As to excessive insurance on the same property, see DOUBLE INSURANCE.
Time Limit for Suit. It is usual in poli cies to have a time limit requiring an action to be brought within a designated period of the loss. Such condition is precedent to a recovery ; Becket v. Imp. Co., 67 Ia. 338, 25 N. W. 271; 14 L. C. Jur. 256 ; and will apply in a forum other than that of the domicil of the insurer ; Fullam v. Ins. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.) 61, 66 Am. Dec. 462. In some courts the time of the limitation is held to be com puted from the date of the event which causes the loss; Johnson v. Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92, 33 Am. Rep. 47 ; Steel v. Ins. Co., 47 Fed. 863 ; Chambers v. Ins. Co, 51 Conn. 17, 50 Am. Rep. 1; 19 Nov. Scot. Rep. 372 ; 18 Ont. 355 ; in others, from the time the loss was payable; Cooper v. Benefit Ass'n, 132 N. Y. 334, 30 N. E. 833, 16 L. R. A. 138, 28 Am. St. Rep. 581; Case v. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473, 23 Pac. 534, 8 L. R. A. 48; Matt v. Aid Ass'n, 81 Iowa, 135, 46 N. W. 857, 25 Am. St. Rep. 483 ; Spare v. Ins. Co., 17 Fed. 568.
The parties may agree to a reasonable time within which suit may be brought; six months is reasonable. It begins to run from the date of the fire, although there may be a provision making the loss payable sixty days after proofs have been received by the company ; Appel v. Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St. 52, 80 N. E. 955, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 10 Ann. Cas. 821.
Limiting Jurisdiction of Courts. Efforts have been made both by contract and by statute to limit the right of suit on a policy to a particular jurisdiction; such provisions in a policy or by law have been held illegal; Nute v. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 174; Ames bury v. Ins. Co., id. 596; Reichard v. Ins. Co., 31 Mo. 518; May, Ins. § 490. Statutes which attempt thus to limit the jurisdiction are strictly construed, and as they generally provide that, after a loss, the directors shall meet and adjust the loss, and if it is not paid in a given time, suit may be brought in a particular court, the limitation is in many states confined to the exact case men tioned, and it is only where the amount has been so determined that it takes effect; Nevins v. Ins. Co., 25 N. H. 22; Martin v.
Ins. Co., 53 Me. 419; Arnet v. Ins. Co., 22 Wis. 516; Boynton v. Ins. Co., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 212; Indiana Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Routledge, 7 Ind. 25 ; but in other cases the limitation has been enforced without refer ence to such previous ascertainment of the loss; Dutton v. Ins. Co., 17 Vt. 369. See May, Ins. § 491.
Specifying the Lorca of the Contract. So, with respect to the effort to provide in the policy that the law of a certain state should determine its construction, where life poll des have been issued in a state other than the same state of the company, it has been held that they are governed by statutory provisions in the state of the insured, al though the policies stipulated that the con tract was to be governed by the law of the same state.
A provision in a policy limiting recovery in cases of suicide is ineffectual as against a state statute declaring suicide to be no de fense to an action ; Whitfield v. Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489, 27 Sup. Ct. 578, 51 L. Ed. 897.
See Lux LOCI; FOREIGN CORPORATIONS; as to the rights and remedies of and against insurance companies in countries or states other than those of their domicil, and the effect of non-compliance with statutes regu lating the manner of doing business.
The business of life insurance is not com merce; a state statute regulating insurance contracts between its residents and foreign corporations, is not invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce ; Cravens v. Ins. Co., 148 Mo. 583, 51) S. W. 519, 53 L. R. A. 305, 71 Am. St Rep. 628, affirmed in 178'U. S. 389, 20 Sup. Ct. 962, 44 L. Ed. 1116; State v Ins. Co., 71 Neb. 320, 99 N. W. 36, 100 N. W. 405, 102 N. W. 1022, 106 N. W. 767; Fisher v. Ins. Co., 136 N. C. 217, 48 S. E. 667; N. Y. Life Ins. CO. v. Deer Lodge Coun ty, 43 Mont. 243, 115 Pac. 911, affirmed 231 U. S. 595, 34 Sup. Ct. 274, 58 L Ed. —,.fol lowing Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357.