Knowingly to utter a false letter by which the sentiments, character, prospects, inter ests, etc., of the person whose utterance the writing purports to be are misrepresented, whereby the writer induced a, woman to promise to marry him, was held to be for gery, though not injurious to the person whose name was forged ; People v. Abeel, 182 N. Y. 415, 75 N. E. 307, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 730, 3 Ann. Cas. 287.
The seal of a corporation is a "character" within the meaning of the New Jersey Crimes Act (relating to forgery) and the forgery of such seal is a crime thereunder ; U. S. v. An dem, 158 Fed. 996.
The intent must be to defraud another ; Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. v. Butler, 83 Ia. 128, 48 N. W. 1026; McDonald v. State, 83 Ala. 46, 3 South. 305 ; but it is not requisite that any one should have been injured; it is suffi cient that the instrument forged might have proved prejudicial; Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 220, 22 Am. Dec. 302 ; U. S. v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726, Fed. Cas. No. 15,825 ; Craw ford v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 51, 19 S.V. 766 ; it has been holden that the jury ought to in fer an intent to defraud the person who would have to pay the instrument, if it were genuine, although from the manner of exe cuting the forgery, or from the person's or dinary caution, it would not be likely to im pose upon him ; and although the object was general to defraud whoever might take the instrument, and the intention of the defraud ing in particular the person who would have to pay the instrument, if genuine, did not en ter into the contemplation of the prisoner ; Russ. & R. 291; State v. Cross, 101 N. C. 770, 7 S. E. 715, 9 Am. St. Rep. 53; State v. Gry der, 44 La. Ann. 962, 11 South. 573, 32 Am. St. Rep. 358. See Russ. Cri. b. 4, c. 32, s. 3 ; 2 East, Pl. Cr. 853 ; 1 Leach 367; Rose. Cr.
Ev. 400; Clark, Cr. L. 300.
Most, and perhaps all, of the states have passed laws making certain acts to be for gery with the result, upon the whole, of en larging the meaning of the term, and the na tional legislature has also enacted several on this subject ; but these statutes do not take away the character of the offence as a misde meanor at common law, but only provide ad ditional punishment in the cases particularly enumerated in the statutes ; Com. v. Ayer,. 3 Cush. (Mass.) 150; Com. v. Ray, 3 Gray (Mass.) 441.
It has been held that the crime of uttering forged commercial paper is included in the common-law definition of the word "forgery" as used in a treaty, and that a prisoner charged with it should be surrendered, al though under the law of the other treaty power that crime is known as "fraud" by means of forgery, and "forgery" is only fal sification of public documents; In re Adutt, 55 Fed. 376.
The act of offering for sale and selling a forged instrument is a sufficient representa tion as to its genuineness; State v. Calkins, 73 Ia. 128, 34 N. W. 777.
When separate instruments are forged on the same date and as part of the same gen eral transaction, the forgery of each consti tutes a separate offense; U. S. v. Carpenter, 151 Fed. 214, 81 C. C. A. 194, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1043, 10 Ann. Cas. 509; Barton v. State, 23 Wis. 587.
Although counts for forgery and uttering a forged instrument may be joined in the same indictment. a conviction cannot be had on both ; State v. Carragin, 210 Mo. 351, 109 S. W. 553, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561.
See Hawk. Pl. Cr. b. 1, cc. 51, 70; 3 Chitty, Cr. L. 1022 ; 2 Russ. Cr. b. 4, c. 32; 2 Bish. Cr. L. c. 22 ; 2 Bish. Cr. Proc.* 398 ; 1 Whart.
Cr. L. C. 9; COUNTERFEIT; UTTERING; CHECK; INDORSEMENT,