FUGITIVE SLAVE. One who, held in bondage, flees from his master's power.
Prior to the adoption of the constitution of the United States, the duty of surrendering slaves flee ing beyond the jurisdiction of the state or colony where they were held to service was not regarded as a perfect obligation, though, on the ground of inter-state comity, they were frequently surren dered to the master. Instances of such surrender or permission to reclaim occur in the history of the colonies as early as 1685 ; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 592. As slavery disappeared in some states, the difficulty of recovering in them slaves fleeing from those where it remained was greatly increased, and on some occasions reclamations became quite impracticable. The subject engaged the attention of the conven tion of 1787 ; and, at the instance of members from slaveholding states, a provision was inserted in the constitution for the surrender of such persons escaping from the state where- they owed service, into another, which provision was considered a val uable accession to the security of that species- of property; 4 Elliott Debates 487, 492 ; 5 id. 176, 286. This provision is contained in art. Iv. sec. 2 of the constitution, and is as follows: "No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Congress, conceiving it to be the duty of the fed eral government to provide by law, with adequate sanctions, for the execution of the duty thus en joined by the constitution, by the act of February 12, 1793, and again by the amendatory and supple mentary act of September 18, 1850, regulated the mode of arrest, trial, and surrender of such tives. Some of the states have, also, at times pass ed acts relating to the subject ; but it has been de cided by the supreme court of the United States that the power of legislation in the matter was vest ed exclusively in congress, and that all state legis lation inconsistent with the laws of congress was unconstitutional and void ; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 608, 10 L. Ed. 1060; Thornton's Case, 11 Ill. 332.
These acts of congress were held to be constitu tional and valid in all their provisions ; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 608, 10 L. Ed. 1060 ; Wright v. Deacon, 5 S. & R. (Pa.) 62; Glen v. Hodges, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 67; In re Martin, 2 Paine, 348, Fed. Cas. No. 9,154; In re Sims, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285 ; Ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean, 355, Fed. Cas. No. 11,935.
The 3d and 4th sections of act of 1793, 1 Stat. L. 302, authorized the arrest of a slave by the owner, his agent or attorney, and on proof before a United States judge or a magistrate, a certificate of owner ship should be given and he a warrant for removal. Under the act of 1850, 9 Stat. L. 462, the marshals of the United States. were required to ar rest such slaves.
The act of 1850, and the 3d and 4th sections of the act of 1793 were repealed by the act of June 28, 1864, 13 Stat. at L. 200. For some decisions as to the question of the interference between the acts of 1793 and 1850, see Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean,
469, Fed. Cas. No. 9,583 ; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. (U. S.) 429, 14 L. Ed. 210.
In the practical application of the provisions of the acts of 1793 and 1850 for the reclamation of fugi tive slaves, it was held that the owner was clothed with authority in every state of the Union to seize and recapture his slave wherever he could do it without any breach of the peace or illegal violence ; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 608, 10 L. Ed. 1060; that he might arrest him on Sunday, in the night-time, or in the house of another if no breach of the peace was committed ; Johnson v. Tompkins, Baldw. 677, Fed. Cas. No. 7,416 ; that if the arrest was by agent of the owner, he must be authorized by written power of attorney executed and authen ticated as required by the act ; Weimer v. Sloane, 6 McLean, 259, Fed. Cas. No. 17,363; and if his authority was demanded it should be shown ; Dris kill v. Parrish, 3 McLean, 631, Fed. Cas. No. 4,089 ; but he was not required to exhibit it to every one who might mingle in the crowd which obstructed him ; Giltner v. Gorham, 4 McLean 402, Fed. Cas. No. 5,453 ; that, if resisted by force in making the arrest, the owner might use sufficient force to over come the unlawful resistance offered without being guilty of the offence of riot ; 3 Am. L. J. 258; Van Metre v. Mitchell, 7 Pa. L. J. 116 ; that whilst the examination was pending before the magistrate who had jurisdiction of the case, the person arrested was in custody of the law and might be imprisoned for safekeeping ; In re Martin, 2 Paine, 348, Fed. Cas. No. 9,154 ; Worthington v. Preston, 4 Wash. C. C. 461, Fed. Cas. No. 18,055 ; Ex parte Robinson, 6 McLean 355, Fed. Cas. No. 11,935 ; that the act of Sept. 18, 1850, did not operate as a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; 5 Op. Attys. Genl. 254 ; but that that writ could not be used by state officers to defeat the jurisdiction acquired by the federal au thorities in such cases ; In re Sims, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285 ; Norris v. Newton, 6 McLean 92, Fed. Cas. No. 10,307; Charge to Grand Jury, 1 Blatchf. 635; Fed. Cas. No. 18,261; Ahleman v. Booth, 21 How. (U. S.) 506, 16 L. Ed. 169.
The provisions of the constitution and laws above cited were held to extend only to cases where per sons held to service or labor in one state or terri tory by the laws thereof escaped into another. Hence, if the owner voluntarily took his slave into such other state or territory, and the slave left him there or refused to return, he could not institute proceedings under those laws for his recovery ; Ex parte Simmons, 4 Wash. C. C. 396, Fed. Cas. No. 12,863 ; Kauffman v. Oliver, 10 Pa. 517 ; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. (U. S.) 82, 13 L. Ed. 337. And chil dren, born in a state where slavery prevailed, of a negro woman who was a fugitive slave, were not fugitive slaves or slaves who had escaped from serv ice in another state, within the meaning of the con stitution and acts of congress ; Fields V. Walker, 23 Ala. 155.
Since the adoption of the thirteenth amendment of the U. •S. constitution, the above is entirely obso lete and possesses only an historical interest.