FOREIGN JUDGMENT. A judgment of a foreign tribunal.
It is a general rule that foreign judg ments are admitted as conclusive evidence of all matters directly involved in the case decided, where the same question is brought up incidentally. 1 Greenl. Ev. 547, and note ; Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 572. Such judgments and decrees in rem, whether re lating to immovable property or movables within the jurisdiction of the foreign court, are binding everywhere; L. R. 4 H. L. 414; [1897] 1 Q. B. 55 ; [1896] 2 Q. B. 455. This rule applies to admiralty proceedings in rem founded on actual possession of the subject matter, and garnishment proceeding in a like case.
It seems to' be the better opinion that judgments in personam regular on their face, which are sought to be enforced in another country, are conclusive evidence, subject to a re-examination, in the courts where the new action is brought, only for irregularity, fraud, or lack of jurisdiction as to the cause or parties; 1 Greenl. Dv. § 546; Wesil. Priv. Int. Law 372; Story, Confi. Laws § 607; 2 Swanst. 325; Dougl. 6, n.; 3 Sim. 458 ; 6 Q. B. 288; Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N. H. 227 ; Folger v. Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 273, 96 Am. Dec. 747 ; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Rogers v. Gwinn, 21 Ia. 58 ; but see Sanford v. San ford, 28 Conn. 28; Bicknell v. Field, 8 Paige, Ch. (N. Y.) 440; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 290, 18 L. Ed. 475. It was formerly held that they were prima facie evidence merely. See 2 H. Bla. 410; Dougl. 1, 6; 3 Maule & S. 20; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 6 Am. Dec. 88; Elizabethtown Say. Inst. v. Gerber, 34 N. J. Eq. 130; Carle ton v. Bickford, 13 Gray (Mass.) 591, 74 Am. Dec. 652; State of Indiana v. Helmer, 21 Ia. 370; Pawling v. Wilson, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 192; Tourigny v. Houle, 88 Me. 406, 34 Atl. 158. But this theory has been entirely overthrown, the doctrine of their conclusive character having been settled in England in L. R. 6 Q. B. 179. It is also fully recognized in this country; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 148, 82 Am. Dec. 404; Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y. 571; Rankin v. Goddard, 54 Me. 28, 89 Am. Dec. 7i8; and see 'Hilton v. Guyot, infra.
The subject of the conclusiveness of for eign judgments has been treated with much diversity of opinibn in the English courts. That they are prima facie evidence to sus tain an action is clear according to all the authorities, but whether conclusive, and if net so in all cases, what defences may be admitted, was for a long time not definitely settled by the English 'courts. The cases were very fully reviewed by Judge Redfield with this result : "So that now it may be re garded as fully established in England, that the contract resulting from a foreign judg ment is equally conclusive, in its force and operation, with that implied by any domestic judgment. But there is still a very essential and important distinction between the two.
Domestic judgments rest upon the conclusive force of the record, whiph is absolutely un impeachable. Foreign judgments are mere matters fa pais, to be proved the same as an arbitration and award, or an account stated; to be established, as matter of fact before the jury; and by consequence subject to any contradiction or impeachment which might be urged against auy other matter resting upon oral proof. Hence any fraud which entered into the concoction of the judgment itself is proper to be adduced, as an answer to the same ; but no fraud which occurred and was known to the opposite party, before the rendition of such foreign judgment, and which plight, therefore, have been brought to the notice of the foreign court, can be urged in defence of it. It is proper to add, that while the English courts thus recognize the general force and validity of foreign judgments, it has been done under such limitations and qualifica tions that great latitude still remains for breaking the force of, and virtually disre garding such foreign judgments as proceed upon an obvious misapprehension of the principles governing the case; or where they are produced by partiality or favorit ism, or corruption, or where upon their face they appear to be at variance with the in stinctive principles of universal justice. But these are rare exceptions." Sto. Confi. Laws, Redfield's ed. § 618 a-618 k. And the same conclusion from the English cases is reached in 35 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 277.
An English writer on the subject attrib utes the vacillation of the courts of that country to the fact that two doctrines have been discussed as the basis of the conclusive effect given to a foreign judgment. The earlier theory was that of comity, which, as defined by Blackburn, J., in opposing the doctrine, is that "it is an admitted principle of the law of nations, that a state is bound to enforce within its territories the judg ment of a foreign tribunal ;" L. R. 6 Q. B. 139. This doctrine was supported by Lords Nottingham, Ellenborough, Kenyon, Cock burn, and Brougham, and Chief Baron Pigot, Sir G. Jessel, and Sir R. Phillimore; 2 Swanst. 326, n.; 4 Campb. 28; 4 M. & S. 141; 7 Term 681; 30 L. J. C. P. 177; 2 Cl. & F. 470; Ir. Rep. 1 C. L. 471; 50 L. J. P. 30; L. R. 4 P. C. 144. Of the objections raised the most important was said to be uncertainty ; Piggott, For. Judg. 6. See Sto. Confi. Laws § 598. The other theory, termed that of obligation, is that when a competent court has adjudicated a certain sum to be due, a legal obligation arises to pay that sum, and an action of debt to en force the judgment may be sustained. This was first enunciated by Parke, B., in 1845; 9 M. & W. 810; 14 L. J. Ex. 145; it was approved in 1870 by Blackburn and Mellor,