"A mere scintilla of evidence in favor of one party does not entitle him of right to go to the jury" (citing Schuylkill & D. Imp. & R. Co. v. Mun son, 14 Wall. [U. S.] 442, as, 20 L. Ed. 867). Nor can it "be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury simply because, in the judgment of the court, there Is a preponderance of evidence in favor of the party asking a peremptory instruction. If the facts are entirely undisputed or uncontradicted, or if, up on any issue dependent upon facts, there is no evi dence whatever in favor of one party, or, what is the same thing, if the evidence is so slight as to justify the court in regarding the proof as substan tially all one way, then the court may direct a ver dict according to its view of the law arising upon such a case. If a verdict is rendered contrary to the evidence, -the remedy of the losing party le a motion for a new trial." 78 Fed. 759, 24 C. C. A. 305.
The conclusions were thus stated: "That there must be something more than a scin tilla of evidence supporting the case of the party upon whom the burden of proof rests, to require the submission of the case to the jury ; that where there is a real conflict of evidence' on a question of fact, whatever may be the opinion of the judge who tries the case as to the value of that evidence, he must leave the consideration of it for the deci sion of the jury ; that where there are material and substantial facts which, if credited by the jury, would in law justify a verdict in favor of one par ty, it is not error for the trial judge to refuse a peremptory instruction to the jury ; that it is not a 'proper standard to settle for a peremptory in struction that the court, after weighing the evidence in the case, would, upon motion for a new trial, set aside the verdict,' and that the, court 'may, and often should, set aside a verdict, when clearly against the weight of the evidence, where it would not be justified in directing a verdict' ; that, upon reason and authority, 'there is a difference between the legal discretion of the court to set aside a ver dict as against the weight of evidence, and that ob.
ligation which the court has to withdraw a case from the jury, or direct a verdict for insufficiency of evidence' ; and that 'in the latter case it must be so insufficient in fact as to be insufficient In law.' " 78 Fed. 760, 24 C. C. A. 305 (citing Mt. Ad ams & E. P. Inclined R. Co. v. Lowery, 74 Fed. 463, 20 C. C. A. 596).
In French Law. The means used and for mality employed to prepare a case for trial. It is generally applied to criminal cases, and is then called criminal instruction; it is then defined the acts and proceedings which tend to prove positively a crime or delict, in order to inflict on the guilty person the pun ishment which he deserves.