They must be delivered (see DELIVERY; Es CROW ; delivery is said not to be necessary in the case of a body corporate, for the affix ing of the common seal' to the deed is tanta mount to delivery; L. R. 2 H. L. 296) ; and accepted; Canning v. Pinkham, 1 N. H. 353; Buffum v. Green, N. N. H. 71, 20 Am. Dec. 562 ; Jackson v. Bodle, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 187 ; 13 Cent. L. J. 222 ; Richardson v. Grays, 85 Ia. 149, 52 N. W. 10; Schwab v. Rigby, 38 Minn. 395, 38 N. W. 101. A deed may be de livered by doing something and saying noth ing, or by saying something and doing noth ing, or it may be by both ; Flint v. Phipps, 16 Or. 437, 19 Pac. 543. Deeds conveying real estate must by statute in some states be ac knowledged and recorded; Lewis v. Herrera, 208 U. 5. 309, 28 Sup. Ct. 412, 52 L. Ed. 506. See ACKNOWLEDGMENT; RECORD. In Pennsyl vania this is unnecessary to its validity as between the parties ; 'Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451, 23 Atl. 223.
"A deed is irrevocable and binding on the promisor from the moment of its delivery by him, even before any acceptance by the prom isee. The promisor does not, strictly speak ing, thereby create an obligation, but rather declares himself actually bound. The very object of the Anglo-Norman writing under seal was to dispense with any other kind of proof ; Pollock, Contr. 7.
The requisite number of witnesses is also prescribed by statute in most of the states. Formal parts. The premises embrace the statement of the parties, the consideration, recitals inserted for explanation, description of the property granted, with the intended exceptions. The habendum begins at the words "to have and to hold," and limits and defines the estate which the grantee is to have. The reddendum,, which is used to re serve something to the grantor, see EXCEP TioN; the conditions, see CONDITION ; the covenants, see COVENANT ; WARRANTY ; and the conclusion, which mentions the execu tion, date, etc., properly follow in the observed here ; 3 Waslib. R. P. 365.
The construction of deeds is favorable to their validity ; the principal includes the in cident; punctuation is not regarded ; a false description does not harm ; the construction is least favorable to the party making the conveyance or reservation ; the habendum is rejected if repugnant to the rest of the deed. Shepp. Touchst. 89 ; 3 Kent 422. There is a tendency in the modern decisions to uphold conveyances where not clearly' repugnant to some well defined rule of law ; Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac. 1059, 48 L. R. A.
257, 78 Am. St. Rep. 334 ; Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298 ; Dismukes v. Parrott, 56 Ga. 513; Uhl v. R. Co., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340; Sherwood v. Whiting, 54 Conn. 330, 8 Atl. 80, 1 Am. St. Rep. 116 ; Love v.. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac. 1059, 48 L. R. A. 257, 78 Am. St. Rep. 334, where an instrument, con veying lands to the grantor's children, but the estate not to vest in them until the death of the grantor, was held not to be testamen tary, but to be a deed presently passing an estate in remainder to the grantees, reserv ing a life estate to the grantor. To the same effect; Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S. W. 998, 68 L. R. A. 180, 7 Ann. Cas. 788. The true test in such cases is the intention of the maker ; Love v. Blauw, 61 Kan. 496, 59 Pac. 1059, 48 L. R. A. 257, 78 Am. St. Roll 334; Nolan v. Otney, 75 Kan. 311, 89 Pac. 690, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317 ; Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S. W. 998, 68 L. R. A. 180, 7 Ann. Cas. 788, where it is said to be the sounder policy in case of doubt to declare the instrument a deed, and thus make it ef fectual, when holding it to be testamentary would, for want of the requisite number of witnesses, render it nugatory ; West v. Wright, un Ga. 277, 41 S. E. 602. Such an instrument was held a deed, though the de livery was made dependent upon the per formance of a condition as well as upon the happening of a contingency ; Hutton v. Cra mer, 10 Ariz. 110, 85 Pac. 483, 103 Pac. 497, where the condition (that the grantee should give the grantor a respectable burial) was incapable of performance in the lifetime of the grantor ; so in McCurry v. McCurry (Tex.) 95 S. W. 35; but a conveyance re citing that the grantee should come into pos session of the property after the death of the grantor on condition that the grantee should care for the grantor as long as he should live, was held to be testamentary ; Culy v. Upham, 135 Mich. 131, 97 N. W. 405, 106 Am. St. Rep. 388 ; in Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797, 41 L. R. A. 258, held, that if the grantor reserves the right to recall the deed, the transaction is testamentary ; and so in Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 26 N. W. 426, 60 Am. Rep. 291, it is held no valid de livery can be accomplished by the deposit of a deed with a custodian who is directed to hold it, not only until the grantor dies, but until the grantee does something on his part, and then deliver it, unless the required act is one intended to be performed or capable of performance while the grantor is yet alive.