Parol authority has been held sufficient to authorize one as agent to make an assign ment of a claim against an insolvent ; Ding ley v. McDonald, 124 Cal. 90, 56 Pac. 790; to sell mules and apply the proceeds ; Hirsh & Co. v. Beverly, 125 Ga. 657, 54 S. E. 678; to fill in the name of the grantee in a deed; Otis v. Browning, 59 Mo. App. 326; to exe cute bills and notes; Harrison v. Tiernans, 4 Rand. (Va.) 177; to settle a controversy ; Piercy v. Hedrick, 2 W. Va. 458, 98 Am. Dec. 774 ; to sign one's name as surety in a bond ; Bannister v. Wallace, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 452, 37 S. W. 250 ; contra, Com. v. Magoffin, 25 S. W. 599, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 775. The authority may be conferred merely by letter ; Lyon v. Pollock, 99 U. S. 668, 25 L. Ed. 265; Smith v. Allen, 86 Mo. 178.
When the agency is not express, it may be inferred from the relation of the parties and the nature of the employment, without proof of any express appointment ;2 Kent 613 ; 15 East 4C0; Judson v. Sturges, 5 Day (Conn.) 556. Where relations exist which constitute agency, it will be such whether the parties understand it to be or not ; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 753, 2 L. R. A. 405, 13 Am. • St. Rep. 768. The admissions of a supposed agent cannot prove the exist ence of the agency ; Osgood v. Pacey, 23 Ill. App. 116; French v. Wade, 35 Kan. 391, 11 Pac. 138; Fullerton v. McLaughlin, 70 Hun 568, 24 N. Y. Supp. 280; Larson v. Inv. Co., 51 Minn. 141, 53 N. W. 179; S21mon Falls Bk. v. Leyser, 116 Mo. 51, 22 S. W. 504.
An agency may be created by law, as in those cases where the law authorizes a wife to pledge her husband's credit, even against his will, it creates a compulsory agency ; Me chem, Ag. § 82; Benjamin v. Dockham, 134 Mass. 418.
The authority may be general, as when it extends to all acts connected with a particu lar business or employment ; Gibson v. Hard ware Co., 94 Ala. 346, 10 South. 304; Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 138; or special, when it is confined to the authority to do one or more specific acts, in which case it is confined within the limits of the authority and ex tends to no other business than is authoriz ed; Lattomus v. Ins. Co., 3 Houst. (Del.) 404; Towle v. Leavitt, 23 N. H. 360, 55 Am. Dec. 193; Martin v. Far worth, 49 N. Y. .555; Union S. & T. Co. .r Mallory, 157 Ill. 554, 41 N. E. 888, 48 Am. St. Rep. 341.
Where the powers are general, they are more liberally construed according to the necessity of the‘transaction and, in the ab sence of notice, par4es dealing with an agent have the right to presume that his authority is general ; Austrian v. Springer, 94 Mich. 343, 54 N. W. 50, 34 Am. St. Rep. 350 ; Coles v. Ins. Co., 41 W. Va. 261, 23 S. E. 732; and, particularly, one dealing with the agent of a corporation may regard his agency as gen eral in the absence of notice to the contrary; Maher v. Moore (Del.) 42 Atl. 721; and this rule was extended so far as to be applied to a subagent employed by the general agent of a corporation ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tift,
100 Ga. 86, 27 S. E. 765. On the other hand, a special agent is limited as to the business to be done, and his authority must in general be strictly pursued ; Kramer v. Blair, 88 Va. 456, 13 S. E. 914; Hooe v. Oxley, 1 Wash. (Va.) 19, 1 Am. Dec. 425; and it will be strictly construed ; Young v. C. H. Ass'n, 99 Ill. App. 290 ; MacDonald v. O'Neil, 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 364; Jeffrey v. Bigelow, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 518, 28 Am. Dec. 47b; but it will be treated as including all usual means for ef fectually executing it ; Bass Dry Goods Co. v. Mfg. Co., 119 Ga. 124, 45 S. E. 980. As if it be to do an act upon condition, and the agent does it absolutely, it is void; and vice versa. If a person do less than the authori ty committed to him, the act is void; but if he does that which he is authorized, and More, it is good for that which is warranted, and void for the rest. Both of these rules, m however, may have many exceptions and limitations; Paley, Ag. 178.
An authority given to two or more persons cannot as a general rule be executed by one, though one die or refuse, unless there is an express provision that a certain number of them may act, or unless the power is coupled with an interest ; Paley, Ag. 177 ; Co. Litt. 112 b, 181 b ; Salisbury v. Brisbane, 61 N. Y. 617 ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilcox, 57 III. 180; Copeland v. Ins. Co., 6 Pick. (Mass.) 198; Low v. Perkins, 10 Vt. b32, 33 Am. Dec. 217; but if the instrument creating the pow er shows such an intention, the authority may be executed by part of those named as agents; Cedar Rapids & St. P. R. Co. v. Stewart, 25 Ia. 115 ; and it has been held that where the act is merely ministerial, anyone may do it ; and so where the agency is expressly made joint and several; Purin ton v. Annuity Co., 72 Me. 22 (but in another case the rule requiring all the appointees to join in the execution of the power was held to apply, whether the duty be ministerial or judicial; Johnston v. Bingham, 9 W. & S. [Pa.] 56); and powers delegated to a com mittee of corporate directors can be exercis ed by a majority ; McNeil v. Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 28 N. E. 245, 13 L. R. A. 559. Where, however, the authority is of a public nature, it may be executed by a majority ; Jefferson Co. v. Slagle, 66 Pa. 202 ; Worcester v. Board of R. Com' rs, 113 Mass. 161; Cooley v. O'Connor, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 391, 20 L. Ed. 446; People v. Nichols, 52 N. Y. 478, 11 Am. Rep. 734. It is also to be noted that the rule under consideration has no application to the case of a partnership, as each partner may execute an authority delegated to his firm, and the act of one is the act of the firm in pursuance of the pow er ; Jeffries v. Life Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 309, 4 Sup. Ct. 8, 28 L. Ed. 156; Deakin v. Under wood, 37 Minn. 98, 33 N. W. 318, 5 Am. St. Rep. 827.