howe v. Russell, 36 Me. 124 ; Smith v. Babcock, 3 Sumn. 583, Fed. Cas. No. 13,008; 1 Bro. C. C. 319; and not, it seems, to the injury of others ;'tort', Eq. Pl. § 904; Bell's Adm'r v. Hall, 5 N. J. Eq. 49. The court may permit an answer to be amended even after the announcement of the decision of the cause; Arnett v. Welch's Ex'rs, 46 N. J. Eq. 543, 20 Atl. 48. A supple mental answer may be filed to introduce new matter; Suydam v. Truesdale, 6 McL. 459, Fed. Cas. No. 13,656; U. S. v. Morris, 7 'Mackey (D. C.) 8; or correct mistakes ; 2 Coll. 133; Graham v. Tankersley, 15 Ala. 634 ; Carey v. Ector, 7 Ga. 99 ; Coquillard v. Suydam, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 24; which is con sidered as forming a part of the original an swer. See DiscovEsx ; Mitf. Eq. Pl. 244, 254.
The effect of an answer must be overcome by two witnesses or by one witness and cor roborating evidence ; but the answer of a corporation is not entitled to the same pro bative force as that of an individual; Langd. Eq. Pl. § 87, citing Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 111, 8 L. Ed. 60; and the rule does not apply where there is a mere denial made for want of knowledge; Blair v. Silver Peak Mines, 93 Fed. 332.
For an historical account, see 2 Brown, Civ. Law 371, n.; Barton, Suit in Eq.; Lang dell's Summary of Equity 41.
By the Equity Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, in effect February 1, 1913 (198 Fed. six; 226 U. S. appendix) every defence to a bill in point of law, which might heretofore have been made by demur rer or plea, shall be made by motion to dis miss or by answer. Defences formerly pre sentable by plea in bar or abatement shall be made in the answer. It shall in short and simple terms set out the defence to each claim in the bill, omitting any mere statement of evidence and avoiding any general denial of the averments of the bill, but specifically admitting or denying or explaining the facts upon which the plaintiff relies, unless defend ant is without knowledge, in which case he shall so state, such statement operating as a denial. It may state as many defences in the alternative, regardless of consistency, as the defendant deems essential. Counter-claims arising out of the transaction must be stated. Any set-off or counter-claim, which might be the subject of any independent equity suit, may be set up without cross-bill.
In Practice. The declaration of a fact by a witness after a question has been put, asking for it.