While one cannot deny the existence of some consideration, so as to defeat a deed; McGee v. Allison, 94 Ia. 527, 63 N. W. 322; Weissenfels v. Cable, 208 Mo. 515, 106 S. W. 1028 ; it may be proved to have been greater or less or different in character, as erty or services, instead of money, and the like ; Jost v. Wolf, 130 Wis. 37, 110 N. W. 232 ; to the same effect; Jackson v. R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 636; Cheesman v. Nicholl, 18 Colo. App. 174, 70 Pac. 797; Martin Y. White, 115 Ga. 866, 42 S. E. 279. The re ceipt for the consideration money is only prima facie evidence of its payment, which may be rebutted by parol testimony; Smith v. Arthur, 110 N. O. 400, 15 S. E. 197; R.
A. Sherman's Sons Co. v. Mfg. Co., 82 Conn. 479, 74 Atl. 773. Parol evidence is admis sible to prove a promise to pay a considera tion in addition to that expressed in the deed ; Allen v. Rees, 136 Ia. 423, 110 N. W. 583 ; 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137; Henry v. Zur flieh, 203 Pa. 440, 53 Atl. 243; but if the consideration is contractual, such evidence is not admissible; Baum v. Lynn, 72 Miss. 932, 18 South. 428, 30 L. II. A. 441.
See note in 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1194.
"The truth is that neither consideration or anything of the kind ever was necessary in the case of a deed and . . . a mere acknowledgment of consideration received, forming no part of a contract, is only evi dence, and hence may be qualified or disput ed altogether." Bigelow, Estoppel, 478.
Where a deed states a consideration gross ly misrepresenting the value of the prop erty for the purpose of cheating and defraud ing another who relies on such representa tions, such statement of value may be made the basis of an action for fraud ; Leonard v. Springer, 197 III. 532, 64 N. E. 299.
Negotiable instruments also, as bills of exchange and promissory notes, by statute 3 & 4 Anne (adopted as common law or by re-enactment in the United States), carry with them prima facie evidence of consid eration ; 4 Bla. Coro. 445. See BILLS OF EXCHANGE; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
The consideration, if not expressed (when it is prima facie evidence of consideration), in all parol contracts (oral or written), must be proved; this may be done by evidence abiuncle; Thompson v. Blanchard, 3 N. Y. 335; Tingley v. Cutler, 7 Conn. 291; Whit ney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394; Bean v. Bur bank, 16 Me. 458, 33 Am. Dec. 681; Arms v. Ashley, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 71; Cummings v. Dennett, 26 Me. 397 ; Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292 ; Sloan v. Gibson, 4 Mo. 33.
Moral or equitable considerations are not sufficient to support an express or implied promise. They are only sufficient an be tween the parties in conveyances by deed, and in transfers, not by deed, accompanied by possession ; Scott v. Carruth, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 418 ; 3 B. & P. 249. See 11 A. & E. 438; Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 207. These purely moral obligations are left by tbe law to the conscience and good faith of the individual. Baron Parke says, "A mere
moral consideration is nothing;" 9 M. & W. 501; Kennerly v. Martin, 8 Mo. 698. See In re James, 78 Hun 121, 28 N. Y. Supp. 992. It was at one time held in England that an express promise made in conse quence of a previously existing moral obli gation created a valid contract ; per Mans field, C. J., Cowp. 290; 5 Taunt. 36. This doctrine was at one time received in the United States, but appears now to be repu diated there ; Poll. Contr. 168 ; except in Pennsylvania; Cornell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364 ; Hemphill v. McClimans, 24 Pa. 370.
Where one is induced to become a surety for another's husband and the promise by the other party is void on account of coverture, a subsequent promise made after the dis ability was removed is void for lack of con sideration ; Hollaway's Assignee v. Rudy, 60 S. W. 650, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1406, 53 L. R. A. 353.
It is often said that a moral obligation is sufficient consideration ; but it is a rule, that such moral obligation must be one which has once been valuable and enforce able at law, but has ceased to be so by the operation of the statute of limitations, or by the intervention of bankruptcy for in stance. The obligation, in such case, re mains equally strong on the conscience of the debtor. The rule amounts only to a permission to waive certain positive rules of law as to remedy; Poll. Contr. 623 ; 2 Bla. Corn. 445 ; Cowp. 290 ; 3 B. & P. 249, n.; 2 East 506 ; 2 Ex. 90 ; 8 Q. B. 487; Way v. Sperry, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 238, 52 Am. Dec. 779 ; Turner v. Chrisman, 20 Ohio 332 ; Ehle v. Judson, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 97 ; War ren v. Whitney, 24 Me..561, 41 Am. Dec. 406 ; Paul v. Stackhouse, 38 Pa. 306; Smith v. Ware, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 259 ; Cook v. Brad ley, 7 Conn. 57, 18 Am. Dec. 79; Hawley v. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420; Biddle v. Moore, 3 Pa. 172 ; Willing v. Peters, 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 177; Levy v. Cadet, 17 S. & R. (Pa.) 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650 ; Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267 ; Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, 60 Am. Dec. 363 ; Trumball v. Tilton, 21 N. H. 129; Ellicott v. Turner, 4 Md. 476. See Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. ). 637 ; In re James, 78 Hun 121, 28 N. V. Supp. 992 ; Brooks v. Bank, 125 Pa. 394, 17 Atl. 418. But now, by statute, in England a promise to pay a debt barred by bankruptcy or one con tracted during infancy is void ; Leake, Contr. 318. If the moral duty were once a legal one which could have been made available in defence, it is equally within the rule; Nash v. Russell, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 556 ; Wat kins v. Halstead, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 311; Phel an v. Kelley, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 389; Mardis v. Tyler, 10 B. Monr. (Ky.) 382 ; Womack v. Womack, 8 Tex. 397, 58 Am. Dec. 119. See as to moral obligation as a consideration, 32 Cent. L. J. 53.