In some states there are constitutional pro visions covering this subject, sixteen of them requiring compensation when property is damaged by such proceedings generally, and three others when the delegated power of eminent domain is exercised by corporations. Under these provisions compensation is re quired for property "damaged" as well as "taken," and the former word is held to in dude all actual damages resulting from the exercise of the right of eminent domain which diminiSh the market value of private property ; City of Omaha v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 41 N. W. 295, 13 Am. St. Rep. 504 ; Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 Pac. 317, 56 Am. Rep. 109; City of Atlanta v. Green, 67 Ga. 386; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Ayres, 106 Ill. 511; Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson, 45 Ark. 429.
The treatment by the courts of the subject of consequential damages is illustrated by the course of decisions under two constitu tions of Illinois, by the supreme court of that state, which is very elaborately reviewed in a judgment of the supreme court of the Unit ed States. The constitution of 1848 prohibit ed the taking or application to public use of property without just compensation; and the rule adopted by the courts was that any physical injury to private property, by the erection, etc., of a public improvement, in or along a public highway, whereby its use was materially interrupted, was to be regarded as a taking, within the meaning of the con stitution. The constitution of 1870 provided that private property should not be taken or damaged without just compensation, and up on this it was held that the property owner was protected against any substantial dam age, though consequential, and that it did not require a trespass or actual physical in vasion; Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 ; City of Chicago v. Bldg. Ass'n, 102 Ill. 379, 40 Am. Rep. 598 ; Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U. S. 161, 8 Sup. Ct. 820, 31 L. Ed. 638. In the judgment last cited Harlan, J., said : "We concur in that construction" and "we regard that case (Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64) as conclusive of this question." This constitution of Illinois was the first in which the word "damaged" was inserted, but in 1894 the supreme court of Colorado enu merated fourteen other states which had then adopted the word ; City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 Pac. 789, 24 L. R. A. ,?.92, 46 Am. St. Rep. 273.
In awarding damages to one, a part of whose land is sought to be condemned for public use, for injury to his remaining land, injury to tracts not connected with, and held under different titles from, although adjoin ing, that from which the parts are taken, cannot be considered ; Sharpe v. U. S., 112 Fed. 893, 50 C. C. A. 597, 57 L. R. A. 932, where Gray, J., upon careful examination of the question, says that it is right and proper to include the damages, in the shape of deterioration of value, to the residue of the tract, but that, to apply this rule, "re gard is had to the integrity of the tract as a unitary holding" and, where the holding from which the part is taken is "of such a character that its integrity as an individual tract shall have been destroyed by the tak ing, depreciation in the value of the residue
. . . may properly be considered allowa ble damages in adjusting the compensation to be given to the owner fell. the land taken. It is often difficult, when part of a tract is taken, to determine what is an independent tract, but the character of the holding, and the distinction between the residue of a tract, whose integrity is destroyed by the taking, and what are merely other parcels or holdings of the same owner, must be kept in mind." The case is accompanied in the last citation by a note in which the cases are examined and which concludes that "the general rule is that when property- is so sit uated that it is used as a unit, and each part is dependent upon the ,other, the dam ages will not be limited in eminent domain to the particular piece taken, but will ex tend to the whole." Substantially this rule has been applied in a great variety of cases to both country and city property ; Gorgas v. R. Co., 215 Pa. 501, 64 Atl. 680, 114 Am. St. Rep. 974; Jeffery v. Osborne, 145 Wis. 351, 129 N. W. 931; Union Traction Co. v. , Pfeil, 39 Ind. App. 51, 78 N. E. 1052 ; St. Louis, Memphis & S. E. R. Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 205 Mo. 167, 103 S. W. 977, 120 Am. St. Rep. 724; West Skokie Drainage Dist. v. Dawson, 243 Ill. 175, 90 N. E. 377, 17 Ann. Cas. 776; In re Lehigh Valley R. Co., 78 N. J. L. '699, 76 Atl. 1067 ; State v. Su perior Court of Clarke County, 44 Wash. 108, 87 Pac. 40; Chicago & W. M. Ry. Co. v. Huncheon, 130 Ind. 529, 30 N. E. 636; Union Elevator Co. v. R. Co., 135 Mo. 353, 36 S. W. 1071; Rudolph v. R. Co., 186 Pa. 541, 40 Atl. 1083, 47 L. R. A. 782; and see Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 568, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270, where the cases are considered by Gray, J. But this rule did not apply when a man owned one parcel in severalty and he and his wife the other in entirety, even if the two were used for a common purpose; Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N. E. 234; and it has been held that the rule does not apply to parcels, not used as a whole for one purpose, when separated by highways; Baker v. R. Co., 236 Pa. 479, 84 Atl. 959; or to such parcels separated by a railroad ; Kansas City, M. & 0. R. Co. v. Littler, 70 Kan. 556, 79 Pac. 114; or a stream of water ; St. Louis, M. & S. E. R. Co. v. Aubuchon, 199 Mo. 352, 97 S. W. 867, 116 Am. St. Rep. 499, 8 Ann. Cas. 822, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 426, and note which repeats the con clusion of that above cited, that the right to have the parcels treated as one must de pend on unity of use and dependence of each parcel on the other ; Baker v. R. Co., 236 Pa. 479, 84 Atl. 959, supra.