CRUELTY.
He was liable for her torts ; Com. v. Munsey, 112 Mass. 287; 5 Car. & P. 484; Flesh v. Lindsay, 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, 37 Am. St. Rep. 374 ; Baker v. Young, 44 Ill. 42, 92 Am. Dec. 149; Fowler v. Chichester; 26 Ohio St. 9; Ball v. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427, 83 Am. Dec. 356; Hinds v. Jones, 48 Me. 348; Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361; Carleton v. Haywood, 49 N. H. 314; Jackson v. Kirby, 37 Vt. 448 ; Brazil v. Moran, 8 Minn. 236 (Gil. 205), 83 Am. Dec. 772 ; Morgan v. Ken nedy, 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912, 30 L. R. A. 521, 54 Am. St. Rep. 647. But he should not be joined for trespass committed by her in the management of her separate estate; Quilty v. Battle, 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47, 17 L. R. A. 521.
At common law a wife was liable for her torts; Hall v. White, 27 Conn. 488; but her legal incapacity made it necessary to join her husband as a defendant ; 17 C. B. N. S. 744 ; and as a consequence his property was liable for execution, as originally was his person; 2 Rolle 53; but this liability ceased at the death of the wife because it arose solely because of her incapacity ; see 21 Harv. L. Rev. 631.
Where a former act provided that, where the husband and wife were jointly sued for the tort of the wife, execution should first be levied against the wife's property, and a later statute repealed it, and provided that the wife might be sued as if she were sole, it was held that the statute abolished, by implication, the common-law liability of the husband for the torts of his wife; Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009.
The husband's liabilities for his wife's torts is not removed by the modern married women's acts; Kellar v. James, 63 W. Va. 139, 59 S. E. 939, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003, and note, which concludes that the weight of authority is that the statutes do abrogate the liability, so fir as concerns torts con nected with the wife's separate property; Quilty v. Battle, 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47, 17 L. R. A. 521; and the common law liabili ty of the husband for a tort committed out of his presence is held to be repealed by im plication by the married women's acts; Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360,
14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009. The common-law liability of the husband for her wrongs still obtains in England and when he and she are sued for her libel, he cannot plead payment into court and she deny liability ; [1904] 1 K. B. 292.
The husband was also liable for her crimes, if committed in his presence, except treason and murder where they were jointly liable; Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559; Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31, 10 South. 506, 33 Am. St. Rep. 88 ; State v. Kelly, 74 Ia. 589, 38 N. W. 503; Cora. v. Dewitt, 10 Mass. 154; Mangam v. Peck, 111 N. Y. 401, 18 N. E. 617. The liability of the husband for crimes grew out of the original idea of the subjection and dependence of the wife. It was a rule of the common law that a married woman who committed a criminal offence in the presence of her husband is presumed to act under his coercion and is therefore exempt from responsibility ; unless it is of a very aggravated character, she is presumed to act by his coercion, and, unless the contrary is proved, she is irresponsible. Under other circumstances she is liable, criminally, as if she were a feme sole. See COERCION ; DU RESS ; WILL.
A husband is not entitled to alimony. The latter is based upon the common-law require ment, to which the husband was subject, of providing his wife with necessaries, and there is no reciprocal obligation on her ; Too tle, Hosea & Co. v. Coldwell, 30 Kan. 132, 1 Pac. 329. In some states there are statutes providing that alimony, or an allowance out of the wife's estate, in the nature of alimony, may be granted the husband. In Kansas alimony was denied the husband because no authority could be found to authorize it ; Tootle, Hosea & Co. v. Coldwell, 30 Kan. 132, 1 Pa.c. 329; Greene v. Greene, 49 Neb. 546, 68 N. W. 947, 34 L. R. A. 110, 59 Am. St. Rep. 560. See ALIMONY; 55 Alb. L. J. 15.