AUTOMOBILES. A vehicle for the car riage of passengers or freight, propelled by its own motor. It has been held to be a car riage, not a machine ; Baker v. Fall River, 187 Mass. 53, 72 N. E. 336; but by the same court in a later case it was held that a stat ute enacted more than one hundred years ago providing that cities or towns should pay for the repairs of highways so as to make them reasonably safe for travellers with car riages could not be construed reasonably to include a heavy modern automobile; Doherty v. Inhabitants of Ager, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N. E. 677, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816, 125 Am. St. Rep. 355.
The legislature may, under the police pow er, regulate the driving of automobiles and motor cycles and provide for a registration fee, which is a license fee, not a tax; Com, v. Boyd, 188 Mal& 79, 74 N. E. 255, 108 Am. St. Rep. 464 ; see Com. v. Densmore, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 217. A city may, under a charter conferring the power to regulate the use of its highways, enact an ordinance requiring the registering and numbering of automo biles or other motor vehicles and exacting a fee from the owner to pay for the license tag to be furnished by the city; People v. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673, 103 N. W. 172, 69 L. R. A. 345, 5 Ann. Cas. no. It may regu late the speed of automobiles require the use of reasonable safety appliances; City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94. It may prescribe different rates of speed in different parts of the city, according to the width of the streets, their use, and the density of pop ulation ; Chittenden v. Columbus, 26 Ohio C. C. 531. An ordinance limiting speed within certain limits is not invalid because another ordinance permits street cars to run at a greater rate of speed; id. A provision in the charter of a city which empowered it to regulate the use of the streets and the speed of vehicles, and to license and regulate cer tain occupations, was held not to confer power to enact an ordinance requiring one who uses an automobile for his private business and pleasure only to submit to an examination and to be licensed; City of Chicago v. Bank er, 112 Ill. App. 94 ; the ordinance was fur ther held to impose a burden upon one class of citizens not imposed upon others.
There may be a recovery for common law negligence in operating an automobile, al though the use of such vehicles has become a matter of statutory regulation ; Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31, 74 N. E. 1035, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Rep. 196, 3 Ann. Cas.
487. The law does not denounce motor car riages as such on the public ways. So long as they are constructed and propelled in a manner consistent with the proper use of the highways and are calculated to subserve the public as a beneficial means of transporta tion, with reasonable safety to travellers by ordinary modes, they have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads; Gregory v. Slaughter, 124 Ky. 345, 99 S. W. 247, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1228, 124 Am. St. Rep. 402; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 lrid. 465, 74 N. E. 615, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238, 6 Ann. Cas. 656. There is nothing dangerous in their use when care fully managed. Their guidance, speed and noise are all subject to quick and easy regu lation, and under the control of a competent and considerate manager it is as harmless on the road as other vehicles in common use; McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57, 76 N. E. 750, 4 L R. A. (N. S.) 1130, 117 Am. St. Rep. 359, 8 Ann. Cas. 1087. It is the manner of driving the vehicle, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly, its quick response to guidance, its uncontrolled sphere of action, would seem to make the automobile one of the least danger ous of conveyances; Yale L. J. Dec. 1905. Because they are likely to frighten horses is no reason for prohibiting their use. In all human activities the law keeps up with im provement and progress brought about by discovery and invention; and in respect to highways, if the introduction of a new con trivance for transportation purposes, con ducted with due care, is met with inconven ience and even accidental injury to those using ordinary modes, there can be no recov ery, provided the contrivance is compatible with the general use and safety of the road. It is improper to say that the driver of a horse has rights in the road superior to the driver of the automobile ; Hannigan v. Wright, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 537, 63 At]. 234; Wright v. Crane, 142 Mich. 508, 106 N. W. 71; and each is equally restricted in the ex ercise of his rights by the corresponding rights of the other; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212, 22 Am. Rep. 522 ; Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46, 22 N. E. 83, 16 Am. St. Rep. 307. Each is required to use ordinary care, in order to avoid receiving injury as well as inflicting injury upon the other, and in this the degree of care required is to be estimated by the exigencies of the particular situation.