In some cases the lathes of the other par ty affects the liability of one who promises under a mistake of law, as, when one, through a mistake of the law, as an endorser of a bill of exchange, acknowledges himself under an obligation which the law will not impose on him, as payment after failure of the bolder to give seasonable notice of protest for non acceptance, he shall not be bound thereby ; Warder v. Tucker, 7 Mass. 452, 5 Am. Dec. 62. See also 2 J. & W. 263 ; 3 B. & C. 280 ; the operation of the rule is adjusted to the equitable conditions existing as between the parties. "If a man has actually paid what the law would not have compelled him to pay, but what in equity and conscience he ought, he cannot recover it back ; Mowatt v. Wright, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 355, 19 Am. Dec. 508 ; Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 79 Am. Dec. 176 ; Evans v. Gale, 17 N. H. 573, 43 Am. Dec. 614; Stewart v. Crosby, 50 Me. 130; but where money is paid under a mis take, which there was no ground to claim in conscience, the party may recover it back ;" 1 Term 285; 15 Am. Rep. 171, 184, note.
"The maxim ignorantia legis imminent ex cusat is not universally applicable, but only when damages have been inflicted or crimes committed. It is true that the law will not permit the excuse of ignorance of the law to be pleaded for the purpose of exempting persons from damages for breach of contract, or from punishment for crimes committed by them, but on other occasions and for oth er purposes, it is evident that the fact that such ignorance existed will sometimes be recognized so as to affect a judicial deci sion ;" Brock v. Weiss, 44 N. J. L. 244; "there is no maxim which says that for all intents and purposes a person must be taken to know the legal consequences of his acts ;" L. R. 3 Q. B. 639; "it would be too much to impute knowledge of this rule of equity" (the doctrine of election) ; Westbury, Ld. Ch., in Spread v. Morgan, 11 H. L. Cas. 602.
According to Lord Westbury in Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 170, the word pus in the maxim ignorantia juris baud excusat is used in the sense of "general law, the law of the country," not in the sense of "a pri vate right." The true meaning of that max im is that parties cannot excuse themselves from liability from all civil or criminal con sequences of their acts by alleging igno rance of the law, but there is no presumption that parties must be taken to know all the legal consequences of their acts, and especial ly where difficult questions of law, or of the practice of the court are involved ; Lord Fitz Gerald, Seaton v. Seaton, in L. R. 13 Ap. Cas. 78.
"There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law ; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so." 2 C. B. 719, per Maule, J. The maxim is said to be "a slovenly way of stat ing the truth that ignorance of the law is not in general an excuse." Pollock, First Book of Jurispr. 160.
Ignorance was held no defence in the case of a woman convicted of illegal voting, who set up a defence that she believed she had a legal right to vote; U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatch. 200, Fed. Cas. No. 14,459; Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 625; so in an in dictment for adultery, where defendant er roneously believed she had been legally di vorced ; State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30; so in the Conviction of a man for polygamy, who, knowing that his wife was living, mar ried again in Utah, and set up the Mormon doctrine as a defence ; Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244. It was held not a defence that the defendant believed that, by reason of the absence of the first wife, the marriage was void and that he was released from it, as that was a mistake of law; Me drano v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. 214, 22 S. W. 684, 40 Am. St. Rep. 775.
If a man marries a woman he believes to be single, it, is not adultery if she has a hus band living; State v. Audette, 81 Vt. 400, 70 Ati. 833, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 527, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1061.
Belief that a minor was an adult is no defense; Cox v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 468, 73 S. W. 950; but it was held to be a defense in the case of a minor playing billiards; Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229, 21 Am. Rep. 266.
A Jew may be indicted under a state law, for working on Sunday ; Com. v. Has, 122 Mass. 40; so where one shoots another through criminal negligence, his ignorance of the law can form no basis for acquittal; People v. Kilvington, 4 Cal. Unrep. Cas. 512, 36 Pac. 13.
An elector's ignorance of a law disquali fying a candidate at an election does not make his vote a nullity ; he must have knowledge both of the law and the fact which constitutes the disqualification ; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y, 463, 10 Am. Rep. 508; L. R. 3 Q. B. 629.
A statute takes effect even in localities so remote as to render any knowledge of its ex istence impossible; Rhodes v. Sargent, 17 Cal. App. 58, 118 Pac. 727, citing Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 179, 5 L. Ed. 425., Involuntary ignorance, is that which does not proceed from choice, and which cannot be overcome by the use of any means of knowledge known to a person and within his power: as, the ignorance of a law which has not yet been promulgated.
Voluntary ignorance exists when a party might, by taking reasonable pains, have ac quired the necessary knowledge. For exam ple, every man might acquire a knowledge of the laws which have been promulgated; Doc tor & Stud. 1, 46 ; Plowd. 343.
See, generally, 3 Smith, L. Cas. 9th Am. ed. 1712; Terry, Pr. Ang. Am. L. §§ 252-5; Broom, Leg. Max. 8th Am. ed. 253 (where there will be found a discussion of the sub ject); Eden, Inf. 7 ; Bisph. Eq. 187; Mer lin, ROpert. ; Savigny, Droit Rom. App. VIII. 387; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 166, 12 Am. L. Rev. 471; 4 So. L. J. N. S. 153 ; 10 Am. Dec. 323 ; MISTAKE.