De Facto

co, am, mo, atl, rep, corporation, notary, officer and office

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When a special judge is duly elected, qual ifies, and takes possession of the office ac cording to law, he becomes judge de facto, though his official oath is not filed as re quired by law ; and the proceedings of the court, if unchallenged during his incumben cy, cannot afterwards be questioned collat erally ; State v. Miller, 111 Mo. 542, 20 S. W. 243. See In re Powers' Estate, 65 Vt. 399, 26 Atl. 640 ; Keith v. State, 49 Ark. 439, 5 S. W. 880 ; Campbell v. Com., 96 Pa. 314; People v. Weber, 86 Ill. 283. • A notary who continues to act after his commission has expired, long enough to af ford a reasonable presumption of reappoint ment, is a de facto notary ; Cary v. State, 76 Ala. 78 ; and so of one who has failed to file his bond ; Keeney v. Leas, 14 Ia. 464; and of an alien appointed a notary; Wilson v. Kimmel, 109 Mo. 260, 19 S. W. 24. But where a notary's commission had expired seven months before he took an acknowl edgment, and it did not appear that he had continued to act and •hold himself out as a notary, he was not a de facto notary; Sand lin v. Dowdell, 143 Ala. 518, 39 South. 279, 5 Ann. Cas. 459.

There can be no de facto officer in the case of an office abolished by statute ; Stensou v. Koch, 152 N. Y. 89, 46 N. E. 176; People T. Welsh, 225 Ill. 364, 80 N. E. 313; Walker v. Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 223 ; Gorman v. Peo ple, 17 Colo.'596, 31 Pac. 335, 31 Am. St. Rep. 350 ; Farrier v. Dugan, 48 N. J. L. 613, 7 Atl. 881, affirtning Dugan v. Farrier; 47 N. I. L. 383, 1 Atl. 751; but there are cases contra, which, however, appear to be all cases of municipal officers; Adams v. Lin dell, 5 Mo. App. 197; Hilgert v. Pay. Co., 107 Mo. App. 385, 81 S. W. 496; Keeling v. R. Co., 205 Pa. 31; 54 Atl. 485; Per kins v. Fielding, 119 Mo. 149, 24 S. W. 444, 27 S. W. 1100.

An injunction does not lie to restrain a de facto officer from performing the duties of his office, on account of irregularity of elec tion, his acts being valid as to third persons; Chambers v. Adair, 110 Ky. 942, 62 S. W. 1128 ; but a mandamus may be directed to one, to compel him to perform the duties of his office, and he cannot set up in defense that he is not in possession of his office de jure; Kelly v. Wimberly, 61 Miss. 548; Har vey v. Philbrick, 49 N. J. L. 374, 8 Atl. 122.

Where the defects in the title of the officer are notorious, such as to make those relying on his acts chargeable with such knowledge, persons relying upon such acts will not be protected; Oliver v. Jersey City, 63 N. J. L. 634, 44 Atl. 709, 48 L. R. A. 412, 76 Am. St. Rep. 228. Officers of a corporation cease to be officers de facto after a judgment of a court of last resort adjudging that they have no rightful title (notwithstanding an appeal pending to the supreme court of the United States and no judgment of ouster appearing of record) ; Rochester & G. V. R. Co. v.

Bank, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 234.

Contracts and other acts of de facto di rectors of corporations are valid; Green's Brice, Ultra Vires, 522, n. c. ; Atlantic, T. & 0. R. Co. v. Johnston, 70 N. C. 348; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McPherson, 35 Mo. 13, 86 Am. Dec. 128 ; Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Coal Co., 21 Pa. 131.

An officer de facto is prima facie one de jure; Allen v. State, 21 Ga. 217, 68 Am. Dec. 457.

When the inspectors of an election fail to issue a certificate of election, one who has received the highest number of legal votes cast, and holding over as the present incumbent, has sufficient apparent authority or color of title to be considered an officer de facto; Montgomery v. O'Dell, 67 Hun 169, 22 N. Y. Supp. 412.

A government de facto signifies one com pletely, though only temporarily, established in the place of the lawful government ; Thomas v. Taylor, 42 Miss. 651, 703, 2 Am. Rep. 625; Chisholm v. Coleman, 43 Ala. 204, 94 Am. Dec. 677. See DE JURE ; Austin, Jur. Lect. vi, p. 336.

A wife de facto only is one whose mar riage is voidable by decree; 4 Kent 36. Blockade de facto is one actually main tained ; 1 Kent 44.

De Facto Corporations. A colorable cor porate organization of persons intending in good faith to form a corporation, under a law authorizing it, who have failed to com ply with one or more provisions of the stat ute, but have used some of the powers which, if a de jure corporation, it would have possessed.

An apparent corporate organization, as serted to be a corporation by its members, and actually acting as such, but lacking the creative fiat of the law. In re Gibbs' Estate, 157 Pa. 59, 27 Atl. 383, 22 L. R. A. 276.

There must have been : (1) A colorable corporate organization ; Bergeron v. Hobbs, 96 Wis. 641, 71 N. W. 1056, 65 Am. St. Rep. 85; Abbott v. Refining Co., 4 Neb. 416; Fin negan v. Noerenberg, 52 Minn. 243, 53 N. W. 1150, 18 L. R. A. 778, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552 ; McLeary v. Dawson, 87 Tex. 524, 538, 29 S. W. 1044; Tulare Irr. District v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 13, 22 Sup. Ct. 531, 46 L. Ed. 773. An agreement to do business as a corpora tion, fulfilling part of the requisites but pur posely stopping short of complete incorpora tion is not sufficient; Card v. Moore, 173 N.

Y. 598, 66 N. E. 1105.

(2) A statute authorizing the proposed corporation; American Loan & Trust Co. v. R. Co., 157 Ill. 641, 42 N. E. 153; Imperial B'l'g Co. v. Board of Trade, 238 111. 100, 87 N. E. 167; Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579,

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