KNOWLEDGE.- Information as to a fact.
The act of knowing ; clear perception of the truth ; firm belief ; information. Knowl edge "is not confined to what we have per sonally observed or to what we have evolved by our own cognitive faculties." State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135, 17 S. W. 290. Where in a charge in a homicide case the court used the expression "knowledge to ex plain," circumstances proven "tending to show that the defendant was connected with the homicide," it was held to be synonymous with "ability to explain" ; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 South. 106.
"Knowledge is information and informa tion knowledge." 1 Heming 1; 5 Esp. 53.
"Absolute knowledge can be had of but few things." Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen (Mass.) 35.
"In a legal sense it may be classified as positive and imputed—imputed, when the means of knowledge exist, known and ac cessible to the party, and capable of commu nicating positive information. When there is knowledge, notice, as legally and techni cally understood, becomes immaterial. It is only material when, in the absence of knowl edge, it produces the same results. However closely actual notice may, in many instances, approXimate knowledge and constructive no tice may be its equivalent in effect, there may be actual notice without knowledge ; and when constructive notice is made the test to determine priorities of right, it may fall far short of knowledge and be suffi cient." Cleveland Woolen Mills v. Sibert, 81 Ala. 140, 1 South. 773.
Many acts are perfectly innocent when the party performing them is not aware of certain circumstances attending them ; for example, a man may pass a counterfeit note, and be guiltless, if he did not know it was so ; he may receive stolen goods, if he were not aware of the fact that they were stolen. In these and the like cases it is the guilty knowledge which makes the crime.
Such guilty knowledge is made by the stat ute a constituent part of the offence ; and therefore it must be averred and proved as such. But it is in general true, and may be
considered as a rule almost necessary to the restraint and punishment of crimes, that when a man does that which by the common law or by statute is unlawful, and in pursu ing his criminal purpose does that which constitutes another and different offence, he shall be held responsible for all the legal consequences of such criminal act. When a man, without justifiable cause, intends to wound or maim another, and in doing it kills him, it is murder, though he had no inten tion life. It is true that in the com mission of all crimes a guilty purpose, a criminal will and motive, are implied. But, in general, such bad motive or criminal will and purpose, that disposition of mind and heart which is designated by the generic and significant term "malice," is implied from the criminal act itself. But if a man does an act, which would be otherwise criminal, through mistake or accident, or by force or the compulsion of others, in which his own will and mind do not instigate him to the act or concur in it, it is matter of defence, to be averred and proved on his part, if it does not arise out of the circumstances of the case adduced on the part of the prose cution. Per Shaw, C. J., in Corn. v. Elwell, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 192, 35 Am. Dec. 398. Thus, it is not necessary, in an indictment against an unmarried man for adultery with a mar ried woman, to aver that he knew', at the time when the offence was committed, that she was a married woman; nor is it neces sary to prove such knowledge at the trial; Corn. v. Elwell, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 190, 35 Am. Dec. 398.
See, as to the proof of guilty knowledge, 1 B. & H. Lead. Cr. Cai. 185-191. See IN TENT ; IGNORANCE. As to the doctrine of im puted knowledge, see NOTICE.