A statute Which provided that the court should state its opinion to the jury upon all questions of law arising in the trial of a criminal case and submit to their considera tion both the law and fact without any di rection how to find their verdict did not make the jury judges of the law as well as of the facts, and it was their bounden duty to accept the law as stated by the court ; State v. Gan non, 75 Conn. 206, 52 Atl. 727, the cases are examined at length and the ions in Sparf v. U. S., 156 U. S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343, supra, are referred to as covering the whole range of the contro versy. The other cases cited in the Con necticut case in support of this view are Lord Mansfield, in 3 Term 428; Story, J., in U. S. v. Battiste; 2 Sumu. 240, Fed. Cas. No. 14,545 ; Shaw, C. J., in Com. v. Porter, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 263 ; Curtis, J., in U. S. v. Mor ris, 1 Curtis 23, Fed. Cas. No. 15,815 ; Selden, J., in Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 588 ; State v. Smith, 6 R. I. 33 ; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 ; State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 25 Atl. 964, 19 L. R. A. 145, 36 Am. St. Rep. 775.
Directing the verdict. The most frequent expression of the rule is that, where there is no evidence tending to prove the facts set up by the party who sustains the burden of 'proof, the court is bound, on request, to direct the jury to return a verdict for the opposite party ; Charles v. Patch, 87 Mo. 462. On the other hand, where there is any evi dence tending to prove such facts, the court cannot so direct the verdict, but must sub mit the evidence to the jury and leave it to them to determine whether it is sufficient to that end ; Dow v. Chandler, 85 Mo. 247; Thomp. Tr. § 2245.
When the testimony is all in one direc tion, or when all the evidence for the plain tiff has been given, and it has no tendency whatever to prove the particular issue relied on to recover, and there is no question in regard to the credibility of the witnesses who have given the evidence, the court may determine the whole case as a question of law ; Eoland v. R. Co., 36 Mo. 491; Vinton v. Schwab, 32 Vt. 612.
It is only where the evidence, with all fair and legitimate inferences, and viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to justify a verdict for the plaintiff, that the court may direct a verdict for the de fendant ; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 32 N. E. 285, 18 L. R. A. 215 ; Dwyer v. R. Co., 52 Fed. 87; Leiser v. Kiecli hefer, 95 Wis. 4, 69 N. W. 979. A federal court may" direct a verdict for either party whenever, under the state of the evidence, it would be compelled to set aside one return ed the other way ; Monroe v. Ins. Co., 52 Fed. 777, 3 C. C. A. 280. Where, from the testimony' before the jury, different minds might draw different conclusions, it is error to direct a verdict; Eisenlord v. Clum, 67 Hun 518, 22 N. Y. Supp. 574; Des Jardins v. Boom Co., 95 Mich. 140, 54 N. W. 718. Where the right of recovery depends on questions of fact, there must be a submis sion to the jury ; Heere v. Bank, 160 Pa. 314,
28 Atl. 688. A direction to find for the de fendant was held proper, in an action against a railroad for interference with the plaintiff's business, where no evidence was offered showing the injury caused by such interference ; Baird v. R. R., 154 Pa. 463, 25 Atl. 834. Where it is shown by an open statement of counsel for the plaintiff that the contract on which the suit is brought is void, the court may direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant ; Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 26 L. Ed. 539. There can be no serious doubt but that the court can at any time direct the jury when the facts are .undisputed, and that the jury should follow such direction ; id.
A court may withdraw a case from a jury and direct a verdict where evidence is un disputed or is so conclusive that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discre tion would be compelled to set aside a ver dict returned iii opposition to it; Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469, 11 Sup. Ct. 569, 35 L. Ed. 213; Anderson County v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 5 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. Ed. 966 ; Randall v. R. Co., 109 U. S. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. 322, 27 L. Ed. 1003 ; though jurors are the recognized triors of the facts and cases are not lightly to be taken from them, particularly the question of negligence, and where the jury had rea sonable ground to infer it, the question should be left to them ; Marande v. R. Co., 184 U. S. 173, 22 Sup. Ct. 340, 46 L. Ed. 487.
For a clear statement of the doctrine of peremptory instructions, as laid down by Mr. Justice Harlan, see INSTRUCTIONS. See also CHARGE ; VERDICT.
Coercion of juries. Any communication of the judge to the jury after they have retired except in open court is improper ; Sargent v. Roberts, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 337, 11 Am. Dec. 185; Texas Midland R. Co. v. Byrd, 102 Tex. 263, 115 S. W. 1163, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 429, 20' Ann. Cas. 137; so if the judge en tered the jury room, it is reversible error ; State v. Murphy, 17 N. D. 48, 115 N. W. 84, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609, 16 Ann. Cas. 1133 ; Abbott v. Hockenberger, 31 Misc. 587, 65 N. Y. Supp. 566 ; Du Cate v. Brighton, 133 Wis. 628, 114 N. W. 103 ; or sends additional in structions without the consent of or notice to parties or 'counsel; Read v. City of Cam bridge, 124 Mass. 567, 26 Am. Rep. 690 ; Quinn v. State, 130 Ind. 340, 30 N. E. 300 ; Fox v. Peninsular White Lead Works, 84 Mich. 676, 48 N. W. 203 ; in some cases a new trial was refused because no prejudice resulted, but the practice was disapproved ; Galloway v. Corbitt, 52 Mich. 460, 18 N. W. 218; Moseley v. Washburn, 165 Mass. 417, 43 N. E. 182; State v. Olds, 106 Ia. 110, 76 N. W. 644., Some cases hold that no consent will be implied but must be affirmatively shown ; Taylor v. Betsford, 13 Johns. (N. X.) 487; Jones v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 257; in other cases consent has been presumed ; Henlow v. Leonard, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 200. See a note on the subject generally, State v. Murphy, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 609.