CHAMPERTY (Lat. campum parUre, to di vide the land). A bargain with a plaintiff or defendant in a suit, for a portion of the land or other matter sued for, in case of a suc cessful termination of the suit which the champertor undertakes to carry on at his own expense. See 19 Alb. L. J. 468; Nickels v. Kane's Adm'r, 82 Va. 309 ; 7 Bing. 369. Champerty differs from maintenance chiefly in this, that in champerty the compensation to be given for the service rendered is a part of the matter in suit, or some profit growing out of it ; 4 Bla. Com., Chase's ed. 905, n. 8 ; Wheeler v. Pounds, 24 Ala. 472; Lathrop v. Bank, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 489; Barnes v. Strong, 54 N. C. 100 ; Arden v. Patterson, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 44; Meeks v. Dewberry, 67 Ga. 263; Hayney v. Coyne, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.) 339; Coleman v. Billings, 89 III. 183 ; while in simple maintenance the question of compensation does not enter into the account; 2 Bish. Cr.' Law § 131; Quig ley v. Thompson, 63 Ind. 317.
The offence was indictable at common law ; 4 Bla. Com. 135; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 415; Brown v. Beauchamp, 5 T. B. Monr. (Ky.) 413, 17 Am. Dec. 81; Douglas v. Wood's Lessee, 1 Swan. (Tenn.) 393 ; 8 M. & W. 691; see L. R. 8 Q. B. 112 ; 2 App. Cas. 186 ; 4 L. R. Ir. 43 ; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 ; Wright v. Meek, 3 G. Greene (Ia.) 472 ; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill. 449 ; Danforth v. Streeter, 28 Vt. 490; McMullen v. Guest, 6 Tex. 275 ; and is in some of the states by statute ; Low v. Hutchinson, 37 Me. 196 ; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289 ; Thomp son v. Reynolds, 73 Ill. 11; Davis v. Shar ron, 15 B. Monr. (Ky.) 64; Stoddard v. Mix, 14 Conn. 12 ; Richardson v. Rowland, 40 Conn. 565; Bentinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458; Duke v. Harper, 2 Mo. App. 1. Cham perty avoids contracts into which it enters ; Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389, 5 Am. Rep. 586. A common instance of champerty, as defined and understood at common law, is where an attorney agrees with a client to collect by suit at his own expense a particular claim or claims in general, receiving a certain propor tion of the money collected ; Dumas v. Smith, 17 Ala. 305; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132 ; 4 Dowl. 304 ; or a percentage thereon; Lath rop v. Bank, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 489 ; 2 Bish. Cr. Law § 132 ; Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Wis. 170 ; 56 N. W. 637 ; and see Ogden v. Des Arts, 4 Duer (N. Y.) 275 ; Major's Ex'r v. Gibson, 1 Pat. & H. (Va.) 48; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill. 449 ; Davis v. Sharron, 15 B. Monr. (Ky.) 64 ; Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676; Evans v. Bell, 6 Dana (Ky.) 479; Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608; Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535 ; Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389, 5 Am. Rep. 586; Fetrow v. Merriwether, 53 Ill. 275; Harmon v. Brewster, 7 Bush (Ky.) 355.
The tendency of modern decisions is, while departing from the unnecessary severity of the old law, at the same time to preserve the principle which defeats the mischief to which the old law was directed. It has been
the disposition of courts to look not so much to technical distinctions, and by treating statutes on the subject as declaratory of the common law, to deal with the subject with more flexibility, keeping in view the real ob ject of the policy to restrain what was de fined by Knight Bruce, L. J., to be "the traf fic of merchandizing in quarrels, of huckster ing in litigious discord ;" 1 D. M. & G. 680, 686. In this spirit, the common-law rule relative to champerty and maintenance is no longer recognized in many states ; Nickels T. Kane's Adm'r, 82 Va. 309 ; Brown v. Begne, 21 Or. 260, 28 Pac. 11, 14 L. R. A. 745, 28 Am, St. Rep. 752 ; Byrne v. R. Co., 55 Fed. 44 ; but in New York by statute it is unlaw ful for an attorney to give or promise a con sideration for placing in his hands a claim for injuries against a railroad company ; Code C. P. 678; Oishei v. Lazzarone, 61 Hun 623, 15 N. Y. Supp. 933. Where an attor ney agrees to prosecute an action for dam ages and advance all costs because of the Poverty of the plaintiff, taking a contingent fee of a portion of the amount recovered, it is not void for champerty ; Dunne v. Her rick, 37 Ill. App. 180 ; nor is a contract to pay for services of an attorney contingent entirely upon success ; Lewis v. Brown, 36 W. Va. 1, 14 S. E. 444; Mumma's Appeal, 127 Pa. 474, 18 Atl. 6; Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Brady, 39 Neb. 27, 57 N. W. 767 ; Lewis v. Brown, 36 W. Va. 1, 14 S. E. 444 (and see Elliott v. Rubel, 132 Ill. 9, 23 N. E. 400) ; Fowler v. Callan, 102 N. Y. 395, 7 N. E. 169 ; Winslow v. R. Co., 71 Ia. 197, 32 N. W. 330 ; Belding v. Smythe, 138 Mass. 530 ; Phelps v. Park Com'rs, 119 Ill. 626, 10 N. E. 230 ; Aultman v. Waddle, 40 Kan. 195, 19 Pac. 730 ; Stevens v. Sheriff, 76 Kan. 124, 90 Pac. 799, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 ; Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441, 28 L. Ed. 64 ; if unconscionable, it will not be upheld ; Mul ler v. Kelly, 125 Fed. 212, 60 C. C. A. 170. A committee of the Pennsylvania Bar Associa tion (1908, 1909) and one of the New York State Bar Association (1909) have reported strongly against contingent fees. The pur chase by attorneys of rights of action, for the purpose of bringing suit thereon, is com monly prohibited in law, on grounds of pub lic policy; Chase's Bla. Com. 905, n. 8 ; and an agreement that the client shall receive a certain amount out of the sum recovered, and that all above that shall belong to the attorney, is champertous ; Dahms v. Sears, 13 Or. 47, 11 Pac. 891; Silverman v. R. Co., 141 Fed. 382 ; but such an agreement for collection without suit is not champertous ; Burnham v. Heselton, 84 Me. 578, 24 Atl. 955.