As between the states, fugitives from justice have no right of asylum, in the international sense ; and a fugitive who has been returned by interstate rendition may be tried for other offences than that for which his return was demanded, without violating any rights se cured by the constitution or laws of the Unit ed States; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283 ; Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 13 Sup. Ct. 687, 37 L. Ed. 549, affirming id., 90 Ga. 347.16 S. E. 945, 35 Am. St. Rep. 216; State v. Glover, 112 N. C. 896, 17 S. E. 525 ; People v. Cross, 135 N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. 246, 31 Am. St. Rep. 850 ; Com. v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149, 33 N. E. 82, 19 L. R. A. 206, 35 Am. St. Rep. 475 ; State v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505, 22 S. W. 696 ; Water man v. State, 116 Ind. 51, 18 N. E. 63 ; State v. Kealy, 89 Ia. 94, 56 N. W. 283 ; Carr v. State, 104 Ala. 4, 16 South. 150; State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N. W. 429, 50 Am. St. Rep. 388 ; Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645 ; Williams v. Weber, 1 Colo. App. 191, 28 Pac. 21; In re Brophy, 2 Ohio N. P. 230 ; Har land v. Territory, 3 Wash. Ty. 131, 13 Pac. 453 ; contra, In re Baruch, 41 Fed. 472 ; In re Fitton, 45 Fed. 471; State v. Hall, 40 Kan. 338, 19 Pac. 918, 10 Am. St. Rep. 200 ; State v. Meade, 56 Kan. 690, 44 Pac. 619 ; In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N. W. 280. In some states the courts have overruled former de cisions, bringing themselves in accord with the United States supreme court ; Petry v. Leidigh, 47 Neb. 126, 66 N. W. 308; see In re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N. W. 267, 8 L. R. A. 398, 26 Am. St. Rep. 378 ; In re Brophy, 2 Ohio N. P. 230 ; Ex parte McKnight, 3 Ohio N. P. 255; id., 48 Ohio St. 588, 28 N. E. 1034, 14 L. R. A. 128. See 12 L. Rev. 532.
Habeas corpus will not lie to release from custody one who has been forcibly abducted from another state and brought to trial into the jurisdiction of a tribunal having jurisdic tion, of the offence charged; Ex parte Davis, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 608, 103 S. W. 891, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 225, 14 Ann. Cas. 522 ; and to the same effect Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421, where the pris oner was kidnapped in Peru, without any pretence of authority under the treaty or from the United States, and brought to Ill inois; his trial in the state courts was held not to involve a violation of the due process clause of the constitution, nor of the treaty with Peru. The principle upon which the judgment rested was that when a criminal is brought into, or is in fact within, the custody of the state, charged with a crime against its laws, the state may, so far as the constitu tion and laws of the United States are con cerned, proceed against for the crime, and need not inquire as to the particular methods employed to bring him into the state. In meeting the contention that the accused, by virtue of the treaty with Peru, acquired by his residence a right of asylum, it was said: "There is no language in this treaty, or in any other treaty made by this country on the subject of extradition of which we are aware, which says in terms that a party flee ing from the United States to escape punish ment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which he has fled." The right of a government voluntarily to give an asylum is different from the right to demand security in such asylum. The trea •V, so far as it regulates the right of asylum at all, is intended to limit this right in one who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from justice, so that on proper demand and pro ceedings had therein the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him up to the country where the crime was committed. To this extent, and to this alone, the treaty does regulate or impose a restriction upon the right of the government of the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from re moval therefrom. In Mahon v. Justice, 127
U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283, the governor of Kentucky made a requisition up on the governor of West Virginia for one charged with the crime of murder in Ken tucky, alleged to have fled from its jurisdic tion and taken refuge in West Virginia. While the two governors were in correspond ence on the subject, a body of armed men without warrant or other legal process, ar rested the accused in West Virginia and delivered him to the jailor of Pike county, Kentucky, in the courts of which he stood in dicted for murder. Thereupon the governor of West Virginia, on behalf of that state, ap plied to the district court of the United States for the Kentucky district for a writ of habeas corpus and his return to the juris diction of West Virginia. The supreme court held that no mode is provided by which a person unlawfully abducted from one state to another can be restored to the state from which he was taken, if held upon any process of law for offences against the state to which he has been carried. The decision was by a divided court, but its authority is said to be none the less controlling ; Moyer v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 221, 27 Sup. Ct. 121, 51 L. Ed. 160 ; affirming In re Moyer, 12 Idaho 250, 85 Pac. 897, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 227, 118 Am. St. Rep. 214. In Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 13 Sup. Ct. 40, 36 L. Ed. 934, it was said that the cases of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421, and Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283, established two propositions : 1. That that court will not interfere to relieve persons who have been arrested and taken by vio lence from one state to another, where they are held under process legally issued from the courts of the latter state. 2. That the question of the applicability of this doctrine to a particular case is as much the province of the state courts as a question of common law, or of the law of nations, as it is of the courts of the United States. If a forcible ab duction from another state and conveyance within the jurisdiction of the court holding him is no objection to his detention and trial for the offence charged, no more is the objec tion allowed if the abduction has been accom plished under the forms of law. The act com plained of does not relate to the restraint from which the petitioner seeks to be reliev ed, but to the means by which he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court under whose process he is held; Pettibone v. Nich ols, 203 U. S. 192, 27 Sup. Ct. 111, 51 L. Ed. 148, where conspiracy was charged against the governors 'of the states of Idaho and Colorado and other officers to secure the pres ence of Pettibone in the former state. It was held that the fundamental question was whether a United States circuit court, when asked upon habeas corpus to discharge a per son held in actual custody by a state for trial in one of its courts, under an indictment charging .'a crime against its laws, can prop erly take into account the methods whereby the state obtained such custody, and that that question had been determined in the negative in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 sup. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421, and Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 7007 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 32 L. Ed. 283, supra.
See 15 L. R. A. 177 n.; 12 L. R. A. (N. 225 n.
The constitutional provision for interstate rendition warrants a surrender after convic tion; In re Hope, 7 N. Y. C. R. R. 406, 10 N. Y. Supp. 28; but after serving his sentence the convict cannot be surrendered under a req uisition from another state until lie has had reasonable time to return to the state from which he was extradited; id.
Extradition proceedings may be made the basis of a suit for malicious prosecution; Cas tro v. De Uriarte, 16 Fed. 93.
See FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.