ATTORNEY. One put in the place, turn, or stead of another, to manage his affairs; one who manages the affairs of another by direction of his principal. Spelman, Gloss.; Ternves de (a Ley.
One who acts for another by virtue of an appointment by the latter. Attorneys are of various finds.
Attorney in A person to whom the authority of another, who is called the con stituent, is by him lawfully delegated.
This term is employed to designate persons who act under a special agency, or a special letter of at torney, so that they are appointed in factum, for the deed, or special act to be performed ; but in a more extended sense it includes all other agents employed in any business, or to do any act or acts in pais for another. Bacon, Abr. Attorney; Story, Ag. § 25.
All persons who are capable of acting for themselves, and even those who are disquali fied from acting in their own capacity, if they have sufficient understanding, as in fants, of a proper age, and femes coverts, may act as attorneys of others; Co. Litt. 52 a ; 1. Esp. 142; 2 id. 511.
An officer in a court of justice who is employed by a party in a cause to manage the same for him.
Appearance by an attorney, on behalf of his cli ent, has been allowed in England from the time of the earliest records of the courts of that country. They are mentioned in Glanville, Bracton, Fleta, and Britton; and a case turning upon the party's right to appear by attorney is reported; Y. B. 17 Edw. III. p. 8, case 23. In France such appearances were first allowed by letters patent of Philip le Bel. A. D. 1290 ; 1 Fournel, Hist. des. avocats, 42, 92; 2 Loizel. Coutumes 14. It results from the nature of their functions, and of their duties, as well to the court as to the client, that no one can, even by consent, be the attorney of both the litigating par ties in the same controversy ; Farr. 47. The name of attorney has commonly been applied in this coun try to those who practise in courts of common law; solicitors, in courts of equity; and proctors, in courts of admiralty.
The two branches of the legal profession were distinguished by Lord Brougham in The Serjeant's Case in 1839: "If you appear by attorney, he represents you, but where you have the assistance of an advocate you are present Appearance by an attorney is one thing, but admitting advo cates to plead the cause of another is a to tally different proceeding." The case is re
ported in Manning's Berviens ad Legenv.
As a general rule the eligibility of persons to hold the office of attorney-at-law is settled by local legislation or by rule of court.
The admission of attorneys to practise and their powers, duties and privileges are prop er subjects of legislative control to the same extent and subject to the same limitations, as in the case of any other profession or business; Cook v. De La Guerra, 24 Cal, 241; In re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67. In Robin son's Case, 131 Mass. 376, 41 Am. Rep. 2,39, this was recognized where a woman applied for admission and was rejected because the statute had not so provided, and it was said that the duty of the courts is limited to de claring the law as it is; and whether any change would be expedient is a legislative question. In In re Applicants for License, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288, 10 Ann. Cas. 187, a statute provided that persons possessing certain qualifications should be admitted to the practise of the law. One of these was that such applicant should file with the clerk of the court a cer tificate of good moral character signed by two attorneys of the court Protests against the admission of three applicants were filed on the ground that they were not of good moral character, and it was held that when a statute has prescribed the qualifications for admission, and an applicant is shown to possess these qualifications, the courts must admit him. It was urged that this statute impaired the inherent right of the court to control its officers, but the court, quoting from a dissenting opinion in an Illinois case infra, said that if this is one of the inherent powers of a court, it is just as inherent in one court as another, and so it might come about that the judges of the supreme court and each of the judges of the superior courts might require widely different qualifications.