JUS AD REM (Lat.). In Civil Law. A right to a thing. It is generally treated as a right to property not in possession, as dis tinguished from jus in re, which implies the absolute dominion. In English law, this distinction is illustrated by Blackstone, by reference to ecclesiastical promotions, where, although the freehold passes to the person promoted, corporal possession is required to vest the property completely in the new pro prietor, who acquires jus ad rem, an in choate, or imperfect, right of nomination and institution, but not the jus in re, or com plete and full right, unless by corporal pos session; 2 Bla. Com. 312. The distinction expressed by these terms in the Roman law is analogous to the common-law distinction between the effect of a right of entry and that of actual entry, which in English real property law is expressed in the maxim non jus, sect seising, Melt stipitem; id. Jun ad rem is said to be merely an abridged expres sion for jus ad rem aeguirendarn, and it properly denotes the right to the acquisition of a thing. Austin, Jur. Lect. 14.
"On this distinction between claims to things advanced against all men, and those advanced primarily against particular men, is based the division of rights into real and personal expressed by writers of the middle ages, on the analogy of terms found in the writings of the Roman jurists, by the phras es Jura in re and jury ad rem. A real right, a jus in re, or, to use the equivalent phrase preferred by some later commentators, jun in rem, is a right to have a thing to the ex clusion of all other men. A personal right, jus ad rem, or, to use a much more correct expression, jun in personam, is a right in which there is a person who is the subject of right, as well as a thing as its object, a right which gives its possessor a power to oblige another person to give, or procure, or do, or do not do, something." Sand. Inst Just. Introd. xlviii.
A right which belongs to a person only mediately and relatively, and has for its foundation an obligation incurred by a par ticular person.
The jus in re, by the effect of its very nature, is independent and absolute, and is exercised per se ipsum, by applying it to its object; but the jus ad rem is the faculty of demanding and obtaining the performance of some obligation by which another is bound to me ad a liquid dandum vet faciendum, vet prcestandum. Thus, if I had the ownership of a
horse, the usufruct of a flock of sheep, the right of habitation of a house, a right of way over your land, etc., my right' in the horse, in the flock of sheep, in the house, or the land, belongs to me directly, and without any intermediary; it belongs to me absolutely and independently of any partic ular relation with another person, I am in direct and immediate relation with the thing itself which forms the object of my right without reference to any other relation. This constitutes a jus in re. If, on the other band, the horse is lent to me by you, or if I have a claim against you for a thousand dollars, my right to the horse or to the sum of money exists only relatively, and can only be ex ercised through you; my relation to the object of the right is mediate,,and is the result of the im mediate relation of debtor and creditor existing be tween you and me. This is a jun ad rem. Every jus in re, or real right, may be vindicated by the actio in rem against him who is in possession of the thing, or against any one who contests the right. It has been said that the words, jus in re of the civil. law convey the same idea as thing in pos session at common iaw. This is an error, arising from a confusion of ideas as to the distinctive char acters of the two classes of rights. Nearly all the common-law writers seem to take it for granted that by the jus in to is understood the title or prop erty in a thing in the possession of the,owner ; and that by the jus ad rem is meant the title or prop erty in a thing not in the poeseesion of the owner. But it is obvious that possession is not one of the elements constituting the jus in re; although pos session is generally, but not always, one of the in cidents of this right, yet the lose of possession does not exercise the slightest influenpe on the char acter of the right itself, unless it shou4d continue for, a sufficient length of time to destroy the right altogether by prescription. In many instances the jus in re is not accompanied by possession at all ; the usuary is not entitled to the possession of the thing subject to his use; still, he has a /us in re. So with regard to the right of way, etc. See