The erection of a bridge entirely within a I state across a navigable river running part ly within and partly without the state is not a matter so directly connected with inter state commerce as to be under the exclusive control of congress, and in the absence of congressional action the state has authority to regulate the same; Rhea v. R. Co., 50 Fed. 16.
A state has no power to fix tolls on a bridge connecting it with another state, thereby regulating charges on interstate com merce without the consent of congress or the concurrence of such other state. The chief justice and three associate justices concurred on the ground that concurrent , acts of the state incorporating the bridge company and authorizing it to fix tolls con stituted a contract between the corporation and both states which could not be altered by one state without the consent of the oth er; Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Corn., 154 U. S. 204, 224, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 38 L. Ed. 962. The power of erecting a bridge, and taking tolls thereon, over a navigable river forming the boundary between two states, can only be conferred by the concur rent legislation of both; President, etc., for Erecting a Bridge near Trenton v. Bridge Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 46; Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge; 17 N. H. 200.
A bridge is no less a means of commercial intercourse than a navigable stream, and the state power may properly determine whether the interruption to commerce occasioned by the bridge be not more than compensated by the facilities which it affords. And if the bridge be authorized in good faith by a state, the federal courts are not bound to enjoin it. However, congress, since its power to regulate commerce is supreme, may interpose whenever it may see fit, by general or special laws, and may prevent the building of a, bridge, or cause the removal of one already erected; Gilman v. Philadel phia, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 713, 18 L. Ed. 96; The Passaic BridgeS, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 782, 16 L. Ed. 799; Silliman v. Bridge Co., 4 Blatchf. 74, Fed. Cas. No. 12,851; Id., 4' Blatchf. 395, Fed. Cas. No. 12,852; The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 19 L. Ed. 969; or it may authorize the erection of a bridge over a navigable river, although it may partially obstruct the free navigation; People v. Kelly,
76 N. Y. 475. So railroads, having become the principal instruments of commerce, are as much under the control of congress as navigable streams, and a railroad bridge might be authorized by congress ; In re Clin ton Bridge, 1 Woolw.. 150, Fed. Cas. No. 2,900; which has power directly or through a corporation created for the purpose to construct bridges, over navigable waters be tween states, for, the purpose of interstate commerce by land ; Luxton v. Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 891, 38 L. Ed. 808; or it may grant such rights to an existing cor poration; Haeussler v. City of St. Louis, 205 Mo. 656, 103 S. W. 1034; the bridge across East River between New and Brooklyn is authorized by acts of New York and of congress and cannot be 'declared to be a public nuisance, even though it may injuri ously affect the business of a warehouseman on the banks of the river above the bridge; Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228, 27 L. Ed. 971. See also on the sub ject at large Miller, Const. U. S. Lect. ix. For any unecessary interruption the pro prietors of the bridge will be liable in dam ages to the persons specially injured there by, or to have the bridge abated as a nui sance, by injunction, though not by indict ment; such bridge, although authorized by state laws, being in contravention of rights secured by acts of congress regulating com merce; Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. (U. S.) 518, 14 L. Ed. 249; 1 W. & M. 401; Works v. Junction Railroad, 5 McLean 425, Fed. Cas. No. 18,046 ; Columbus Ins. Co. v. Bridge Ass'n, 6 McLean 70, Fed. Cas. No. 3,046 ; Jolly v. Drawbridge Co., 6 McLean 237, Fed. Cas. No. 7,441.
Dedication. The 'dedication of bridges de pends upon the same principles as the dedi cation of highways, except that their ac ceptance will not be presumed from mere use, until they are proved to be of public utility ; 5 Burr. 2594; State v. Town of Camp ton, 2 N. H. 513; Williams v. Cummington, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 312; 3 • M. & S. 526. See Town of Dayton v. Town of Rutland, 84 Ill. 279, 25 Am. Rep. 457; State v. Bridge Co., 22 Kan. 438 ; HIGIIWAYS.