In sales of goods where the promisor can be put substantially in statu quo the prom isee is the sole judge; Wood Reap. & M. M.
Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565, 15 N. W. 906, 45 Am. Rep. 57; Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. R. Co., 66 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. 343, 57 Am. Rep. 257. In contracts for work and labor other than such as are to satisfy a matter of per sonal taste, where the work and labor would be wholly lost to the promisor If refused, the courts tend to the view that the promisee must be satisfied when he ought to be; Du plex Safety Boiler Co. v. Garden, 101 N. Y. 387, 4 N. E. 749, 54 Am. Rep. 709; Haw kins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422 ; Keeler v. Clifford, 165 III. 544, 46 N. E. 248; Boyd v. Hallowell, 60 Minn. 225, 62 N. W. 125.
There are a few eases which are appar ently discordant, but which will be found, as Prof. Lawson observes, to rest on the dif ference between executory contracts of sale, and contracts for work and labor which have been done on the house or land of the prom isee; Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N. E. 312, 14 Am. St. Rep. 422; Doll v. Noble, 116 N. Y. 230, 22 N. E. 406, 5 L. R. A. 554, 15 Am. St. Rep. 398; Clark v. Rice, 46 Mich. 308, 9 N. W, 427; McNeil v. Arm strong, 81 Fed. 943, 27 C. C. A. 16; Electric Lighting Co. of Mobile v. Elder, 115 Ala. 138, 21 South. 983; Pope Iron & Metal Co. v. Best, 14 Mo. App. 503. The cases of Mulint ly v. Greenwood, 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. 1001, 48 Am. St. Rep. 613, Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 395, and Burns v. Munger, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 75, appear to be really discord ant. In Crawford v. Pub. Co., 163 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. 616, it was held that where one is employed to do work which involves taste, fancy, interest, 'personal satisfaction and judgment, to the satisfaction of his employer, the employer is the sole judge, of whether the work is satisfactory.
The rule is held to be otherwise in the case of a complete contract of an ordinary com mercial nature. That which the law shall
say a contracting party ought in reason to be satisfied with that the law will say he is satisfied with; Brooklyn v. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475, 7 Am. Rep. 469. Referring to this case, Brown, D. J., in Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414, 1 L. R. A. 645, Points out that the differences between the New York decisions and those of other states are more apparent than real, and he cites the rule laid down in Silsby Mfg. Co. v. Chico, 24 Fed. 893, as "an accurate summary of the whole law on the subject:" Where a fire engine was to be made and delivered which should be satisfactory to the purchas er, it must in fact be satisfactory to him, or be is not bound to take it; but that where the purchaser was in fact satisfied, but fraudulently and in bad faith declared he was not satisfied, the contract had been fully performed by the vendor, and the purchaser was bound to accept the article.
If the goods are rejected as unsatisfac tory, they must be returned to the vendor; Campbell Printing Co. v. Thorp, 36 Fed. 414, 1 L. R. A. 645; Savage Mfg. Co. v. Armstrong, 19 Me. 147; but it was held In Shupe v. Collender, 56 Conn. 489, 15 Atl. 405, I L. R. A. 339, that the dissatisfied buyer may retain the goods and recoup damages in an action for the price.
If the dissatisfaction of a third party des ignated as an arbiter is required, the con tractor must show fraudulent collusion be tween the other party and such arbiter in order to recover; Thaler Bros. v. Greisser Const. Co., 229 Pa. 518, 79 Atl. 147, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 345.
Under an agreement to pay commissions for negotiating a "satisfactory lease" the lessor cannot arbitrarily refuse to accept a lease negotiated ; Mullally v. Greenwood. 127 Mo. 138, 29 S. W. 1001, 48 Am. St. Rep. 613.