At common law jurors were selected, usu ally, by the sheriff or coroner. It is done in this country in various ways; by judges of election; by town authorities or by various officials or special boards or commissions. Statutory provisions as to the time and mode of selecting jurors are said to be usu ally directory only and need not be strictly complied with; Thomp. & Merr. Juries 44; but this is not the case with all such require ments.
In the federal courts the panel of jurors is selected by the clerk of the court and a commissioner appointed by the court, who must be taken from the opposite political party to that to which the clerk belongs; the clerk and the commissioner place names in the jury box alternately without regard to party affiliations. Any judge may order the names to be drawn from the boxes used by the state authorities in selecting jurors in the highest court of the state; no person may serve as a petit juror more than once in a year.
A juror is not disqualified by having form ed or expressed an opinion from newspaper accounts where he testified that he could try the case solely on the evidence and would be governed by, it; Dimmick v. U. S., 121 Fed. 638, 57 C. C. A. 664; nor is one incom petent merely because he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or inno cence of a person jointly indicted with the defendant; Griggs v. U. S., 158 Fed. 572, 85 C. C. A. Weston v. Com., 111 Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191; State v. Bill, 15 La. Ann. 114.
Erroneously overruling challenge for cause is harmless error where peremptory chal lenges are not exhausted ; Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 South. 851; or where the jury did not serve and the jury was not complete without exhausting peremptory challenges; State v. Nicholls, 50 La. Ann. 699, 23 South. 980. See CHALLENGE.
Summoning improper jurors, whether bias ed or otherwise, is a contempt of court on the part of the officer who does it ; Richards v. U. S., 126 Fed. 105, 61 C. C. A. 161; and a challenge to the array will lie in such case; id.; Harjo v. U. S., 1 Okl. Cr. R. 590, 98 Pac. 1021, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1013.
Exemption. Usually public officials are exempt ; and persons engaged in various classes of occupations are often exempt; thus in New York, clergymen, physicians, lawyers, professors, and teachers, persons engaged in certain kinds of manufacturing, canal officials, those employed •on steam vessels. employs of railroad and telegraph companies, members of the militia and fire department, etc. Exemption is only during
actual employment ; State v. Willard, 79 N. C. 660; and the right of exemption is a per sonal privilege and usually not a ground of challenge; Moore v. Cass, 10 Kan. 288 ; Da vison Y. People, 90 Ill. 221; or a disqualifi cation; Breeding v. State, 11 Tex. 257; State v. Forshner, 43 N. H. 89, 80 Am. Dec. 132.
The members of an association formed to aid in the prosecution of a particular class of offences, and those who are in sympathy with the association, and contribute money for the purposes of its organization, are not competent to sit as jurors on the trial of an indictment for an offence of the class for the prosecution of which the association is formed and the money contributed; State v. Moore, 48 La. Ann. 380, 19 South. 285. In a suit against a beneficial association, mem bership in the order does not disqualify a juror, but only membership of the lodge sued; Delaware Lodge No. 1, I. 0. 0. F., v. Allmon, 1 Pennewill (Del.) 160, 39 Atl. 1098.
Persons related within the prohibited de gree to members of a mutual fire insurance company' are incompetent to serve as jurors in an action against it ; Moore v. Ins. Ass'n, 107 Ga. 199, 33 South. 65.
A juror was disqualified at common law by openly declaring his opinion that the party was guilty; 2 Hawk. Pl. C. ch. 43, § 27. Yet if such declaration was made from his knowledge of the case and not out of any ill-will to the party, it is no cause of chal lenge ; 2 id. § 28.
Where a statute disqualifies persons re lated within certain degrees of affinity from serving as jurors on the trial of a cause to which their affinities are parties, husbands whose wives are second cousins are not af Tegarden v. Phillips, 14 Ind. 27, 42 N. E. 549.
In Tennessee it has been held that a stat ute disqualifying from service, either on grand or petit juries, persons engaged in a conspiracy against law and order is not un constitutional; Jenkins v. State, 99 Tenn. 569, 42 S. W. 263. In this case the statute in question was for the suppression of what are known as White Caps, and disqualified for jury all persons who had been guilty orany offence under the statute. So also a similar disqualification of all persons violat ing the act for the suppression of polygamy was held valid ; Clawson v. U. S., 114 U. S. 477, 5 Sup. Ct. 949, 29 L. Ed. 179.