2, 133 U. S. 553, 10 Sup. Ct. 374, 33 L. Ed. 740. See contra, Hart v. Board of Levee Com'rs, 54 Fed. 559. Such statute may be treated by the land owner as void ; Boston & L. R. Co. v. R. Co., 2 Gray (Mass.) 1; and he has the same rights against a trespasser un der color of such authority as if it did not exist ; id.; Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge Co. V. Bridge Co., 7 N. H. 35. Such an act is, however, said not to be so far void as not to warrant the acquisition of the property by purchase ; Carbon Coal & Min. Co. v. Drake, 26 Kan. 345. This compensation must be in money ; Com. v. Peters, 2 Mass. 125; Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 304, 1 L. Ed. 391; Murphy v. De Grott, 44 Cal. 51; Chicago, M. & St. P. v. Mel ville, 66 Ill. 329; State v. Sewer Com'rs, 39 N. J. L. 665.
In constitutional construction the words "just," "ample," "full," "adequate," "due," etc., prefixed to the word "compensation," has been said to lend no appreciable addi tional weight ; Rand. Em. Dom. § 223 ; but much stress has often been put upon it by courts. The word "just" in the fifth amend ment excludes the taking into account as an element in the compensation any supposed benefit that the owner may receive in com-' mon with all from the public uses to which his private property is appropriated and leaves it to stand as a declaration that no Private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equiva lent for it be returned to the owner ; Monon gahela Nay. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 326, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463. The word "just" is not used as an antithesis of unjust, but "evidently to intensify the meaning of the word compensation;" Virginia & T. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165 ; it means recompense "all circumstances considered ;" McIntire v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 384, "to save the owner from suffering in his property or estate . . . as far as compensation in money can go ;" Bangor & P. R. Co. v. McComh, 60 Me. 290 ; -"making the owner good by an equivalent in money ;" Bigelow v. R. Co., 27 Wis. 478.
The Federal Power. All lands held by private owners everywhere within the geo graphical limits of the United States are subject to the authority of the general gov ernment to take them for such objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it ; Cherokee Nation v. R. Co., 135 IL S. 641, 10 Sup. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295. The federal government exercises its own right of eminent domain subject to the constitu tional limitations requiring compensation ; it does not proceed under the right of the state and the measure of compensation in each case may be •different; Town of Nahant v. U.
S., 136 Fed. 273, 70 C. C. A. 641, 69 L. R. A. 723, modified in U. S. v. Town of Nahant, 153 Fed. 520, 82 C. C. A. 470 ; Alexander v. U. S., 39 Ct. Cl. 383 ; Burt v. Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339 ; the consent of the state is not necessary for the condemna tion, but only for the transfer of jurisdic tion; People v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94. It has the right in territory acquired either by purchase or conquest ; People v. Folsom, 5 Cal. 373.
The right of eminent domain is one of the powers of the federal government essential to its independent existence and perpetuity. Among the purposes for which it is exercised are the acquisition of lands for forts, ar mories, arsenals, navy yards, light-houses, customhouses, post-offices, court-houses, and other public uses. The right may be exer cised within the states without application to them for permission to exercise it ; Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449 ; the fact that the power has not been exercised ad versely does disprove its existence, nor does the fact that in some instances the states have condemned lands for the use of the general government ; id. It is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses but not for those of another ; hence the power of the United States must be complete in itself, it can neither be enlarged nor diminished, nor can the manner of its exercise be regulated by the state whose consent is not a condi tion precedent to its enjoyment ; id.
Originally the method of proceeding was usually for the state to condemn lands for the United States when needed by the latter ; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590 ; U. S. v. Dump lin Island, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 24 ; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229 ; Burt v. Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356, 8 Am. Rep. 339 ; and the power has been delegated by the state to the United States within a comparatively recent period; In re Certain Land in Lawrence, 119 Fed. 453 ; but this method is not only unnecessary, but is not based on correct principles, since the absolute and unqualified power belongs to the federal government, and that method has been disapproved ; Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449 ; Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444, 74 Am. Dec. 550 ; In re Appoint ment of U. S. Com'rs, 96 N. Y. 227. When the taking of property is authorized by con gress, the proceedings are carried on under federal law ; Town of Nahant v. U. S., 136 Fed. 273, 70 C. C. A. 641, 69 L. R. A. 723.