DAMAGES. The indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained an injury, either in his person, property, or relative rights, through the act or default of another.
The sum claimed as such indeMnity by a plaintiff in his, declaration.
The injury or loss for which compensation is sought.
Compensatory damages. Those allowed as a recompense for the injury actually rer ceived. They cannot include an allowance for inconvenience as well as injuries ; Jen son v. R. Co., 86 Wis. 589, 57 N. W. 359, 22 L. R. A. 680.
Consequential damages. Those which, though directly, are not immediately, con sequential upon the act or default complain ed of.
Double or treble damages. See MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
Exemplary damages. Those allowed for torts committed with fraud, actual malice, or deliberate violence or oppression, as a punishment to the defendant, and as a warn ing to other wrong doers. Mayer v. Probe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S. E. 58 ; Hale, Dam. 200; MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
General damages. Those which necessarily and by implication of law result from the act or default complained of.
They are such as jury may give when the judge cannot point out any measure by which they are to be ascertained, except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man. They are such as by competent evidence are directly traceable to a failure to discharge a contract, obligation or duty imposed by law. Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437, 58 N. W. 84, 23 L. R. A. 190.
Liquidated damages. See that title. Nominal damages. See that title.
Punitive damages. See MEASURE OF DAM AGES.
Special damages. Such as arise directly, but not necessarily or by implication of law, from the act or default complained of.
These are either superadded to general damages, arising from an act lujurious in itself, as when some particular loss arises from the uttering of slander ous words, actionable in themselves, or are such as arise frem an act indifferent and not actionable in itself, but, injurious only in its consequences, as when the words become actionable only by reason of Special damage ensuing.
Unliquidated See LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
Vindictive damages, See MEASURE OE DAMAGES.
In modern law, the term damages is not used in a legal sense to include the costs of the suit; though it was formerly so used. Co. Litt. 267 a; Dougl. 751. The various classes of damages here given are those commonly found in the ,text-books and in the decisions' of courts of common law. Other terms are of occasional use (as resilltVitq, to denote con sequential damages). but are easily recognizable as belonging to some one 'of the above divisions. The question whether damages are to be limited to an allowance compensatory merely, in its nature and extent, or whether they may be assessed as a pun ishment upon a wrong-doer in certain cases for the injury inflicted him upon the, plaintiff, received much attention from the courts and was very fully and vigorously discussed by Greenleaf and Sedg wick, the latter whom, though supporting, the doctrine admitted that it was exceptional and anom alous and could not be logically supported; Sedgw.
Dam. F 353. He attributes the origin of the princi ple to the rule making juries the judges of the dam ages; id. § 354. In cases of aggravated wrong there were large verdicts and the courts were powerless, although the early cases consisted mainly of setting them aside. Originating In the unrestrained expres sions of judges in justifying verdicts, there grew up this doctrine of exemplary damages characterized as "a sort of hybrid between a display of ethical indignation, and the imposition of a criminal line." The current of authorities set strongly (in numbers, at least) in favor of allowing punitive damages; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. (U. S.) 363, 14 L. Ed. 181; and that rule of decision has prevailed in most of the states, though in some it is repudiated en tirely; Stilson v. Gibbs, 63 Mich. 280, 18 N. W. 815; Hawes v. Knowles, 111 Mass. 618, A Am. Rep. 383; Greeley, S. L. & P. R. Co. v. Yeager, 11 Colo. 345, 18 Pac. 211; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H, 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475; and in others the doctrine is also de nied but exemplary damages were permitted on the ground that they were compensatory merely for mental suffering; Quigley v. R. Co., 11 Nev. 350, 21 Am. Rep. 757 ; Union Pac. R. R. Co'. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27. This rule prevailed in West Virginia; Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 6 S. E. 485; Beck Thompson, 31 Va. 469, 7 S. E. 447, 13 Am. St. Rep. 870 ; but has been over-ruled; Mayer v. Probe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S. E. 58. The argument against such damages was based on the objection that it admits of the infliction of pecuniary punishment to an almost unlimited extent by an irresponsible jury, a view which is theoretically more obnoxious (sup posing that there is no practical difference) than that which considers damages merely as a compen sation, of the just amount of which the jury may well be held to be proper judges. It also seemed to savor somewhat of judicial legislation in a criminal department to extend such damages beyond those cases where an injury is committed to the feelings of an innocent plaintiff. See 2 Greenl. Ey. I 253; 2 Sedgw. Dam. 323; 1 Kent 630; Grand Trunk R. R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 465, 23 L. Ed. 366; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270, where the terms exemplary, vindictive and punitive or punitory are considered as synonymous, and the cases and authorities are exhaustively reviewed. Direct is here used in opposition to remote, and immediate to consequential.