DOUBT. The uncertainty which exists in relation to a fact, a proposition, or other thing; an equipoise of the mind arising from an equality of contrary reasons. Ayliffe, Pand. 121.
Some rules, not always infallible, have been adopted in doubtful cases, in order to arrive at the truth. 1. In civil cases, the doubt ought to operate against him who, hav ing it in his power to prove facts to remove the doubt, has neglected to do So. In cases of fraud, when there is a doubt, the presump tion of innocence ought usually to remove it. 2. In criminal cases, whenever a reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused, that doubt ought to operate in his favor. In such cases, particularly the liberty, honor, or life of an individual is at stake, the evidence to convict ought to be clear and devoid of all reasonable doubt.
The term reasonable doubt is often used, but not easily defined. Failure to explain reasonable doubt in a charge is not error; Thigpen v. State, 11 Ga. App. 846, 76 S. E. 596. The words require no definition ; anan v. State, 11 Ga. App. 756, 76 S. E. 73. It is a better practice not to define it; Holmes v. State (Tex.)" 150 S. W. 926; State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129. "It is not mere possible doubt ; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral cer tainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is. upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evi dence are in favor of innocence ; and every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquit tal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary ; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral cer tainty; a certainty that convinces and di rects the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take
to be proof beyond reasonable doubt ; because if the law, which mostly depends upon consid erations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence al together." Per Shaw, C. J., in Corn. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 320, 52 AM. Dec. 711; Schmidt v. Ins. Co., 1 Gray (Mass.) 534; Bethel' v. Moore, 19 N. State v. Goldsborough, Roust. Cr. Rep. (Del.) 316. In approving the opinion of Shaw, C. J., the court in Peo ple v. Wreden, 59 Cal. 395, says: "There can be no 'reasonable doubt' of a fact after it has been clearly established by satisfactory proof." No man should be deprived of life under the form of law unless the jury can say upon their conscience that the evidence is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged ; Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353, 40 L. Ed. 499.
Reasonable doubt is the result of proof, not the proof itself ; whereas the pre sumption of innocence is one of the instru ments of proof going to bring about the proof from which reasonable doubt arises ; thus one is a cause and the other an effect. To say that one is the equivalent of the other is therefore to say that legal evidence can be excluded from the jury, and that such exclusion may be cured by instructing them correctly in regard to the method by which they are required to reach their conclusions upon the proof actually before them ; Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. 394, 39 L. Ed. 481. It must be an actual, substan tial doubt, arising from the evidence or want of evidence in the case ;. Langford v. State, 32 Neb. 782, 49 N. W. 766.