GIFT. A voluntary conveyance or trans fer of property ; that is, one not founded on the consideration of money or blood.
A voluntary, immediate and absolute trans fer of property without consideration. Lew is' Estate, 139 Pa. 640, 22 Atl. 635.
As used by the old text writers, it signi fied a distinct species of deed, applicable to the creation of an estate tail; while a feoff ment was strictly confined to the creation of a fee-simple estate. This use is almost ob solete; Wharton. It has been said that the word denotes rather the motive of the con veyance; so that a feoffment or grant may be called a gift when gratuitous. A gift is of the same nature as a settlement; neither denotes a form of assurance, but the nature of the transaction. Watk. Cony. 199. The operative words of this conveyance are do, or give, or I have given. The mak er of this instrument is called the donor, and he to whom it is made, the donee, and the entail is the gift or donation, the issue taking per forman Boni. 2 Bla. Com. 316; Littleton 59; Shepp. Touchst. c. 11; 2 Poll. & Maitl. 12, 81, 211.
Gifts inter vivos are gifts made from one or more persons, without any prospect of Immediate death, to one or more others. Gifts mortis causa are gifts made in pros pect of death.
Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the future, and go into immediate and absolute effect; 2 Kent 439; no further act of the parties is needed to give them effect ; Rob son v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62. Delivery is es sential. Without actual possession, the title does not pass. A mere intention or naked promise to give, without some act to pass the property, is not a gift. There may be repentance (the locus pcenitentice) as long as the gift is incomplete in the mode of making it; 1 Pars. Contr. 245; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 26; but see Poullain v. Poullain, 79 Ga. 11, 4 S. E. 81, where it was held that a donatio inter vireos, as distin guished from a donatio mortis cause, does not require actual delivery, and that it is sufficient to complete a gift inter vivos that the conduct of the parties should show that the ownership of the chattels has been changed.
tinder a gift:a person "may take a benefit to accrue at a future day—it may be at the donor's death; but this can be only through the instrumentality of a trust created either in a third person or in the donor. The ef fect Is to divest at once the former property of the donor in the thing given. Such a gift is no more immediate than in the ordinary case." Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62.
The subject of the gift must be certain; and there must be the mutual consent and concurrent will of both parties. There must be an intention on the part of the donor to make a gift; Thornt. Gifts & Adv. § 70, and
expressions of it are admissible as part of the res gestce; 1 Wils. Ch. 212; In re Ward, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 251 ; Booth v. Cornell, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 261; Stevens v. Stevens, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 265; Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 22 N. E. 1071, 6 L. R. A. 366; and also declara tions of the donor prior to the gift; Smith v. Maine, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 33; if followed up by proof of delivery; Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13; and subsequent to the gift to support it ; Blalock v. Miland, 87 Ga. 573, 13 S. E. 551; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. 925; but not to disapprove it ; Baxter v. Knowles, 12 Allen (Mass.) 114. See Thornt. Gift § 222. Acceptance is also nec essary; Peirce v. Burroughs, 58 N. H. 302; Nickerson v. Nickerson, 28 Md. 327; Thomas v. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459, 18 S. W. 27; and this is true under both the common and civil law; De Levillain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120. It must be in the lifetime of the donor; Esk ridge v. Farrar, 34 La. Ann. 709; but it is presumed if the gift is of value; Thouvenin v. Rodrigues, 24 Tex. 468; Love v. Francis, 63 Minh. 181, 29 N. W. 843, 6 Am. St. Rep.
290. Delivery must be according to the na ture of the thing. It must be an actual de livery, so far as the subject is capable of de livery. If the thing be not capable of actual delivery, there must be some act equivalent to it; something sufficient to work an im mediate change in the dominion of the prop erty; Gartside v. Pahlman, 45 Mo. App. 160. The donor must part not only with the pos session, but with the dominion. If the thing given be a chose in action, the law requires an assignment or some equivalent instru ment, and the transfer must be executed; 1 Swanst. 436; Picot v. Sanderson, 12 N. C. 309. Delivery first and gift afterwards of a chattel capable of delivery, is as effectual as gift first and delivery afterwards ; 64 Law T. 645. The presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the donor arises where a convey ance has been made, without consideration, to one of an estate or other property which has been purchased with the money of an other ; but this presumption is rebutted where the purchase may fairly be deemed to be made for another from motives of natural love and affection ; Appeal of Roberts, 85 Pa. 84; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78, 3 Am. Rep. 115. Knowledge by the donee that the gift has been made is not necessary ; L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 104. The gift is complete when the legal title has actually vested in the do nee; 108 E. C. L. R. 435; and in cases of gifts by husband to wife, or parent to child living at home, the necessity for an actual change of possession does not exist; Appeal of Crawford, 61 Pa. 52, 100 Am. Dec. 609.