In the absence of statutes, such a bill does not ordinarily lie, except where there is priv ity of some sort between all the parties, and where the claim by all is of the same nature and character ; 3 Beay. 579; Story, Eq. Jur. § 807; Lincoln v. R. Co., 24 Vt. 639; White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Comegys, 2 Ind. 469. The granting of an order of interplead er is within the judicial discretion ; Taylor v. Satterthwaite, 2 Misc. 441, 22 N. Y. Supp. 187.
The decree for interpleader may be obtain ed after a hearing in the usual manner ; 4 Bro. Ch. 297; City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 570; or without a hearing, if the defendants not deny the statements of the bill ; 16 Ves. Ch. 203 ; Story, Eq. Pl. § 297 a.
A bill in the nature of a bill of interplead er will lie in many cases by a party in in terest to ascertain and establish his own rights, where there are other conflicting rights between third persons ; Story, Eq. Pl. § 297 b ; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 199; Cameron v. The Marcellus, 48 N. C. 83.
In a bill of interpleader the complainant being indifferent between the parties, the duty of his solicitor is ended as such, when the bill is filed, and he has no interest in the decree except that the bill shall be adjudged to be properly filed. The solicitor may then appear for one of the parties, but only by leave of the court, which will be granted only upon consideration of the special cir cumstances of the facts of the case and the conclusion that the case is a proper one for granting the leave ; Morrow v. Robinson, 4 Del. Ch. 534, note ; Webster v. McDaniel, 2 id. 297 ; and see Houghton v. Kendall, 7 Al len (Mass.) 72. See INTERPLEADER.
A bill of interpleader is said in 22 Harv. L. R. 294, to lie on behalf of one who is in the position of an innocent stakeholder who is ready to do his duty, in order to free him from subjection to two suits and the possibility of a double liability. The requi sites of the suit are, roughly speaking, ten in number : 1. The adverse claims must be mutually exclusive ; National Ins. Co. v. Pin grey, 141 Mass. 411, 6 N. E. 93 ; Bassett v. Leslie, 123 N. Y. 396, 25 N. E. 386. It would be manifestly unjust to make the claimants fight each other when the validity of one claiin is not dependent upon the invalidity of the other ; there can then be no dispute between the claimants. For this reason, if one of the claimants gets a verdict or judg ment the bill no longer lies ; see Maxwell v. Leichtman, 72 N. J. Eq. 780, 65 Atl. 1007. 2. The complainant must be willing 'to bring into court or surrender all that is claimed by either defendant ; M. & H. R. Co. v. Clute, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 384. If he has a counter claim against either claimant he cannot have it determined in such a proceeding. 3. The position of the stakeholder must be such a precarious one that he really needs the aid of equity to prevent injustice. Thus, one who is in possession of land claiming no title need only move out. So also the bill does not lie if all the claims would be settled in one suit at law ; Fitts v. Shaw, 22 R. I. 17, 46 Atl. 42 ; or if one of the claims is clearly invalid; M. & H. R. Co. v. Clute, supra; or both are illegal; Applegarth v. Colley, 2 Dowl. N. S. 223. 4. There must be no col lusion between the complainant and either claimant ; Murietta v. So. Amer. Co., 62 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 396. The bill lies to help only a disinterested stakeholder. 5. The stake holder must not have been placed in his pre carious position through his own fault; Horner v. Willcocks, 1 Ir. Jur. 0. S. 136; and he must not be guilty of lathes in pur suing his remedy. 6. If equity is unable to
enjoin the prosecution of one of the claims at law, it can give no relief. Thus a state court declined to entertain a bill because it could not enjoin a federal court from en forcing its judgment ; Smith v. Reed, 74 N. J. Eq. 776„ 70 Atl. 961. These six requisites are based on sound principles of justice. The following, although supported by author ity, are extremely technical and will be found upon examination to have a doubtful equitable basis. 7. It is often required that all the claims be derived from a common source; First Nat. Bank v. Bininger, 26 N. J. Eq. 345. This is a survival of the narrow view of interpleader held by the common law. The requisite of privity is foreign to the purpose of the bill; for the position of a stakeholder is equally precarious irrespective of the sources from which the defendants de rive their claims. The refusal to allow an interpleader therefore seems unsound; see Crane v. McDonald, 118 N. Y. 648, 23 N.• E. 991; 17 Harv. L. Rev. 489. 8. It is some times required that the stakeholder have no claim or interest in the stake ; see 4 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisp. § 1325 ; Maclennan, Interpleader 64. If the amount of the stakeholder's charge is disputed, the bill will not lie; Lawson v. Warehouse Co., 70 Hun 281, 24 N. Y. Supp. 281; but it is otherwise if the claim is avail able against, and admitted by, both defend ants ; Gibson v. Goldthwaite, 7 Ala. 281, 42 Am. Dec. 592. The result should be the same where the lien is available against only one of the defendants, if he does not dispute it. Hence this requirement is really covered by the second class above. 9. The stakeholder must have incurred no collateral or hide pendent liability to either claimant; Bartlett v. His Imperial Majesty, 23 Fed. 257; Craws hay v. Thornton, 2 My. & C. 1; contra, At tenborough v. London, etc., Co., 3 C. P. D. 450 (statutory) ; since, it is argued, one of the claimants may be subjected to two suits to enforce his rights. On the contrary (and this seems to be the better and more modern view) the bill will settle once and for all the ownership of the res.; and it may settle the whole controversy ; see In re Mersey Docks, [1890] 1 Q. B. 546. The fact of the collateral liability is immaterial and relief should therefore be granted. 10. Lastly, it is in sisted that the same thing, debt, or duty, must be claimed by all the defendants; Blan ey v. Sidney, 14 M. & W. 800. See 4 Pom eroy, Eq. Jurisp. § 1323. This however seems unnecessarily refined in its technicality. So long as the claims are mutually exclusive, and the stakeholder is willing to bring into court the full amount claimed by either, it would seem that he should be entitled to maintain his bill. And in a few cases it has so been held ; Thomson v. Ebbets, Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 272.
In Hayward & Clark v. McDonald, 192 Fed. 890, 113 C. C. A. 368, it was said that the true limits of equity jurisdiction in bills of interpleader is not precisely settled ; but that a strict bill is one in which the com plainant claims no relief against either de fendant. There are, however, innumerable cases of bills in the nature of bills of inter pleader in which the complainant may be en titled to relief by such bill ; among these is a case where the complainant has property in which others have conflicting claims, but in which the complainant may have equitable rights himself, citing Van Winkle v. Owen, 54 N. J. Eq. 253, 34 AU. 400; Stephenson & Coon v. Burdett, 56 W. Va. 109, 48 S. E. 846, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 748; Groves v. &fatal, 153 U. S. 465, 14 Sup. Ct. 898, 38 L. Ed. 785.