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General Laws

class, co, pac, law, pa, legislation and special

GENERAL LAWS. Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon all members of any class of persons, places, or things, re quiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the laws. Binney, Restrictions upon Local and Special Legis lation. Quoted in Com. v. State Treasurer, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 578.

Statutes which relate to persons and things as a class. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 348. Laws that are framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operat ing equally upon all of a group of objects which, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished by characteris tics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. L. 123, 29 Am. Rep. 210.

The later constitutions of many of the states place restrictions upon the legislature as to passing special laws in certain cases. In some states there is a provision that general laws only may be passed, in cases where such can be made applicable. Pro visions requiring all laws of a general nature to be uniform in their operation do not pro hibit the passage of laws applicable to cities of a certain class having not less than a cer tain number of inhabitants, although there be but one city in the state of that class ; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85 ; Cooley, Const. Lim. 156. See Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366.

The wisdom of these constitutional pro visions has been the subject of grave doubt. See Cooley, Const. Lim. 156, n.

When thus used, the term "general" has a twofold meaning. With reference to the subject-matter of the statute, it is synony mous with "public" and opposed to "pri vate" ; Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366 ; Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Arnold, 46 Wis. 218, 49 N. W. 971; Dwarris, Stat. 629; Sedgw. Stat. L. 30; but with reference to the extent of ter ritory over which it is to operate, it is op posed to "local," and means that the stat ute to which it applies operates throughout the whole of the territory subject to the legislative jurisdiction ; 4 Co. 75 a; 1 Bla. Com. 85 ; People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585; King v. State, 87 Tenn. 304, 10 S. W. 509, 3 L. R. A. 210; Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 180. Further, when used in antithesis to "special" it means relating to all of a•class instead of to men only of that class; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 398 ; Hymes v. Aydelott, 26 Ind. 431; Porter v. Thomson, 22 Ia. 391;

Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 348 ; Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390, 32 Pac. 440.

When the constitution forbids the pass ing of special or local laws in specified cases, it is within the discretion of the legislature to decide whether a subject not named in the constitution is a proper subject for gen eral legislation; the fact that a special law is passed in relation thereto is evidence that it was thought that a general law would not serve ; and in such a case clear evidence of mistake is required to invalidate the enact ment ; People v. McFadden, 81 Cal. 489, 22 Pac. 851, 15 Am. St. Rep. 66; Kelly v. State, 92 Ind. 236 ; Richman v. Sup'rs Muscatine County, 77 Ia. 513, 42 N. W. 422, 4 L. R. A. 445, 14 Am. St. Rvp. 308.

In deciding whether or not a given law is general, the purpose of the act and the objects on which it operates must be looked to. If these objects possess sufficient char acteristics peculiar to themselves and the purpose of the legislation is germane there to, they will be considered as a separate class, and legislation affecting them will be general ; Long Branch v. Sloane, 49 N. J. L. 356, 8 Atl, 101; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N. E. 1062, 15 L. R. A. 505; Ripley v. Evans, 87 Mich. 217, 49 N. W. 504; Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finlen, 124 Ill. 666, 17 N. E. 11; Demoville & Co. v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214, 10 S. W. 353 ; but if the distinctive characteristics of the class have no relation to that purpose of the legislature, or if objects which would appropriately belong to the same class have been excluded, the classification is faulty, and the law not general ; Lorentz V. Alex ander, 87 Ga. 444, 13 S. E. 632; City of Pasa dena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604 ; City of Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan. 431, 4 Pac. 800; Inhabitants of Lodi Tp. v. State, 51 N. J. L. 402, 18 Atl. 749, 6 L. R. A. 56; State v. Boyd, 19 Nev. 43, 5 Pac. 735 ; Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N. Dak. 270, 50 N. W. 970, 14 L. R. A. 725 ; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377. The effect, not the form of the law, deter mines its character; D/IcAunich v. R. Co., 20 Ia. 338; State v. Tolle, 71 Mo. 645 ; Demp sey v. Newark, 53 N. J. L. 4, 20 Atl. 886, 10 L. R. A. 700; Marmet v. State, 45 Ohio St. 63, 12 N. E. 463; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258.

See LEGISLATIVE POWER; STATUTE.