There is a wide difference between a tax or assessment prescribed by a legislative body, and one imposed by a municipal cor poration. And the difference is still wider between an act making the assessment, and the action of mere functionaries acting un der municipal ordinances ; Parsons v. Dis trict of Columbia, 170 U. S. 52, 18 Sup. Ct.
521, 42 L. Ed. 943, where the legislation in question was that of Congress, and was con sidered in the light of the conclusion that the United States possesses complete juris fiiction both of a political and municipal character. There a comprehensive system regulating the supply of water and the erec tion and maintenance of reservoirs and wa ter mains was established, and of it every property owner of the District of Columbia was presumed to have notice. Accordingly, it was held that, when Congress enacted that thereafter assessments for laying water mains be levied on a front foot basis against all abutting lots, such act- must be deemed conclusive alike of the question of the ne cessity of the work and of its benefits to abutting property, and that a property own er could not be heard to complain that he was not notified of the creation of such a sys tem, or consulted as to the probable cost thereof.
The question of special benefit and the property to which it extends is a question of fact, and when the legislature determines it in a case within its general power, its de cision is final ; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585, 3 N. E. 682. The courts cannot re view its discretion. Where a tax or assess ment is imposed by a direct exercise of the legislative power, calling for no inquiry into the weight of evidence, nor for anything in the nature of judicial examination, no no tice to the owner is required ; Hagar ' v. Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 663, 28 L. Ed. 569. But where an assessment is imposed upon property according to its val ue to be ascertained by assessors upon evi dence, such officers act judicially ; Williams v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 547, 25 L. Ed. 708 ; and notice and opportunity to be heard are nec essary; id.
Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187, 43 L. Ed. 443, was not intended, it is said, to overrule Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270, or Par sons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 18 Sup. Ct. 521, 42 L. Ed. 943, both of these cases being cited in the opinion in the for mer case, and declared not to be inconsist ent with the conclusion there reached. Spe cial facts showing an abuse or disregard of the law, resulting in an actual deprivation of property, may be ground for applying to a court. of equity ; and this was thought by a majority of the Supreme Court to have been the case in Norwood v. Baker, supra, per Shiras, J., in Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 385, 21 Sup. Ct. 616, 45 L. Ed. 900.
The legislative authority in respect to as sessment districts is sometimes exercised by making several districts for a single work, as in case of street improvements, a statute may make each street or part of a street a taxing district ; Hilliard v. City of Ashe ville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738. Where un connected sections of a street were opened, such sections were held separate streets, and the cost of each chargeable on the property benefited; In re Opening One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh St., 68 Hun 158, 22 N. Y. Supp.
604 ; Bacon v. City of Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580. Where a street is of different widths, it may be divided into as many se6 tions as there are different widths, and the property on each section be assessed for the cost thereof ; Findlay v. Frey, 51 Ohio St. 390, 38 N. E. 114. The improvement of sev eral streets may be treated as one work for the purposes of a special assessment and the whole work apportioned by uniform rule throughout one district ; Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 155 ; Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass. 352; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. The legislature may create a city boundary, or designate any other boundary, for a local taxing district, without reference to existing civil or political districts ; and a city, as such a district, may tax property within its limits which it would not be able to tax for municipal purposes only ; Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 90 Ky. 498, 14 S. W. 493 ; or it may create tax districts fat road purposes without regard to the bounda ries of counties, townships, or municipali ties ; Board of Com'rs of Monroe County v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124 ; Street Lighting Dist. No. 1 v. Drummond, 63 N. J. L. 493, 43 Atl. 1061; for the construction and maintenance of a bridge across a river, several towns may be created a bridge and highway district; State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131, 35 . 24, 421, 48 L. R. A. 465.
See Cooley, ion (3d ed.) 238. Taxing districts may numerous as the purpos es for which the taxes are levied ; Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S. W. 1041, 34 L. IL A. 725.
Of Damages. Fixing the amount of dam ages to which the prevailing party in a suit is entitled.
It may be done by the court through its proper officer, the clerk or prothonotary, where the assessment is, a mere matter of calculation, but must be by a jury in other cases. See DAMAGES; MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
In Insurance. An apportionment made in general average upon the various articles and interests at risk, according to their value at the time and place of being in safety, for contribution for damages and sacrifices pur posely made, and expenses incurred for es cape from impending common peril. 2 Ins. c. xv.
It is also made upon premium notes given by the members of mutual fire insurance companies, constituting their capital, and be ing a substitute for the investment of the paid up stock of a stock company ; the lia bility to such assessments being regulated by the charter and the by-laws ; May, Ins. § 549; Herkimer County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Full er, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 374 ; New England Mut. Fire Ina Co. v. Belknap, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 140 ; Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 36 N. H. 252; Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Leavy, 136 Pa, 499, 20 Atl. 502, 505. A member of a mutual insurance company, who has paid something on a premium note, can be assessed for further losses to the face of the note only ; Davis v. Parcher & Stewart Co., 82 Wis. 488, 52 N. W. 771. The right to assess is strictly construed, the notes being merely conditional promises to pay ; Tesson v. Ins. Co., 40 Mo. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 293 ; American Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 19 Ia. 502 ; Devendorf v. Beardsley, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 656; May, Ins. § 557. As to assessments on cor porate stock, see STOLE.