All persons who deserted the naval or military service of the United States, and did not return thereto within sixty after the issuance of the proclamation of the president, dated March 11, 1865, are deemed to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship, and to be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under the United States, or of exercis ing any rights of citizenship thereof ; R. 8, § 1996.
As to citizenship as acquired by natural ization, see ALLEGLANCE; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN.
Citizenship, not residence, confers the right to sue in the federal courts ; Haskell. v, Bailey, 63 Fed. 873, 11 C. C. A. 476. See Reno. Non-Residents, c. vii. Corporations are citizens of the state by which they are created, irrespective of the citizenship of their members ; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 ; National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 1 Sup. Ct. 58, 27 L. Ed. 87; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James; 161 U. S. 545, 16 Sup. Ct. 621, 40 L. Ed. 802; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. 281, 43 L. Ed. 552. If two tions created by different states, are consoli dated each still retains its own citizenship for purposes of suit ; Nashua & L R. Corp. v. R. Co., 136 U. S. 356, 10 Sup. Ct. 1004, 34 L. Ed. 363; Williamson v. Krohn, 66 Fed. 655, 13 C. C. A. 668. See Reno. Non-Resi dents, § 104. See MERGER.
There is an indisputable legal presump tion that a state corporation, when sued or suing in a circuit court of the United States, is composed of citizens of the state which created it ; and this presumption accom panies it when it does business in another state, and it may sue or be sued in the fed eral courts in such other state as a citizen of the state of its original creation; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 Sup. Ct. 621, 40 L. Ed. 802 ; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 18 Sup. Ct. 526, 42 L. Ed. 964.
A corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the first clause of section 1 of the 14th Amendment; Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 1 Woods 85, Fed. Cas. No. 7,052; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384, 51 L. Ed. 520; North western Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 51 L. Ed. 168, 7 Ann. Cas. 1104; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. 737, 31 L. Ed. 650; but it is a person (q. v.). In many cases a corporation is treat ed as a citizen for purposes of jurisdiction; U. S. v. Transp. Co., 164 U. S. 686, 17 Sup. Ct. 206, 41 L. Ed. 599. In order to ac complish this result a curious legal fiction was created which is discussed infra.
It may now be considered as fairly well settled that except as to the 14th Amend ment as stated supra, corporations are recog nized as citizens by all departments of the federal government. This was done by the Supreme Court in construing an act for pay ment of "claims for property of citizens of the United States" taken or destroyed by Indians. It was held that the word "citi
zen" included corporations ; U. S. v. TrallSP• Co., 164 U. S. 686, 17 Sup. Ct. 206, 41 L. Ed. 599. The word has also been frequently used by Congress to include corporations; id., where an instance is referred to in R. S. § 2319; the right to purchase mineral de posits in public lands is given to "citizens of the United States and those who have de clared their intention to become such," and section 2321 in prescribing how citizenship shall be established, makes specific provi sion for the evidence required "in the case of a corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state or territory thereof." Again corporations are expressly recognized as citizens by the ex ecutive branch of the government in various treaties with Great Britain, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico, all referred to in the case last cited, 164 U. S. at page 689, 17 Sup. Ct. 206, 41 L. Ed. 599.
The doctrine that a corporation is a "citi zen" was not accepted in the first instance, but it was treated as an association of in dividuals whose citizenship should control the question of federal jurisdiction; Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux, 5 Cra. (U. S.) 61, 3 L. Ed. 38, where Marshall, C. J., delivered the opin ion. But this doctrine was speedily ques tioned and the Chief Justice regretted the decision and expressed his conviction that it was unsound in principle ; Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U. S.) 555, 11 L. Ed. 353. The case however was followed; Breithaupt T. Bank, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 238, 7 L. Ed. 127; and not until after his death depart ed from. It was then first held that, "when a corporation exercises its powers in the state which chartered it, that is its resi dence, and such an averment is sufficient to give the circuit courts jurisdiction." Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U. S.) 559, 11 L. Ed. 353. In that case the doctrine was decisively sustained that "a corporation created by and doing business in a particular state is to be deemed to all in tents and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabitant of the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable of being treated as a citizen of that state as much as a natural person. Like a citizen it makes contracts, and though in regard to what it may do in some particu lars, it differs from a natural person, and in this especially, the manner in which it can sue and be sued, it is substantially, with in the meaning of the law, a citizen of the state which created it and where its busi ness is done, for all the purposes of suing and being sued." A few years after, Daniels, J., in a dis senting opinion insisted that a corporation could be in no sense a citizen, and Catron, J., in one of the majority opinions in the same case, considered that the jurisdiction in cases of corporations depended upon the citizenship of the managing officers: Rundle v. Canal Co., 14 How. 101, 14 L. Ed. 335.