This question was elaborately considered by the supreme court in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294. In this case it was held that the authority conferred by a tariff act upon the president to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugar, etc., when he should be satisfied that any country produc ing such articles imposed duties or other exactions upon agricultural or other products of the United States, did not conflict with the recognized principle that congress could not delegate its legislative power to the pres ident. The law was complete when it was declared that the suspension should take ef fect upon a named contingency, the presi dent was the mere agent to ascertain the event upon which the legislative will was to take effect. The court quotes with ap proval the language, often cited, of Ranney, J., in Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. County Com'rs, 1 Ohio St. 88: "The true distinc tion is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and con ferring authority or discretion as to its exe cution, to be exercised under and in pursu ance of the law. The first cannot be done ; to the latter no valid objection can be made." Two Pennsylvania cases are quoted with approval as follows: "Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some person or peisons to whom is confided the duty of determin ing whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law." Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. 188, 202. "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the legis lature of the power to act wisely fof the public welfare whenever a law is passed re lating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction, the court said, was this: "The legislature cannot del egate its power to make a law ; but it can make a law to delegate a power to deter mine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and must, therefore, be subject to inquiry and deter mination outside of the halls of legislation." Appeal of Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 498, 13 Am. Rep. 716.
While it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws and and administrative authority to make regula tions, congress may delegate power to fill up details where it has indicated its will in the statute, and it may make violations of such regulations punishable as indicated in the statute. Regulations of the secretary of ag riculture as to grazing sheep on forest re serves have the force of law ; and violation thereof is punishable under R. S. Sec. 5388 ; U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563. The authority given by congress to the secretary of war to prescribe rules and regulations for the use, adminis tration, and control of canals, etc., owned or
operated by the United States, is held not to be a delegation of legislative power, and rules made pursuant thereto have the force of law ; U. S. v. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. 207. So au thority given to the same officer to decide as to whether bridges over navigable rivers in terfere with navigation is not a delegation of legislative power ; Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523 ; U. S. v. City of Moline, 82 Fed. 592 ; and see Miller v. New 'York, 109 U. S. 385, 3 Sup. Ct. 228, 27 L. Ed. 971; nor is the de termination of the treasury department of standards of teas that may be imported ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525. Congress may con fer upon the department of commerce and la bor the power to determine the right of a Chinese person to enter the United States and may make the decision of that depart ment_ conclusive on the federal courts in ha beas corpus proceedings even where citizen ship is the ground on which the right of en try is claimed ; U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040.
Where the decision of questions of fact is committed by congress to the judgment of the head of a department, his decision is conclusive ; and even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone, there is a strong presumption of its correctness and the courts will not ordinarily review it, al though they may occasionally do so ; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 48 L. Ed. 894, where the court re fused to interfere with the decision of the postmaster general as to the postal rates to be charged' on a certain publication. The findings of the land department are treated by the courts as conclusive, though such pro ceedings involve, to a certain extent, the ex ercise of judicial power ; Burfenning v. R. Co., 163 U. S. 321, 16 Sup. Ct. 1018, 41 L. Ed. 175 ; Johnson v. Drew, 171 U, S. 93, 18 Sup. Ct. 800, 43 L. Ed. 88. And since the land department is constituted a special tribunal with judicial functions, neither injunction nor mandamus will lie against an officer of that department to control him in discharg ing an official duty requiring the exercise of his judgment and discretion ; U. S. v. Hitch cock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 698, 47 L. Ed. 1074, citing Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.
S. 473, 25 L. Ed. 800; Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 347, 19 L. Ed. 62 ; U. S. v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct. 12, 32 L. Ed. 354 ; U. S. v. Windom, 137 U. S. 636, 11 Sup. Ct. 197, 34 L. Ed. 811.
There seems to be a presumption that of ficers of state making rules under statutory powers have not exceeded their authority ; Lord Esher in (1887) 18 Q. B. Div. 383, 400.
The legislature may confer upon commis sions the power to determine for what pur poses, and upon what terms, conditions, and limitations, an increase of capital stock may be made by railroad corporations ; State v.1 Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289, 10