ENTIRETY. This word denotes the whole, in contradistinction to moiety, which denotes the half part. A husband and wife, when jointly seized of land, are seized by entireties per tout and not per my et per tout, as joint tenants are. Jacob, Law Diet.; 2 Kent 132. See In re Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 Atl. 405, 22 L. R. A. 594, 36 Am. St. Rep. 64. PER TOUT ET NON PER MY.
The same words of conveyance that would make two other persons joint tenants will make the husband and wife tenants of the entirety ; Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Scott, 38 S. C. 34, 16 S. E. 185, 839 ; Oglesby v. Bing ham, 69 Miss. 795, 13 South. 852 ; Noblitt v. Beebe, 23 Or. 4, 35 Pac. 248 ; Chambers v. Chambers, 92 Tenn. 707. 23 S. W. 67.
Such an estate has the quality of survivor ship, whereby the heirs of the survivor take, to the exclusion of the heirs of the first de ceased ; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402, 33 Am, Rep. 266 ; Kunz v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch. 404, 68 Atl. 450. There can be no partition between tenants by entireties ; Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391; no interest in it can be sold on execution for the debts of the husband or wife ; id.; Almond v. Bonnell, 76 Ill. 537. But in Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337, 30 L. R. A. 305, 43 Am. St. Rep. 762, a purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale which covered the property held in entirety and in which the wife did not join was held to become a tenant in common with the wife as to such property; and to the same effect Washburn v. Burns, 34 N. J. L. 18. In Butt lar v. Rosenblath, 42 N. J. Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695, 59 Am. Rep. 52, an act which in terms preserves to a married woman her separate right of property was held to change the status of an estate by entirety to the extent of limiting the rights of the creditors of the husband to subject the use of only his half of such an estate to the payment of his debts.
That a judgment against the husband is not a lien on real estate owned himself and wife' by entirety, and that they can con vey it free and clear of an unsatisfied judg ment lien against him (valid on land owned by him personally), is held ; Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424, 89 Am. Dec. 471, where it is said: "As between husband and wife, there but one owner, and that is neither the one nor the other, but both together. The estate be longs as well to the wife as to the husband." The husband cannot therefore possess any interest separate from his wife, nor can he alienate or encumber the estate. From the peculiar nature of this estate and from the legal relation of the parties, there must be unity of estate, unity of possession, unity of control, and unity in conveying or encum bering it ; and it necessarily results that it cannot be seized and sold upon execution for the separate debts of either the husband or the wife ; followed in Hulett v. Inlow, 57
Ind. 412, 26 Am. Rep. 64 ; Barren Creek Ditching Co. v. Beck, 99 Ind. 247; and to the same effect, Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463, 116 Am. St. Rep. 791, 9 Ann. Cas. 137 ; Dickey v. Con verse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N. W. 80, 72 Am. St. Rep. 568 ; Bank v. Corder, 32 W. Va. 232, S. E. 220 ; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S. W. 1000, 30 L. R. A. 315, 49 Am. St. Rep. 921; Ray v. Long, 132 N. C. 891, 44 S. E. 652.
Where a husband and wife sold land owned by them as tenants by en-rptv no mortgage to husband and wife, the wife died, and the bond was paid, it was held that one half the proceeds belonged to the wife's legal representatives ; In re Baum, 121 App. Div. 496, 106 N. Y. Supp. 113.
Where a wife pays for land and consents that the title may be taken in the name of herself and husband, they hold as tenants in entirety, and a conveyance by the husband passeg the rights to the possession of the land during their joint lives, and to the fee in case the husband survive ; Hiles v. Fisher, 67 Hun 229, 22 N. Y. Supp. 795; Phelps v. Simons, 159 Mass. 415, 34 N. E. 657, 38 Am. St. Rep. 430.
In Merritt v. Whitlock, 200 Pa. 50, 49 Atl. 786, it was said it might be considered as still• an open question whether husband and wife may not, since the married woman's acts, take, as well as hold in common, if there be a clear actual intent, notwithstanding the presumption to the contrary. But a later case in the same state holds that as the qual ity of the estate is determined at its incep tion, that estate could not be stripped of any of its incidents except by express stat utory provision existing at the time of its in ception ; Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 463, 116 Am. St. Rep. 791, 9 Ann. Cas. 137.
This estate, where it exists as at common law, is not affected by the statutes for the protection of married women, nor by statutes providing that conveyances to two or more persons shall be deemed to create a tenancy in common and not a joint tenancy; Kunz v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch. 404, 68 Atl. 450.
As to the effect of the married woman's acts on estates held by entirety, see MARRIED