DECREE. The judicial decision of a liti gated cause by a court of equity. It is also applied to the determination of a cause in courts of admiralty and probate. It is ac curate to use the word judgment as applied to courts of law and decree to courts of equity, although the former term is now used in a larger sense to include both. There is, however, a distinction between the two which is well understood, and may wise ly be preserved as tending to keep before the mind the distinction betwen the two ju risdictions—quite as fundamental with re spect to the final determination of a cause as to the forms of procedure and the prin ciples of jurisprudence applied by the two tribunals. Even the modern tendency of courts of law to avail themselves of equita ble forms of procedure and principles of de cision has left undisturbed the well-defined line of demarcation between the judgment at law and the decree in equity. It is stated by an able writer, thus : "A judgment at law was either simply for the plaintiff or for the defendant. There could be no fications or modifications of the judgment. But such a judgment does not always touch the true justice of the cause or put the parties in the position they ought to occupy. While the plaintiff may be entitled, in a giv en case, to general relief, there may be some duty connected with the subject of ,litiga tion which he owes to the defendant, the performance of which, equally with the ful filment of hia duty by the defendant, ought, in a perfect system of remedial law, to be exacted. This result was attained by the decree of a court of equity which could be so moulded, or the execution of which could be so -controlled and suspended, that the relative duties and rights of the parties could be secured and enforced;" Bisph. Eq. It necessarily springs from the nature of the chancery jurisdiction that its determi nations should be cast in a mould differing, Coto ccelo, from a judgment at law, and it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the essential character of the decree, as de scribed by the author quoted, is to be found in the literal application of the fundamental maxim, "He who seeks equity must do eq uity." Accordingly, it is said that a court of equity will always reach, by a direct de cree, what would otherwise be accomplished by a circuity of proceedings; Dodd v. Wil
son, 4 Del. Ch. 410. And even when a com plainant is entitled to relief which it is in equitable to grant except upon a condition to be performed by him springing from an obligation of equity and good conscience, though not from legal right, a chancellor may make a decree only upon such condition; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 501; Bisph. Eq. § 43. In such case, when something remains to be done by the party in order to entitle him to relief, while no present decree, can be made, as the decree must be absolute and final and not contin gent, the court will enter an interlocutory decree and suspend the entry of a final de cree until the performance of such condi tion ; Pleasanton v. Raughley, 3 Del. Ch. 124 ;1 and in default thereof in a reasonable time dismiss the hill ; Pleasanton v. Raughley, Del. Ch. 43. The doctrine of the wife's eq uity is a familiar instance of this principle. Decrees are either interlocutory or final. This distinction is well recognized and im portant; Comely v. Marckwald, 131 U. S. 159, 9 Sup. Ct. 744, 33 L. Ed. 117; Richmond v. Atwood, 52 Fed. 10, 2 C. C. A. 607, 17 L. R. A. 615 (citing many cases and discussing the distinction at large). In the strictest sense all decrees are interlocutory until sign ed and enrolled ; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 6th Am. ed. 987, n. 1; but it is not in this sense that the terms are in practice used. But while there is a distinction well understood, it is not al ways easy of exact definition. The exist ence of the two classes is, however, neces sary in American chancery courts, as the right of appeal is frequently confined to final decrees, as in the federal courts. The form er is entered on some plea or issue arising in the cause which does not decide the main question ; the latter settles the matter in dis pute; and a final decree has the same effect as a judgment at law; 2 Madd. 462; 1 Ch. Ca. 27; 2 Vern. 89; 4 Brown, P. C. 287. See 7 Viner, Abr. 394; 7 Comyns, Dig. 445; 1 Belt, Suppl. Ves. 223; McGarrahan v. Maxwell, 28 Cal. 75, 85. For forms of decrees, see Seton, Decrees ; 2 Dan Ch: Pr. 986.