Sec. 1994. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Unit ed States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen.
The term natural-born citizen used in the federal constitution is not therein defined.
Its meaning must be gathered from the com mon law ; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct 456, 42 L. Ed. 890.
Citizens are either native-born or natu ralized. Native citizens may fill any office ; naturalized citizens may be elected or ap pointed to any office under the constitution of the United States, except the offices of president and vice-president The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute ; Pamphlet by Mr. Binney on the Alienigeme of the United States (1853), partly published In 2 Am. L. Reg. 193 (1854). See In Roman Law, supra.
Generally it is presumed, at least until the contrary is shown, that every person is a citizen of the country in which he resides ; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. (U. S.) 163, 12 L. Ed. 387; Molyneaux v. Seymour, 30 Ga. 440, 76 Am. Dec. 662 ; State v. Haynes, 54 Ia. 109, 6 N. W. 156 ; Moore v. Wilson's Adm'rs, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 406; Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Harr. (Del.) 383. Where it is shown that a person was once a citizen of a foreign coun try even though residing in another, the pre sumption is, until the contrary appears, that he still remains such ; Hauenstein v. Lyn ham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628; Ehrlich v. Weber, 114 Tenn. 711, 88 S. W. 188; Bode v. Trimmer, 82 Cal. 513, 23 Pac. 187; Charles Green's Son v. Sales, 31 Fed. 106. Evidence of foreign birth overcomes the presumption of citizenship raised by residence and raises the presumption of citizenship of the coun try of birth ; State v. Jackson, 79 Vt. 504, 65 Ati. 657, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1245.
The first clause of section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitu tion for the first time recognizes and defines citizenship of the United States and makes those who are entitled to it citizens of the state in which they reside. This amendment changed the origin and character of Ameri can citizenship, or at least removed all doubt. Instead of a man's being a citizen of one of the states, he was now made a citizen of any state in which he might choose to reside be cause he was antecedently a citizen of the United States. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, vol. 2, p. 189. There is therefore a
twofold citizenship under our system-fed eral citizenship and state citizenship ; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wail. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 ; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,• 23 L. Ed. 588 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97. One may be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state, and an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside with in the state to make him a citizen thereof, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to make him a citizen of the Union; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 73, 21 L. Ed. 394 ; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890.
The object of the amendment in respect to citizenship was to preserve equality of rights and prevent discrimination between citizens, but not radically to change the whole theory of state and federal governments and the relation of both to the people or to each other ; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a par ticular state and makes "all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States." This language is intended to except children of "ministers, consuls, and citizens or sub jects of foreign states born within the United States." In order to make a citizen of the United States also a citizen of a state, he must reside within it. This distinction be comes important in connection with the ques tion, hereafter noted, as to what are the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the amendment; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 72, 21 L. Ed. 394.
The object of the clause is to protect from the hostile legislation of the states the privi leges and immunities of citizens of the Unit ed States ; U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290. It applies, so far as state citizenship is concerned, only to citizens removing from one state to another ; In re Hobbs, 1 Woods, 542, Fed. Cas. No. 6,550; Live Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Slaughter-House Co., 1 Abb. U. S. 397, Fed. Cas. No. 8,408. The constitution had already provided in art. IV, § 2, that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." As to the scope and meaning of these words, see PRIVILEGES AND