This proof may be of external and visible acts and conduct from which the jury may infer the fact ; 8 Co. 146; or it may be by proof of an act committed, as, in case of I burglary with intent to steal, proof of bur glary and stealing is conclusive; 5 C. & P. 1510; 2 Mood. & R. 40. When a man intend ing one wrong fails, and accidentally com mits another, he will, except where the par ticular intent is a substantive part of the crime, be held to have intended the act be did commit; People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 159, 27 Am. Dec. 197; Corn. v. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 515; U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, Fed. Cas. No. 16,196; 1 C. & K. 746.
Where intent is a material ingredient of the crime it is necessary to be averred, but it may always be averred in general terms; Evans v. U. S., 153 U. S. 584, 14 Sup. Ct. 934, 38 L. Ed. 830 ; 153 U. S. 608, 14 Sup. Ct. 939, 38 L. Ed. 839.
As to when a party can prove his intent un der various circumstances, see note in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 367.
As to the distinction between intention and motive, see Pollock's First Book of Jurispr. 144, where he defines intention as the wish or desire accompanying an act and having regard not only to the act itself, but to the• consequences to be produced; and as includ ing will, but including much more than is commonly understood by will.
As to• "motive," external or internal, he points out that external motive is a particu lar inducement to a course of action, but that motive can also mean internal motive, the general moral quality or disposition of the agent which is a constant element as com pared with particular inducements, and gives weight in his deliberation to this or that in ducement. The effect of general moral qual
ity or disposition in the process of delibera tion or choice is for many purposes more important than the average or objective val ue of things reputed desirable; this he deems to be the meaning of motive according to the best modern authors.
In Contrdets. An intention to enter into the contracts is necessary: hence the person must have sufficient mind to enable him to in tend.
In Wills. The intention of the testator governs unless the thing to be done be op posed to some unbending rule of law; 6 Cruise, Dig. 295; Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 68, 8 L. Ed. 322. This intention is to be gathered from the instrument, and from ev ery part of it ; 3 Ves. 105; Brown v. Bart lett, 58 N. H. 511; Hinton v. Milburn's Ex'rs, 23 W. Va. 166; Metcalf v. First Parish in Framingham, 128 Mass. 374 ; Banks v. Jones, 60 Ala. 605; Mather v. Mather, 103 Ill. 607; and from a later clause in preference to an earlier ; Woodbury v. Woodbury, 74 Me. 413; Murfitt v. Jessop, 94 Ill. 158; Hemphill 'v. Moody, 62 Ala. 510.
See INTERPRETATION; CONSTRUCTION; STAT UTES; WILLS.