BY DEED. Such as arises from the provi sions of a deed. It is a general rule that a party to a deed is estopped to deny any thing stated therein which has operated upon the other party: as, the inducement to accept and act under such deed ; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 214, 18 Am. Dec. 99 ; Green v. Clark, 13 Vt. 158; Douglass v. Scott, 5 Ohio 199 ; Bennett v. Conant, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 163 ; Reinhard v. Min. Co., 107 Mo. 616, 18 S. W. 17, 28 Am. St. Rep. 441; Carson v. Cochran, 52 Mimi 67, 53 N. W. 1130 ; Craig v. Reeder, 3 McCord (S. C.) 411; including a deed made with covenant of warranty, which estops even as to a subsequently acquired title ; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 91, 6 Am. Dec. 355 ; Baxter v. Bradbury, 20 Me. 260, 37 Am. Dec. 49 ; Blake v. Tucker, 12 Vt. 39 ; Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546, 12 Sup. Ct. 868, 36 L. Ed. 812 ; Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 9 Sup. Ct. 447, 32 L. Ed. 878 ; Ayer v. Brick Co., 157 Mass. 57, 31 N. II. 717; Woods v. Bonner, 89 Tenn. 411, 18 S. W. 67; but, while this is the general rule, there is no estoppel where the deed is a release with a covenant of restricted warranty merely of the title granted ; Comstock v. Smith, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 116, 23 Am. Dec. 670; nor will a deed of release without covenant of war ranty estop the grantor from contesting the seisin of the grantor and showing seisin in himself by an older and better title ; Ham v. Ham, 14 Me. 351; so a conveyance of all of the grantor's right, title and interest does not convey more than be has at the time and the covenants apply only to the grant and do not enlarge it ; Coe v. Persons Unknown, 43 Me. 432. A grantor who covenants against incumbrances without reservation is estopped to sue for obstruction to a right of way across the granted premises ; De Rochemont v. R. R., 64 N. H. 500, 15 Atl. 131. A grantor whose deed recites or affirms his seisin of the estate granted, either expressly or by im plication, is estopped to deny that such es tate passed, though there is no warranty; Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 3 S. E. 710, 5 Am. St. Rep. 317 ; but while he may not show that he had no such estate as the deed pur ported to convey, he is not estopped to show a subsequently acquired, independent title consistent with the deed ; Cuthrell v. Haw kins, 98 N. C. 203, 3 S. E. 672 ; and a con veyance with warranty by one who had no title, but who afterwards acquired title as trustee, did not operate by estoppel so as to make the latter enure to the former grantee, since an estoppel arises only when the new title is taken in the same right ; Dewhurst v. Wright, 29 Fla. 229, 10 South. 682. The
doctrine of estoppel by deed has been applied to one who, having as agent leased land for a term of years, was not permitted to set up want of authority to make the lease; Lee v. Lee, 83 Ia. 565, 50 N. W. 33 ; to a vendor who, having only a certificate of purchase at a tax sale, and having given bond to make a quitclaim deed on payment of the purchase money, was precluded from acquiring any title by virtue of the tax sale, as was also one claiming from him by descent or as a purchaser with notice; Jernigan v. Flowers, 94 Ala. 508, 10 South. 437; to a tenant for life who, having recognized the right of the remainderman in a bequest of personal prop erty and executed a deed of trust therefor, could not afterwards deny the right ; Welsch v. Bank, 94 Ill. 191; to one who attempts to convey title to the property as executor or administrator ; Millican v. McNeill, 102 Tex. 189, 114 S. W. 106, 132 Am. St. Rep. 863, 20 Ann. Cas. 74, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 60, and note in which are collected many cases and the conclusion reached that the question is to be determined by the general principles of the law of estoppel and not by any considera tions peculiar to this class of cases.
There was held to be no estoppel against the setting up of a subsequently acquired ti tle by one who quitclaimed lands in which at that time be had no interest; Jackson v. Peek, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 300 ; where, after the purchase of a mortgage, the premises were conveyed subject to it, and the deed had con tained a covenant to pay it, the grantee was permitted to insist, as against the purchaser of the mortgage, that he was not liable ; Real Estate Trust Co. v. Balch, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 528, in which the court held that the case presented no one of the necessary elements of an estoppel, and critically examined the New York cases on the question of liability under such covenants. A partition deed be tween tenants in common and assignment thereunder does not estop one of the parties from setting up an after-acquired title to land so assigned ; Doane v. Willcutt, 5 Gray (Mass.) 328, 66 Am. Dec. 369.