CUMULATIVE SENTENCE. A second or additional judgment given against one who has been convicted, the execution or effect of which is to commence after the first has ex pired. Clifford v. Dryden, 31 Wash. 545, 72 Pao. 96.
Thus, where a man is sentenced to an imprison ment for six months on conviction of larceny, and afterwards he is convicted of burglary, he may be sentenced to imprisonment for the fatter, to .com mence after the expiration of the first imprison ment: this ie called a cumulative judgment. And if the former sentence is shortened by a pardon, or by reversal on writ of error, it expires, and the subsequent sentence takes effect, as if the former had expired by lapse of time ;, Kite v. Com., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 681. Where an indictment for misdemeanor contained four counts, the third of which was held on error to be bad in substance, and the defendant, being convicted on the whole indictment, was sen tenced to four successive terms of imprisonment of equal duration, held that the sentence on the fourth count was not invalidated by the insufficiency of the third count, and that the imprisonment an it was to be computed from the end of the imprisonment on the second count; 15 Q. B. 594.
Upon an indictment for misdemeanor containing two counts for distinct offences, the defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment for consecutive terms of punishment, although the aggregate of thepun ishments may exceed the punishment allowed by law for one offence, and this rule is in many states prescribed by statute; 1 Bish, New Crim. Proc. I UZI (2); Whart. Cr. Pl. & Pr. § 932; In re White, 50 Kan. 299, 32 Pac. 36; In re Walsh, 37 Neb. 464, 65 N. W. 1076; in re Wilson, 11 Utah, U4, 89 Pac. 498. But it may in some cases be the means of per petrating great injustice. See O'Neil v. Vermont. 144 U. S. 323, 12 Sup. Ct. 693, 36 L. Ed. 450, where a justice of the peace imposed a fins of $6638, and on failure to pay it, a sentence of nearly 60 years' im prisonment, for selling intoxcating liquors. The
Supreme Court of the United States refused to inter fere. See 31 Am. L. Rag. 619.
In the absence of a statute, it is generally held that the court has power to impose cumulative sen tences upon conviction under separate indictments for separate offences, the imprisonment under one to commence at the termination of that under the other ; Howard v. U. S., 75 Fed. 986, 21 C. C. A. 586, 34 L. R. A. 509, 43 U. S. App, 678; Simmons v. Coal Ca., 117 Ga. 315, 43 S. E. 780, 61 L. R. A. 739 ; In re Breton, 93 Me. 39, 44 Atl. 125, 74 Am. St. Rep: 335 ; Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 Ati. 631, 4 Ann. Cas. 719; State V. Hamby; 126 N. C. 1066, 35' S. E. 614; Contra, Ex parte Meyers; 44 Mo. 279; Lockwood V. Dills, 74 Ind. 67. A statute giving this authority is ex past facto; Baker v, State, 11 Tex. App. 262 ; where a court imposes sentences exceeding, in the aggregate, its jurisdiction, only the excess is void; Harris v. Lang, 27 App. D. C. 84, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 124, 7 Ann. Cas. 141. If the second conviction of three is erroneous, the third at once follows the first; U. S. v. Carpenter, 151 Fed. 214, 81 C. C. A. 194, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1043, 10 Ann. Cas. 609. Upon an indictment for perjury charging offences committed in different suits, the defendant, upon conviction, may be sentenced to distinct punish ments, although the suits were instituted with a common object ; 5 Q. B. Div. 490.
Where, upon trial of an indictment-containing several counts-charging separate and distinct mis demeanors, identical in character, a general verdict of guilty is rendered, or a verdict of guilty upon two or more specified counts, the court has no power to impose a sentence or cumulative sentences ex ceeding in the aggregate what is prescribed by stat ute as the maximum punishment for one offence of the character charged ; People v. Liscomh, 60 N, Y. 559, 19 Am. Rep. 211; but this case is said to stand alone. See 1 Dish. New Cr. Proc. § 1327 (2); 6 App. Cas. 241.