When interest will be barred. When the money due is tendered to the person entitled to it, and he refuses to receive it, the inter est ceases ; 3 Campb. 296; Loomis v. Knox, 60 Conn. 343, 22 Atl. 771; Riley v. McNamara, 83 Tex. 11, 18 S. W. 141. See Cheney v. Lib by, 134 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 498, 33 L. Ed. 818. A tender by a junior mortgagee to a senior mortgagee of the amount due on the senior mortgage, with accrued costs of fore closure, does not, •unless kept good, prevent the running of interest; NelSon v. Loder, 132 N. Y. 288, 30 N. E. 369.
Where the plaintiff was absent in Mreign parts beyond seas, evidence of that fact may be giver] in evidence to the jury on the plea of payment, in order to extinguish the inter est during such absence ; McCall v. Turner, 1 Call. (Va.) 133; Blake's Ex'rs v. Quash's Ex'rs, 3 McCord (S. C.) 340 ; Borland v. Sharp, 1 Root (Conn.) 178. But see Schaef fer's Estate, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 263.
Whenever the law prohibits the payment of the principal, interest during the prohibi tion is not demandable; Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dall, (Pa.) 102, 1 L. Ed. 307 ; Foxcraft v. Nagle, 2 Dail. (Pa.) 132, 1 L. Ed. 319 ; Crawford v. Willing, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 286, 1 L. Ed. 836. Where payment has been prevented by war, interest cannot be recovered ; Selden v. Pres ton, 11 Bush (Ky.) 191. See supra.
If the plaintiff has accepted the principal, he cannot recover the interest in a separate action;. 1 Esp. 110; Tillotson v. Preston, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 229. See Kellogg v. Rich ards, 14 Wend. 116.
For or against Government or State. In: terest is not to be awarded against a sover eign government, unless its consent has been manifested by an act of its legislature or by a lawful contract of its executive officers; U. S. v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 10 Sup. Ct. 920, 34 L. Ed. 336. The U. S. is not liable to pay interest or claims against it, in the absence of express statutory provision therefor ; U. S. v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 8 Sup. Ct. 1156, 32 L. Ed. 159; Wightman v. U. S., 23 Ct. Cl. 144; U. S. v. Verdier, 164 U. S. 213, 17 Sup. Ct. 42, 41 L. Ed. 407 ; but this does not apply to subordinate govern mental agencies (The National Home); Na tional Volunteer Home v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494, 33 Sup. Ct. 944, 57 L. Ed. 1296 ; interest must be allowed to the United States under U. S. R. S. § 966 ; id. A city is not liable for interest on its loans, after maturity, if it has provided funds to pay them ; Friend v. City of Pittsburgh, 131 Pa. 305, 18 Atl. 1060, 6 L. R. A. 636, 17 Am. St. Rep. 811.
A general interest statute cannot be ap plied as against a county, and in an action to recover taxes wrongfully exacted, inter est cannot be recovered; Jackson County Com'rs v. Kaul, 77 Kan. 715, 96 Pac. 45, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552.
For exceeding the legal rates of interest the penalty is variously fixed by the differ ent states. See USURY.
In Practice. Concern; advantage; benefit.
Such a relation to the matter in issue as creates a liability to pecuniary gain or loss from the event of the suit. Inhabitants of Northampton v. Smith, 11 Metc. (Mass.) 395, 396.
When used as a criterion of the proper parties to a suit it means interest in the object, not interest in the subject-matter ; Penn v. Bahnson, 89 Va. 253, 15 S. E. 586.
A person may be disqualified to act as a judge, juror, or witness in a cause by reason of an interest in the subject-matter in dis pute. As to the disqualifying interest of judges, see JUDGE; as to the disqualifying in terest of jurors, see CHALLENGE.
The old rule that interest disqualifies a witness has been abolished here and in England by statute. The only question now is one of credibility with the jury. A few cases may be given for historical reasons.
An interest disqualifying a witness must be legal, as contradistinguished from mere prejudice or bias arising from relationship, friendship, or any of the numerous motives by which a witness may be supposed to be influenced; 2 Hawk. Pl. Cr. 46, s. 25 ; must be present; Gilkinson v. The Scotland, 14 La. Ann. 417 ; Paxton v. Paxton, 38 W. Va. 616, 18 S. E. 765 ; must be certain, vested, and not uncertain and cobtingent; 2 P. Wms. 287; Ely v. Forward, 7 Mass. 25; Edwards v. McKinnon, 25 Ga. 337; Millett v. Parker, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 608; Dundas v. Muhlenberg's Ex'rs, 35 Pa. 351; must be an interest in the event of the cause, or the verdict must be lawful evidence for or against hiim in an other suit, or the record must be an instru ment of evidence for or against him ; Bass v. Peevey, 22 Tex. 295 ; Van Nuys v. Ter hone, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 83. But an in terest in the question does not disqualify the witness ; People v. Howell, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 302 ; Miles v. O'Hara, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 32 ; Baring v. Reeder, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 165, 168 ; or the fact that he has a case of the same kind pending; Warren v. McGill, 103 Cal. 153, 37 Pac. 144.
An attorney will under most circumstances be permitted to testify in behalf of his cli ent; but the courts do not look with favor upon the practice ; Follansbee v. Walker, 72 Pa. 229, 13 Am. Rep. See Mealer v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 102, 22 S. W. 142. Prob ably the test would lie in hip withdrawal from the case.
• The magnitude of the interest is altogeth er immaterial ; a liability for costs is suffi cient; 5 Term 174; Butler v. Warren, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 57.
Interest will not disqualify a person as a witness if he has an equal interest on both sides ; 7 Term. 480; Wright v. Nichols, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 298; Cushman v. Loker, 2 Mass. 108 ; Cameron v. Paul, 6 Pa. 322 ; Hidell v. Dwinell, 89 Ga. 532, 16 S. E. 79.