This provision is not self-executing; Grif fin's Case, Chase 364, Fed. Cas. No. 5,815;, Rothermel v. Meyerle, 136 Pa. 250, 20 Atl. 583, 9 L. R. A. 366 ; Com. v. Deinno, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 371. The disability did not operate at once to vacate offices and render official acts void ; In re Griffin, Chase 364, 25 Tex. Supp. 623, Fed. Cas. No. 5,815 ; but was in tended to operate by legislation ; id.; Pow ell v. Boon & Booth, 43 Ala. 469. It disquali fied any person who held office under the Confederate government as a county attor ney ; In re Tate, 63 N. C. 308 ; or a sheriff ; Worthy v. Barrett, 63 N. C. 199. The result of the early decision of Chief Justice Chase was the enactment of the legislation known as the enforcement acts. See CIVIL RIGHTS.
Section 4 provides for the validity of the public debt, including that incurred for pen sions, and prohibits the assumption or pay ment by the United States or any state of "any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave," all such debts or claims being expressly declared void.
A contract to pay in Confederate money is void as being payment of a debt in aid of rebellion; Smith v. Nelson, 34 Tex. 516 ; but one made in a state in insurrection, if not in aid of rebellion, is valid ; Hale v. Wilkinson, 21 Grat. (Va.) 75. That a debt was incurred in violation of this provision, or on any con sideration forbidden by the constitution of the United States, is not a matter of judi cial notice, but must be pleaded and proved; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 24 L. Ed. 1071.
Section 5 gives power to congress to en force the .amendment by appropriate legis lation.
General Prinalplee of Construction. the language of the proclamations might sug gest some questions respecting the validity of the ratification (Guthrie, XIVth Arndt. 1, note), that question was not afterwards se riously raised in cases before supreme court involving its construction and it has been uniformly treated as duly incorporated into the constitution ; Miller, Const. 655. The adoption of this amendment undoubtedly resulted in broadening the sphere of the fed eral government and greatly enlarging the ju risdiction of the federal courts. Guthrie, XIVth Arndt. ; 1 Burgess, Pol. Sc. & Const. L. 225 ; 1 Hare, Am. Const. L. 747. Fortu nately the supreme court entered 'upon the duty of defining its limitations and constru ing its provisions in a spirit of marked ju dicial impartiality.
The amendment was first authoritatively construed within five years after its adoption, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; and a long line of subsequent cases have served to establish well-settled rules of decision which, although, in some cases, modifying expressions contained in the opinion in the first case, have not departed from its essential principles.
It was judicially recognized that the pur pose of the amendment, together with the XIIIth and XVth, was to secure to the col ored race in the 'South the benefit of the free dom accorded to them; Slaughter-House Cas es, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 71, 21 L. Ed. 394 ; Cooley,
Const. Lim. 498 ; in other words to estab lish the citizenship of the negro ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 26 L. Ed. 664; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 813, 25 L: Ed. 667 ; Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263, 30 Am. Rep. 131. By force of it •negroes born in the United States are entitled to vote and are protected by the act of May 31, 1870, R. S. § 2004 ; U. S. v. Canter, 2 Bond 389, Fed. Cas. No. 14,719.
Nevertheless, it was held that it did not follow that "no one else but the negro can share in this protection," but, "if other rights are assailed by the states which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply ;" Slaugh ter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; In re Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 667 ; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 382, 385, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 ; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 676, 18 Sup. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890. It is a restriction on the states as distinguished from the restric tions on the federal government in the Vth Amendment; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 ; U. S. v. Stanley, 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 ; Le Grand v. U. S., 12 Fed. 581; Santa Clara County v. R. Co., 18 Fed. 385. It is prohibitory on the states only, but the legislation authorized to be en acted by congress for enforcing it is not di rect legislation on matters respecting which the states are prohibited from making or en forcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but it is corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and reducing the effect of such laws or acts ; .U. S. v. Stanley, 109 U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 ; see also Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429. In these cases, known as the Civil Rights Cases, sec tions 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act, intend ed to secure to all persons equal facilities, etc., in inns, public conveyances, theatres, etc., and prescribing penalties for violations, were declared unconstitutional, as direct leg islation; id. The XIVth and XVth Amend ments operate solely on state action and not on individual action ; Hodges v. U. S., 203 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 6, 51 L. Ed. 65. But indict ments were sustained against state officers or persons charged with a duty in the selec tion of jurors, under section 4 of the act, pro viding that no person, otherwise qualified, shall be disqualified by race, color, etc.; In re Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 667. If, however, the states do not conform their leg islation to the amendment congress has au thority to enforce it by appropriate legisla tion ; U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 1 Sup. Ct. 601, 27 L. Ed. 290.