214; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903, 962, 29 L. Ed. 185 ; U. S. v. Kaufman, 96 U. S. 567, 24 L. Ed. 792 ; U. S. v. Bank, 104 U. S. 728, 26 L. Ed. 908 ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L: Ed. 128; Huntington v. Worthen, U. S. 102, 7 Sup. Ct. 469, 30 L. Ed. 588.
The same principle is applied in the state governments. In a recent case in Louisiana it was held that the executive officers of the state government have no authority to decline the performance of, purely minis terial duties imposed upon them by a stat ute, on the ground that it is unconstitutional. An executive officer cannot nullify a law by neglecting or refusing to act under it ; State v. Heard, 47 La. Ann, 1679, 18 South. 746, 47 L. R. A. 512.
The so-called war powers of the executive, so much discussed during the Civil War, do not now present a practical subject for dis cussion, and may be passed, with this quo tation from a judicious writer on the sub ject : "During our Civil War, many powers were claim ed and exercised by the president under a stringen cy of circumstances for which no provision had been made in the constitution. Secession being the out growth of the doctrine of states governed by com pact and not by law, it became necessary, in the complication growing out of the war, whether in the form of military occupancy and blockade, iegislative reconstruction, or judicial protection of persons and property in the seceded states, to find by impli cation, in the executive department, certain war powers not hitherto contemplated and never before invoked. While the general results of their exercise doubtless contributed to the restoration of the Un ion, and the re-establishment of the government of the United States over all its territory, these powers were so far anomalous in their assumption as to afford no justifiable precedents for the government of the executive, in the ordinary circumstances of our federal administration. A formal discussion of their scope and application has accordingly been omitted, because they present exceptions in the body of our constitutional legislation that are never again likely to be repeated." Ordronaux, Const. Leg. 109. See Whiting, War Powers under the Con stitution ; Campbeli, • Collection of Pamphlets on Habeas Corpus, Martial Law, etc.
The president is not responsible to the courts, civil or criminal ; Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatchf. 451, Fed. Cas. No. 4,186; nor are his acts reviewable by them to the extent of bringing them into conflict with him; Missis sippi v. JohnSdn, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 475, 18 L. Ed. 437 ; except that they may declare' void an order or regulation in excess of his pow ers; U. S. v. The Franklin, 1 GalL 137, Fed. Cas. No. 10,585 ; 9 Am. Law Reg., 524; but with respect to all of his political functions growing out of the foreign relations, the con trol, of military officers, and his relations with congress, it is settled that the courts have no control whatever ; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 20, 8 L. Ed. 25;
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (U. S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 475, 18 L. Ed. 437; 1 Goodn. Comp. Adm. L. 34, 73; Pom. Const. L. § 633. See also 1 Ves. 467; 1 Ves, Jr. 375; 2 id. 56.
All the acts of the president by which his political powers are exercised are considered equally political, and are only brought with in the scope of judicial examination where the act of some inferior ministerial officer, who is the direct instrument for exercising the executive function, is submitted to the scrutiny of the courts. This usually occurs where the constitutionality of a law is ques tioned by the judicial examination of the act of some officer who has attempted to carry the law into execution. In such a case there is not a direct judicial examina tion of the presidents acts, or those of his subordinates, but merely the determination of the question whether there is a' valid law ; id. 419 ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60; Mississippi v. John son, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 4.75, 18 L. Ed. 437; Pom. Const. Law § 633.
So, as a necessary incident of the power to perform his executive duties, must be in cluded freedom from any obstruction or im pediments ; accordingly, the president can not be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or de tention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability ; 2 Sto. Const. § 1569.
Whether in any case a court may issue a mandamus to the governor of a state is a question on which the decisions are not uni form. In some states it is held that, al though conceding the independence of the executive from the control of the judiciary with respect to political duties and powers, as to ministerial duties imposed upon the executive, which might have been committed to another officer, the writ may be resorted to ; Cotten v. Ellis, 52 N. C. 545 ; State v. Chase, 5 Ohio St. 528 ; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 2 Am. Rep. 432 ; Groome v. Gwinn, 43 Md. 572 ; Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Routt, 17 Colo. 156, 28 Pac. 1125, 15 L. R. A. 369, 31 Am. St. Rep. 284; Ten nessee & C. R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371; State v. Thayer, 31 Neb. 82, 47 N. W. 704; Chumasero v. Potts, 2 Mont. 242 ; Martin v. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641, 17 Pae. 162. But the weight of authority would seem to be in favor of the contrary opinion ; In re Den nett, 32 Me. 508, 54 Am. Dec. 602 ; Mauran v. Smith, 8 R. I. 192, 5 Am. Rep. 564; People v. Cullum, 100 Ill. 472; State v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S. W. 376, 23 L. R. A. 194, 41 Am. St. Rep. 705 ; Hovey v. State, 127 Ind. 588,